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С. Козак: Михайло Максимович і формування романтичної думки в Україні

В. Krawchenko: Changes in the National and Social Composition of the CPU

D. R. Marples: Khrushchev, Kaganovich, and the Ukrainian Crisis

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Степан Козак

МИХАЙЛО МАКСИМОВИЧ І ФОРМУВАННЯ РОМАНТИЧНОЇ ДУМКИ В УКРАЇНІ

(До 150-річчя Київського університету
та „Українських народних пісень” Максимовича)*

1

У цьому році минає 150 років від утворення Київського університету (1834), першим ректором якого був Михайло Максимович (1804-73), та 150-річчя виходу друком другої збірки Максимовича *Українські народні пісні* (1834).

Говорячи про Михайла Максимовича, треба перш за все відзначити, що в розвитку гуманітарних наук в Україні він відіграв першорядну роль. Гідна подиву не лише його дослідницька ерудиція, сумлінність і працездатність, а й різнобічність його наукових зацікавлень: фолкльористика, літературознавство, історія, етнографія, археологія, археографія. Максимович був, по суті, засновником в Україні більшості названих дисциплін. Водночас треба пам'ятати, що на українському ґрунті М. Максимович був одним з перших теоретиків і практиків науково-романтичної ідеології. Ще в 1827 р. він видав у Москві збірник *Малоросійські пісні*, завдяки якому відразу здобув собі літературне ім'я, як в Україні і в Росії, так і в зарубіжних слов'янських країнах, зокрема в Польщі. Виста-

* У статті автор користувався 3-томним виданням праць українського вченого: Михайл Максимович, „Собрание сочинений”, тт. 1, 3 (Київ, 1876-80), а також його збірниками українських пісень з 1827 і 1834 р. Цитовані дослідження Максимовича а також уривки його листування, частково опублікованого в журналі „Кіевская Старина” (1904, № 9), автор статті подає у власному перекладі на українську мову. [Стаття відредагована редакцією за харківським правописом.]

чить нагадати, що *Малоросійськими піснями* Максимовича користувався О. Пушкін при написанні *Полтави*; чимало мотивів почерпнув звідси М. Гоголь для своїх *Вегорів на хуторі біля Диканьки*, *Сорогінського ярмарку* і *Тараса Бульби*; ними користувалися польські поети „української школи” на чолі з Б. Залеським і Ю. Словацьким; врешті про них прихильно відзивалися такі славісти і письменники, як В. Ягич, П. Шафарік, А. Міцкевіч, не кажучи вже про перших рецензентів цієї збірки, а саме О. Соболевського, О. Сомова, С. Шевирьова та ін.

Проте, найбільше враження справила збірка Максимовича на представників молодого української інтелігенції, для яких *Малоросійські пісні* були прикладом і стимулом до праці на ниві рідної культури. Наприклад, М. Костомаров у своїй *Автобіографії* згадував, що *Малоросійські пісні* так його захопили та збудили уяву, що через якийсь місяць він знав напам'ять увесь збірник Максимовича. Під великим впливом збірки І. Срезневський почав видавати славнозвісну *Запорозьку старину*; появилася чимало українських літературних альманахів, в тому числі й *Русалка Дністрова*. Ім'я Максимовича стало для тодішньої української інтелігенції, зокрема молоді, чулою на нові літературно-культурні повіви, свого роду прапором, під яким вони почали групуватися й починали власну працю.

Що ж „збуджувало уяву”, інтригувало і спонукувало до праці молодих українських інтелігентів від Москви і Харкова до Львова, Відня і Будапешту? Звичайно, перш за все неспокійний дух нової доби, „бродячий по Європі привид романтизму”, що саме вловив Максимович і що знайшло свій вияв у виданій ним збірці *Малоросійських пісень*, зокрема у його передмові:

Настав, здається той час, коли пізнають справжню ціну народности; починає вже здійснюватися бажання — хай твориться поезія справжня руська. Крайні наші поети вже в основу та зразок своїх творів кладуть твори не інших племен, лише беруть, як засіб до найповнішого розвитку, самобутньої поезії, що зродилася на рідному ґрунті, лише була довго заглушувана чужоземними пересаджуваннями, через які тільки зрідка подекуди пробивалися.

З цього погляду на велику увагу заслуговують пам'ятки, в яких повніше виявилася б народність; це є пісні, де звучить душа, збуджується почуттям, і казки, де віддзеркалюється народна фантазія. В них часто бачимо мітологію, повір'я, звичаї й нерідко достеменні події, що в інших пам'ятках не доховалися... Особливо вдосконалюється

мова через досліди залишків минувшини, де вона ближча до свого кореня, а водночас чистіша будовою і дужча силою...

З такими думками я звернув увагу на ці речі в Україні і на перший раз видаю добірку пісень цього краю, сподіваючись, що вони будуть цікаві і в багатьох відношеннях корисні для нашого письменства—маючи цілковиту певність, що вони посідають безсумнівну вартість і між піснями слов'янських племен займають одне з перших місць.

Процитовані рядки є велемовним свідченням, що передмова не мала виключно характеру фолкльористичного коментаря до зібраних пісень, а й була першим романтичним літературним маніфестом та своєрідною декларациєю романтичної ідеології в Україні. Тут помітні характерні атрибути романтичного мислення: апологія народности — історичного минулого народу, його творчости, мови, отже, тих основних моментів, які підкреслюють національну самобутність народу і в яких романтики вбачали джерело його духовного пробудження і культурного відродження, а відтак національно-автономічного утвердження. У тодішній ситуації українців нагадування, а тим паче спроба відстоювання мови, історії, традиції й культури народу — це була водночас боротьба за національну самобутність і рівноправність українського народу серед державних народів.

Максимовичеві мусила глибоко запам'ятатися візія майбутньої України, якою її хотів бачити його духовний вчитель Й. Гердер: „Україна стане колись новою Елладаю. Прекрасне підсоння цієї країни, погідна вдача народу, його музичний хист, плодюча земля — колись обудиться. Із малих племен, якими колись були греки, повстане велика культурна нація”. Під впливом цього теоретика романтичної історіософії та з інспірації фолкльористичних праць З. Доленги-Ходаковського, К. Бродзінського і М. Цертелева, Максимович шукав у минулому України, в її героїчній історії та багатій культурній традиції, що її зберегла усна словесність і літературні пам'ятки, джерел регенерації народу, його національної свідомости.

Кілька років після виходу *Малоросійських пісень*, Максимович, говорячи про тогочасну освіту й науку в Росії, відзначив: „Ми любимо наше минуле, бо воно було і дало нам буття наше; ми любимо прикрашене надіями і спогадами наше сучасне, бо в ньому зберігається наша майбутність; ми любимо наше майбутнє, бо воно повинне покращати і підняти наше сучасне”. Це речення пояснює джерела творчого неспокою Максимовича, його зацікавлення вивченням всіх культурних

виготовів народу. Оце безнастанне прагнення вивести поміж людей ідею української народності в усіх її духовних виявах справило, що автор звертався не лише до фолкльору й етнографії, але й до історії та археології, мовознавства й літератури, завдяки чому він став — за влучним висловом М. Драгоманова — „цілим ученим історико-філологічним закладом”.

Це тим вагомніше, що таких закладів українських тоді не було, а такі люди як Максимович, а вслід за ним О. Бодянский, М. Костомаров, П. Куліш та ціла когорта талантів з Т. Шевченком на чолі мусили цілим своїм подвижницьким життям, копіткою працею відстоювати свою національну автентичність перед великою армією академічних професорів, які відмовляли їм права на існування. У такому контексті практична діяльність Максимовича в здійсненні основних постулатів романтизму набирає особливої ваги. Натомість його теоретичні положення свідчать про неабияку проникливість і ерудицію:

Чужі думки і міркування лише тоді корисні, коли вони служать для розвитку власних наших. І ми тепер вже починаємо усвідомлювати необхідність власного і переконуватися, що самі вже в силах народжувати свої живі думки і міркування, які і будуть для нас суттєві і звучно прикладніші думок чужого народу. Тому, якщо нам і тепер не менш попереднього потрібна Європа (бо життя завжди вимагає зв'язку із зовнішнім світом), то вже не для керівництва, не для наслідування форм її, але тільки своїми досвідом і знаннями, для власних наших міркувань і висновків; не для того, щоб слідувати їй в наших діях, але щоб слідувати розумом її освіту.

Цей патріотично-науковий імператив, сформульований Максимовичем на початку 1830-их років ще в Москві, починаючи з 1834 р. він почав реалізувати вже як професор Київського університету. Поруч з виданнями наступних збірок українських пісень, історичними, мовознавчими та археографічними дослідженнями, він зайнявся ґрунтовно *Словом о полку Ігоревім*, продовжуючи і творчо розвиваючи концепцію української народності й національності, започатковану передмовою до *Малоросійських пісень* 1827 р.

Це особливо помітно в його подальших дослідженнях. Але заки буде про них мова, годиться нагадати, що в зв'язку з утворенням Київського університету (1834) Максимовича покликане на його першого ректора. З переїздом ученого до Києва набрала дедалі більшого розмаху його фолклористично-видавнича та дослідницька діяльність. Саме 1834 року, коли Максимович став ректором і професором Київського уні-

верситету, вийшов у Москві другий його збірник *Українські народні пісні*, з нотним додатком мелодій 25-и пісень, гармонізованих відомим на той час російським композитором О. Аляб'євим.

Як і в попередньому збірнику, звертає на себе увагу авторська передмова, в якій Максимович писав про українські пісні як про свідків історії народу, порівнюючи їх з надгробними пам'ятками героїчної минувшини. Декотрі народи, — зауважив дослідник — в честь важливих подій видають пропам'ятні медалі, з яких історики розгадують минуле. Натомість події життя українського народу відбилися в героїчних піснях і тому „вони можуть скласти найвірніший і найпереконливіший літопис для нового побутописця Малоросії”.

Вагу даного збірника, до якого ввійшли найбільш прикметні історичні пісні часів „козацької слави”, а також суть та значення авторської програмно-романтичної передмови найкраще вловив Микола Гоголь. У статті „Про малоросійські пісні”, написаній з приводу цього збірника, автор *Тараса Бульби*, неначе перегукуючись з основними думками Максимовичевої передмови, писав:

Це народна історія, жива, яскрава, сповнена барв, правди, історія, яка розкриває все життя народу. Якщо його життя було діяльне, різноманітне, свавільне, сповнене всього поетичного, і він, при всій всебічності його, не здобув вищої цивілізації, то весь запал, все сильне молодецьке буття його виливається в народних піснях. Вони — надгробний пам'ятник минулого, більш ніж надгробний пам'ятник: камінь з красномовним рельєфом, з історичним написом — ніщо проти цього живого літопису, який говорить, співає про минуле. В цьому відношенні пісні для Малоросії — все: і поезія, і історія, і батьківська могила. Хто не зрозумів їх глибоко, той нічого не знатиме про колишній побут цієї квітучої частини Росії. Історик не повинен в них шукати даних про день і число битви або докладного пояснення місця, достоїнств реліквій; в цьому відношенні небагато пісень допоможуть йому. Але коли він захоче пізнати справжній побут, стихію, характер, всі нюанси і відтінки почуттів, хвилювань, страждань, радощів описуваного народу, коли захоче збагнути дух минулого віку, загальний характер всього цілого і окремо кожного часткового, тоді він буде задоволений повністю; історія народу розкривається перед ним в ясній величчі.

Пісні малоросійські можуть цілком назватися історичними, тому що вони не відриваються ні на мить від життя і завжди відповідають тодішньому моментові і тодішньому станові почуттів. Всюди проймає їх, скрізь дихає в них оця широка воля козацького життя.

З наведеного уривку видно добре, що Гоголеве романтичне захоплення українськими піснями йде в парі з їх історично-мітологічним трактуванням. Можна здогадуватися, що таке розуміння українського героїчного епосу „підказали” Гоголеві, між іншим, авторські передмови до обох збірників та й сам Максимович, з яким Гоголь мав дружні відносини. Ще напередодні видання *Українських народних пісень* Гоголь в листі до Максимовича писав: „Як би я бажав бути тепер з Вами і переглянути їх [пісні] разом, перед мерехтливою свічкою поміж стінами, заставленими книжками і припорошеними порохом . . . Моя радість, життя моє! Як я вас люблю! Всі літописи, в яких я тепер копаюся, неначе мертві в порівнянні з оцими дзвінкими й живими літописами! . . . Ви собі уявити не можете, як пісні допомагають мені в історії”.

Після виходу *Українських народних пісень* авторитет Максимовича як збирача, дослідника і коментатора остаточно уgruntувався, а він сам набув великої популярності, в першу чергу в слов'янських країнах. Про це свідчить, між іншим, цитована вище стаття Гоголя, а також обширна рецензія-стаття провідного теоретика і практика польського романтизму Михайла Грабовського. Як і Гоголь, автор *Літератури й критики*, де була вміщена згадана рецензія на *Українські народні пісні*, спираючись, між іншим, на передмову Максимовича, трактує український героїчний епос як найдосконаліший витвір духа народу, що виблискує поетичністю і разом з тим віддзеркалює суспільну і політичну його історію. Ось кінцеві абзаци першої частини цієї статті-рецензії, яку для влучності та передачі всіх її нюансів подаю в оригіналі:

W miejscach, gdzie zgasto życie dawniej Kozaczyzny, żyje dotąd świeża i żywa jego pamięć w tych naśladowanych śpiewach. Śpiewy te, tak ważne dla historii tego kraju, są niemniej zajmujące, jako jedna z najzdrowszych latorośli wielkiego szczepu poezji gminnych. Od niejakiego czasu poznano się nareszcie na ich wartości i zaczęto je zbierać . . .

Dopiero z wyjściem tego szacownego zbioru [Maksymowicza] można mówić, iż znamy poezję ukraińską. Dotąd rozprawiano o niej więcej ze słyszenia, niżeli według gruntownej znajomości. Wszyscy wiedzieli, że na Ukrainie są dawne dумы, dawne historyczne śpiewy o Niczaju, Doroszenku; że na prawym brzegu Dniepru są lirnicy, na lewym bandurzyści, lecz wiadomości te były głuche i raczej domyślaliśmy się niżeli znali dokładnie, co za skarby posiadamy, albo raczej co za skarby codzień tracimy, ze śmiercią starców, ze zmianą obyczajów wieśniaczego ludu, z utratą przez niego pamięci swojego upłynionego bytu. Można się było obawiać, ażeby z przejściem lat, ta zamożna poezja nie zamieniła się u tegoż samego ludu w takąż błahą pamiątkę, jaką była dotąd nasza o niej wiadomość . . .

Dlatego wyznać trzeba, że dopiero dzieło P. Maksymowicza nadaje formę i ciało temu, cośmy pierwiej we mgle i niejasnym zmierzchu widzieli. Przyłqczywszy ten zbiór poezji ukraińskiej do zbioru galicyjskiego, do pieśni czeskich i serbskich, do rękopisów królowodworskich, do pieśni Igora, można powiedzieć, że jest już z czego uczyć się ducha przyrodniej Słowiańszczyzny. Jeżeli nie wszystko jest zrobione, przynajmniej zrobiono już wiele.

Така висока оцінка народного епосу українців і, зокрема, збірника Максимовича,— явище відрадне і симптоматичне. Це тим важливіше, що ці апологетичні рядки належать чільному представникові т. зв. української школи в польській літературі. Зрештою, з процитованого видно, що в компетентності критика не слід сумніватися (про деякі його помилкові твердження не говорю, бо не про це йдеться). Як критикові й теоретикові романтизму, Грабовському були близькі також романтичні постулати Максимовича. Тому говорячи про козацький епос, автор статті „О рієсніах українських” один з перших у польській критиці намагався саме зрушити панахидну атмосферу „піснопіння” деяких представників української школи, вказуючи одночасно, що в більшості українських героїчних пісень та дум пробивається історична правда і відлунює волелюбний дух козащини.

Звертає також на себе увагу й закінчення цитованої статті Грабовського, де він порівнює збірник Максимовича з аналогічними збірниками чеськими і сербськими та *Словом о полку Ігоревім*, підкреслюючи, що лише в них можна вловити „справжній дух Слов'янщини”. З цього видно, що Грабовський слідував за працями Максимовича з його найновішими розвідками, наприклад, про *Слово о полку Ігоревім*, в яких український учений виявив себе як теоретик і практик т. зв. культурно-мітологічних досліджень. Деякі міркування Максимовича не втратили актуальності й по наш день. Так, наприклад, вказуючи на певну спорідненість поетичної спадщини минулого різних народів, Максимович писав:

У всіх племен індоєвропейського коліна лежить в основі один загальний запас вірувань і слів, який згодом у кожного племені, розвинувшись по-своєму та своєрідно у кожного, впорядкувався. Нашій руській мітології і руській філології найближча наша рідна слов'янщина, південна і західна, особливо те, як там вірували і говорили; без цього порівняльного вивчення не можуть вони й бути ґрунтовними науками; а для більшої повноти і міцності своєї не можна ж їм не зрівнятися з віруваннями і мовами інших індоєвропейських племен і не перевіряти себе ними.

Вказуючи на вагоміші аспекти теоретичних формулювань Максимовича, можна бодай приблизно уявити собі, яким ерудитом був цей учений і яку ролю відіграли його критично-наукові концепції в розвитку української романтичної ідеології, як у ділянці критики й літературознавства, так і в поезії та в художній творчості взагалі. Треба водночас пам'ятати, що обговорені дотепер етнографічно-філологічні праці Максимовича становили щойно початковий етап в його науковій діяльності і були неначе підготовкою до широко задуманих досліджень, присвячених українській мові, історії, археології й культурі взагалі, починаючи від шедевру староруської доби — *Слова о полку Ігоревім* — і на сучасному авторові стані українського письменства в Галичині скінчивши.

З певністю можна ствердити, що звернення Максимовича до *Слова о полку Ігоревім* мало для розвитку української науково-романтичної ідеології не менше значення, ніж видання збірників українських пісень 1827 і 1834 рр. Це, по суті, наступний етап в розвитку й утвердженні романтичної ідеології в Україні, започаткований передмовою до збірника з 1827 р. Оскільки дана передмова є, перш за все, першим українським романтичним літературним маніфестом, а друковані в збірнику пісні та думи — поетичною ілюстрацією теоретичних положень її автора, остільки розвідка про *Слово о полку Ігоревім* є теоретичним і практичним утвердженням на українському ґрунті основ науково-романтичної критики й ідеології в цілому, які в передмові щойно закріплювалися. Проте, сама з зацікавлення піснями і героїчним епосом виростає Максимовичів інтерес до романтичної ідеї народности, до з'ясування її значення в українській історії, в минулому, нарешті до відшукання найвіддаленіших її джерел, в яких уявлення про народність було б найяскравіше.

Згідно з таким романтичним імперативом Максимович звертається до культури Київської Русі, до українського середньовіччя, яке взагалі становило цілісний, а відтак приналежний для романтиків фрагмент культури, що давав величезні можливості історично-порівняльних досліджень найосновніших виявів народного духа, включно з його героїчним минулим і мітами. „Якщо порівняти староруську словесність — відзначав Максимович — з сучасним її станом словесности у західних народів, то, звичайно, ні один з них не досягне переваги над ними; принаймні нам невідомо нічого в XI і XII ст. західноєвропейськими мовами, що перевершувало б *Літописання* Нестора, *Слово* Кирила Туровського і *Пісню о полку Ігоря*”.

Процитований уривок є велемовним свідченням плідно застосованого Максимовичем романтичного принципу історичного дослідження: чим далі заглиблюватися в історично-культурне минуле народу, тим самобутніші і видніші краще істотні його прикмети й національна фізіономія; або: чим якесь явище суспільного життя давніше, тим воно більш національно самобутнє і вражає своєю споконвічністю. Саме цим, як відомо, живиться народ; воно збуджує його історіотворчу енергію. Не випадково, отже, в ідеології романтиків проблеми ці належали до провідних, більше — становили її ядро.

Тому-то різкий і категоричний протест викликала в Максимовича норманська теорія походження Руси, яку перейняли від німецького історика Августа Шлецера окремі російські дослідники, в тому числі лідер панславистів Михайло Погодін. Спростовуючи погляди останнього, Максимович писав:

Ви називаєте Шлецера батьком нашої історичної критики, але це був для неї лихий вітчим, від якого народився і наш історичний скептицизм. Як самовільно і неохайно він поведився з Несторовим літописом? Все, що знаходив він у Нестора незгідним зі своїми власними поглядами про Русь, називав нісенітними вставками, дурними переробками і навмисними підробками пізніших переписувачів та продовжувачів; а що знаходив у них тотожне зі своїми поглядами — те залучав у даний текст Нестора; та й самого нашого літописця він обвинувачував у вигадках і дуже нечисто дивився на його вірування. Який же це взірєць критики? І що ж означають ентузіастичні гіперболічні похвали Несторові від Шлецера? Під виглядом Нестора він вихваляв лише себе! А в своєму шведському вченні про Русь — він був найзавзятіший і однобічний систематик.

Відстоюючи автентичність Київської Руси, Максимович з не меншою увагою відносився до пам'яток староруської культури, з якими окремі історики поводитися щонайменше дивно, віддаючи їх або на поталу прихильникам „німецької вченості, яку посадили на почесний стіл”, або інтерпретуючи їх згідно зі своїми панславистичними спекуляціями чи теорією „офіційної народности”.

Треба пам'ятати, що ці дискусії торкалися не лише історії й літератури, але й мови, перш за все української, якій відмовлялося права бути літературною мовою народу, називаючи її діалектом або „дивною мішаниною російської і польської”. Відповідаючи на закиди полемістів Максимович відзначив:

Народна південноросійська мова втілена найбільшою єдністю утворення і складу в своїх місцевих відмінностях, так, що в ній можна розрізнити, та й то не дуже різко, два наріччя: східне — українське або малоросійське, і західне — галицьке або червононоруське. Ця прикмета єдності південноросійської мови є запорукою її давнього утворення, яке сталося, без сумніву, не пізніше древнього періоду, а не в середні часи, як гадали деякі, марно виводячи південноросійську мову від змішання російської і польської.

У своїх численних працях Максимович розвинув свою гіпотезу і переконливо довів, що на „малоросійське наріччя треба дивитися як на окрему мову, яка відрізняється від великоросійської, а тим більше від польської”. Натомість тим, які й надалі її зневажали і задля власної вигоди або матеріальної користі чи службової кар’єри закликали покинути цю мову, Максимович у з’їдливому пасквілі писав:

Бери, бери скоріш назад
Твое ледаче слово,
Коли поваживсь нам сказать:
Забудьте рідну мову!

І нащо здумав себе звать
Ти нашим другом, братом?
Готов еси за гроші стать
Ти нашим сѹпостатом.

Пізнай, ораторе, себе!
Твоя брехня велика:
Од неї й правда у тебе
Становиться каліка.

Читаючи ці рядки не можна не признати Максимовичу літературного хисту і громадянського підходу до цієї справи. Проте, як учений він своєю ерудицією, всебічністю зацікавлень і копіткою працьовитістю будить і нині подив історика літератури.

2

Характеризуючи Михайла Максимовича як теоретика і практика української романтичної ідеології, я вказував і на те, що автор збірників українських народних пісень мав також дуже розвинуте критичне чуття, завдяки чому він неабияк відзначився в українській науці критикою джерел і висвітленням окремих моментів українського письменства, історії й культури взагалі.

Шукаючи українського історико-культурного родоводу, Максимович звернувся найперше — як уже згадувалось — до княжої доби, а першою літературною пам'яткою, опрацюванням якої він зайнявся, було *Слово о полку Ігоревім*.

Слід відзначити, що вже до Максимовича навколо цього твору накопичилося чимало непорозумінь, перш за все, відносно його оригінальності й давності. І це за такий короткий час від моменту надрукування першої вістки про його віднайдення, тобто від 1797 до 1835 року, коли Максимович почав інтенсивно ним займатися. Звичайно, український учений був добре обізнаний з дотеперішньою історією праць над *Словом*, про що свідчать його коментарі до поставлених уже дослідниками питань і полеміка з ними.

Першу вістку про *Слово* надрукував, як це було згадано, 1797 р. в Гамбурзькій газеті *Spectateur du nord* граф О. Мусін-Пушкін, який знайшов цей твір. Зрозуміло, що граф, будучи ще тоді обер-прокурором т. зв. Святішого синоду, хотів таким чином привернути до *Слова* увагу вчених, зокрема західніх країн. Сталося те, чого, мабуть, автор не передбачав, а саме А. Шлецер, до якого Максимович ставився з нехиттю, а якого вважали найбільшим авторитетом у питаннях давньої Русі, віднісся до *Слова* з сумнівом. Це, здається, примусило навіть Мусіна-Пушкіна відректися від обов'язків обер-прокурора Святішого синоду і переїхати до Москви. Тут він разом з Малиновським, директором архіву Міністерства закордонних справ Росії, видав 1800 р. *Слово о полку Ігоревім* під заголовком *Историческая песнь*.

Ця публікація викликала зразу ряд сумнівів і полеміку щодо походження *Слова* та його правдивості й авторства. Адже, пам'ятаймо, що надруковано цей твір на підставі досить знищеного рукописного списку. Не дивно, що полеміка навколо *Слова* загострилась — як згадує Максимович — після 1812 р., тобто після пожежі Москви, під час якої згорів і цей єдиний список цього твору. Тому не випадково, що саме в цей час поставлене Московським товариством любителів російської словесності питання „якою мовою було написане” *Слово* Максимович вважає запізненим — згорів список і не можна буде перевірити. Не дивно, що у зв'язку з цим виникли підозріння про пізніше походження *Слова*, про його фальсифікацію тощо.

Першим з таким твердженням виступив — на що звернув особливу увагу Максимович — граф Румянцев, який вважав себе за наукового мецената і в особі Мусіна-Пушкіна бачив свого ворога. Саме тоді появилось ряд фальсифікатів *Слова*

на пергамені. Але захисники цієї пам'ятки не піддавалися. Згадали навіть про іншу копію *Слова*, що була зроблена для цариці Катерини. Більше того, Мусін-Пушкін, відповідаючи на лист Калайдовіча, твердив, що рукопис був писаний на гладкому папері. Натомість Малиновський, як знавець письма, стверджував, що це „півустав, що переходив у скоропис XV віку”. Інші дослідники, наприклад, Карамзін, вказували на подібність *Слова* з галицькими літописами XII—XIII ст. або, як українець Тимковський, професор Московського університету, звертали увагу на стилістичні подібності *Слова* з іншою пам'яткою — *Задонщиною*. Однодумці й послідовники Румянцева, Каченовський і Стров, твердили, що *Слово* було написане не в XII ст., а в XVI—XVII ст., або було підроблене в XVIII ст.

Відсіч останнім, а водночас відповідь на поставлене Московським товариством питання спробував дати — на чому наголошує Максимович — Калайдовіч, стверджуючи, м. ін., що мова *Слова* така ж, як і інших староруських пам'яток, або „образ выражения песни и самые слова неизвестные великоруссам и теперь употребляемые у малороссиян показывают, что сочинитель принадлежит к нынешней Малороссии”.

Інші дослідники того часу приписували *Слову* подібність до скандинавського героїчного епосу або вважали підробкою на взірць Оссіяна. Але думка тодішнього скандинавіста Сенковського була не на користь прихильників цієї теорії. Взагалі, Сенковський трактував *Слово* не як автентичну пам'ятку, а як „фабрикат карпаторуса”, про що, на його думку, свідчать в ній західні україніزم. Зрештою, окремі дослідники, наприклад, Каченовський, говорили навіть про польську стихію в пам'ятці. Коли до цих розходжень додамо ще низку інших, хоча б те, що *Слово о полку Ігоревім* деякі дослідники, напр., Беліков, вважали за народну пісню, то лише тоді усвідомимо собі значення, вагу і актуальність дослідницької роботи Максимовича над цим твором.

Зрештою, вже з'ясування літератури предмету та стану досліджень над *Словом* вимагало від Максимовича, про що була мова вище, неабиякої начитаности, наукової відваги і такту, тим паче, що навколо цих питань накопичилося чимало непорозумінь, спірних тверджень і гіпотез. З'ясувавши їх всебічно, Максимович цілком логічно приходить до вирішення кардинальних проблем, зв'язаних зі *Словом* — його давности й оригінальності. Годиться принагідно сказати, що цих питань торкнувся Максимович будучи ще в Москві, а саме в рецензії у часописі *Молва* (1833, № 23-24) на переклад *Слова*,

зроблений поетом А. Вельтманом. Через кілька років у великій праці *Песнь о полку Игореве*, що друкувалася на сторінках *Журнала министерства народного просвещения* в 1836-37 рр., Максимович наводить цілу низку доказів щодо достовірності й давності *Слова*.

Характеризуючи *Слово* як твір, що дає правдивий погляд „на Русь, на її порядок речей, на різні події і особи”, Максимович особливо наголошує на факті, що воно „зберегло відомості про славного віщого Бояна”. Це тому, що він вважав, що були предтечі *Слова*. Вказуючи на походи на Царгород, на Схід, на оповідання про багату Індію, і про царя Македонського, Максимович твердить, що вони були настільки відомі, що для „писемної поезії [вони] заслонили собою давню Київську Русь з її битвами, з її витязями і героями”. До речі, Калайдовіч також вважав, що „поетична мова Ігорової пісні не новонароджена, що вона мала початок ще до своєї появи”. Але Максимович іде ще далше: він вважає, що вся попередня „поетична творчість знайшла своє завершення у славновісній пісні о полку Ігоревім”.

Це дуже ймовірно. Адже відомо, що вихвалити князя, його героїчні подвиги — „співати йому славу” — належало до тодішнього звичаю, який перейняли згодом козацькі літописці, і що знайшло своє виявлення в історичних піснях і думках. У цьому контексті легше зрозуміти, чому вихваляються, напр., князь Тхорик (1199 р.), Данило Галицький (1251 р.), Байда, Дорошенко, Хмельницький і т. п. Для Максимовича вплив *Слова* чи виразні паралелізми до нього в творах середніх віків не викликають здивування. Як приклад дослідник вказує на *Сказаніє про побойще Дмитрія Донського* та додаток до *Апостола* з 1307 р., де згадується, що війна Михайла і Юрія за новгородський престол описується словами *Пісні Ігоря*, тобто *Слова*. Це свідчить про те, що цей лицарський твір трапляв до рук духовних осіб, а надто, що *Слово* є твором автентичним, давнім, а не підробкою новіших часів. Для підтвердження своєї тези дослідник наводить інші історичні дані, які співпадають з подіями, відображеними в *Слові*.

Крім того, Максимович не погоджується з гіпотезами, що *Слово* — це пісня або літопис. Наш автор — хоч у термінології сам не дуже послідовний — пересвідчений, що це книжний твір. Підтверджує це, на думку Максимовича, зміст твору, а надто його композиція. Власне з композиційних міркувань він поділяє *Слово* на 14 частин: заспів, дванадцять пісень і закінчення. Слід відзначити, що деякі історики літератури ставилися критично до цього поділу, твердячи, що Максимович

хоче надати *Слову* пляновості і гармонійності, яких у ньому немає. Звичайно, вони були пересвідчені що *Слово* є в крайньому разі лише піснею. Натомість Максимович трактував його як книжний твір, як суто історичну поему, яка характеризується патріотизмом та численними жанровими прикметами: „*Слово* являє собою безперервний ряд живих образів, у яких скрізь виступає Ігор чи то сам, як діючий персонаж, чи то як об'єкт і причина дії; весь твір відзначається не лише поетичною розповідністю, а й історичною достеменністю”.

Власне думка про історичну правдивість зображених у *Слові* подій — це вагомий доказ Максимовича проти його наукових опонентів. Дослідники різних часів неодноразово вказують, що про тогочасні події в давній Русі читач довідується зі *Слова* в майже хронологічному порядку. Очевидно, звернено увагу й на певну хаотичність і випадковість окремих історичних подробиць, вказуючи, як приклад, частину 6 і 11. Саме ці дві частини Максимович трактує як відступ в історичне минуле. До того ж, підкреслює дослідник, це відступ свідомий, згідний з намірами анонімного автора, який хотів згадати попередніх князів: „почати свою повість від старого Володимира до нинішнього Ігоря”.

Думається, що ці історичні відступи у недавнє минуле відповідають жанровим особливостям поетичної повісті — так приблизно окреслив *Слово* Максимович. Та найосновніше, що ці історичні відступи, як влучно підхопив учений, згідні „з духом, зокрема, даного твору, як нагадування про минулу силу, особливо коли матиметься на увазі теперішні нещастя, викликані княжими сварками і міжусобицями та половецькими набігами”.

З сучасної перспективи ці відступи можна трактувати як художній засіб для ще більшого підкреслення трагічної ситуації — битви Ігоря з половцями, як психологічно-емоційний елемент збудження читацької уваги, духовного підбадьорення. Це тим більше ймовірно, коли брати до уваги, що автор, будучи дружинником, брав безпосередньо участь в описуваних подіях, на що він сам обережно в тексті натякає. Це утверджує Максимовича в думці, що *Слово* — це історична поема, жанрові прикмети якої помітні виразно в „українських історичних піснях і думках, близьких за своїм характером і однорідністю до *Пісні о полку Ігоревім*”. Тому він схильний розглядати цей твір скоріше в зв'язку з українським епосом, з епосом слов'янських народів та іншими літературними пам'ятками того часу, „ніж за якиминбудь об'єктивними критеріями книжки, взорованої на зарубіжних зразках”.

У другій частині аналізованої розвідки Максимович звертає увагу на ідейний зміст твору. Відзначаючи, що *Слово* сповнене духом любови до руської землі, до її князів і воїнів (про що свідчать, напр., описи подвигів Всеволода) з одного боку, та ненавістю до ворожих половецьких полчищ з другого, дослідник констатує: „За землю руську, за її славу — ось основна думка, основна пружина дії *Слова*”. Керуючись отакими щирими і глибокими патріотичними почуттями, анонімний автор, підкреслює Максимович, з особливим сумом згадує про роздрібненість руських земель, спричинену незгодами і колотнечами князів „недостойних попередньої слави”. Тільки в єдності автор бачить можливість відродження давньої могутності, в ім'я цієї ідеї закликає руських князів до згуртованості і братання. Саме цим слід пояснити серйозність та деяку патетичність тону мови, згармонізованої бездоганно з цілим змістом та духом твору.

Зрозуміла річ, що помітні й деякі непослідовності. Певну дисгармонію вносять, напр., нотки песимізму, особливо при нагоді історичних екскурсів, що нагадують про славу і престиж руської держави, тобто в моментах зіткнення героїчного минулого з сумною і трагічною дійсністю. Як завжди спостережливий, Максимович зробив з цього приводу ось таке зауваження: „Це саме ми спостерігаємо в останньому періоді української поезії; подібні думки про свою [минулу] славу її також хвилювали”. Ця паралеля *Слова* й українського історичного епосу останнього періоду — тобто, вже, мабуть, після зруйнування Січі і Гетьманщини, коли трагедійний тон, поєднуючись з безнастанним нагадуванням про минулу славу, став домінуючим мотивом історичних пісень і дум — була виразним політичним натяком на становище в Україні і мала неабияке актуальне звучання.

Таких порівнянь і зіставлень Максимович наводить багато, але не всі вони мають характер натяків. Інколи це історіософічне спостереження або історична моралістика. У підрозділі „Битва і смерть”, при характеристиці картин поля битви, яке обернулось у величезний цвинтар, учений зауважує: „Поле життя стало полем глуму; ось така, здається, задушевна, думка південно-руського співця товаришує йому при зображенні битви, проведеної на землі своїй”.

Проте дослідника найбільше приваблюють літературні паралелі між *Словом о полку Ігоревім* та українським героїчним епосом. Донині не втрачають свіжості та емоційної наснаги епітети *Слова*, які зустрічаються в народній творчості і ввійшли до повсякчасного фонду: сизий орел, чорний ворон, синє

море, студена роса, чорна земля. Зупиняючись над засобами авторського зображення поразки Ігоря, Максимович наводить ось таку текстуальну збіжність:

Чърна земля подъ копыты
Костьми была посяяна
а кровію поляна

(Слово)

Аналогічну метафору дослідник віднайшов в українській народній пісні:

Чорна земля заорана,
І кулями засіяна,
Білим тілом зволочена
І кровію сполошена.

Іншу прикметну деталь відзначав Максимович, характеризуючи похоронний обряд у *Слові*: „Затихли голоси, зникла радість; сурми сурмлять — ось похоронні звуки во вічну пам'ять князя, якими поезія українська нагадує завжди про смерть козаків своїх”.

Другу частину розвідки Максимович закінчує міркуваннями про „Плач Ярославни” і про самого автора. „Плач Ярославни” — це чи не найприкрасніша частина *Слова*, в якій воедино сплетені почування людини і природи набрали особливої моральної сили і прозвучали з небувалою поетичною красою та патріотичним піднесенням. Цей фрагмент багато в чому нагадує і наслідують народні голосіння. Це, здається, привело дослідника до думки, що „Плач Ярославни — це тема, що різноманітно наспівується в сповнених любови жіночих піснях України”.

Ярославна, дружина Ігоря, звертається до сил природи, щоб допомогли „в д'лах її князя”. Вона оплакує долю свого чоловіка, його хоробрих воїнів, але водночас її молитвенний голос мужніє, наповнюється громадянськими мотивами і, не наче впадаючи в тон і патріотичний патос автора, вона звертається до всіх з закликом, щоб стали за Ігоря, за руську землю. Недармо ж Максимович відзначив, що „Плач Ярославни” характеризується небувалою художністю, а в архітектоніці цілого твору займає особливе місце. І це вже питання художньої майстерності й образної тканини *Слова*.

Треба відразу відзначити, що в порівнянні з обговореними дотепер двома попередніми розділами Максимовичевої студії, третя частина, „Образна система і мова”, викликає певні застереження, перш за все тому, що ця аналіза далеко неповна. Автор зупинився тут лише на деяких формах мистецької

майстерности й образної тканини *Слова*, а саме: символіці, уподібненнях, повтореннях і мові. Як і в попередніх частинах, Максимович, порівнюючи текст *Слова*, його образну систему, найрадіше звертається до українського пісенного й мовного матеріалу, рідше до російського. Це мабуть тому, що, як видавець і коментатор українських пісень, він знав їх куди краще, міг без труднощів знайти тут текстуальну паралелю чи образну збіжність. Хоча б, приміром, оця алегорія, яку наводить дослідник уже на початку цього розділу:

Другого дни вельми рано
кровавыя зори світь повідають.
Чорныя тучи съ моря идуть,
хотять прикрыти четыри солныцы...

Натомість у пісні, яку цитує Максимович, мовиться:

Із-за гори хмара виступає, —
виступає, виходжає...
До Чигрина громом вигремляє,
на українську землю блискавкою, блискає...

Відзначені дослідником риси схожості не викликають заперечення. Можна навіть добачити в цитованих уривках ритмічне співпадання. Ритмічно-інтонаційну подібність вносять численні алітерації, тобто повторення однакових приголосних та асонанси — повторення однакових голосних, які, разом з симетричністю конструкцій-словосполучень, є організаторами не лише образно-ритмічної системи, а й ідейного духу та поетичної настроєності твору. Адже в *Слові* спостерігаємо те саме явище, що й в думках, — смисловий ритм, який змінюється в залежності від характеру такого чи іншого місця твору, його сенсу, теми чи думки. Зрозуміло, ця смислова ритмічність окремих частин підпорядкована композиційній структурі цілого твору, але треба також пам'ятати, що тут композиція твору і співвідношення його частин мають також свій ритм.

У безпосередньому зв'язку з описаним явищем слід розглядати своєрідні повторення в *Слові*, які водночас є характерні для історичних пісень та дум. Ці тавтологічні звороти, наприклад, „виступає, виходжає”, „громом вигремляє”, виконують ораторсько-патетичну функцію, що в словесно-музичних творах, а такими є думи і, зрозуміло, *Слово*, є невід'ємною частиною їхньої поетики, зокрема ритміки. Правда, Максимович не зумів цього належно пояснити, але він інтуїтивно відчував, що явище оцих повторень не впливає з бідности

авторської фантазії, що це, на його думку, „улюблені й вибрані співцем фарби для малювання своїх картин”.

Оце свідоме „словес живописання” відноситься також до символіки *Слова о полку Ігоревім*. Тут, здається, Максимовичева ерудиція виявилася з усією повнотою й глибиною. Як знавець українського пісенного фолкльору і природознавець, дослідник відзначає, що символіка птахів і звірів у *Слові* має цілком народно-поетичний характер. Наприклад, сокіл у *Слові* є символом хоробрости, тому Ігор, а також Всеволод зображені тут як соколи: „се бо два сокола слітєста...” Натомість лебідь — це символ пісні і звуку взагалі. Шукаючи відповідника в українському фолклорі, Максимович відзначає, що на ці символи прикладів надто багато, взяти хоча б пісню про Коновченка:

Не ясен сокіл на долині по табору гуляє,
Не білая лебідь співає...

Зозуля в українських піснях є символом сирітства та родинного смутку. Наприклад, в пісні „Умер чумак”:

Насипали чумаченьку високу могилу
Посадили на могилу червону калину
Прилетіла зозуленька, да й сказала: ку-ку
Подай, сину! подай, орле! хоч правую руку!

Натомість, у *Слові* саме Ярославна, сумуючи й оплакуючи Ігоря, уподібнена до зозулі-зегзиці. Крім того, зозуля є також віщункою. Соловейко своїм тьохканням-щебетанням виспівує славу звияжних полків. Протилежне значення мають ворон і сорока. Ворон у *Слові* є символом смерті: разом з сорокою об’їдають трупів. А в козацькій пісні співається:

Тільки ж ворон, ворон прилетить до тебе
Да й сяде на тебе і поклєє тебе...

Це лише оркемі приклади, яких Максимович наводить значно більше. Але й цього вистачить, щоб пересвідчитись, що народно-поетична символіка в українських піснях така ж, — відзначає автор, — як і в *Слові о полку Ігоревім*.

Вагомим питанням, яким зайнявся Максимович у даній частині своєї праці є проблема мови *Слова*. Зрозуміло, тут його міркування мають властиво підсумковий характер, бо ж — як можна було пересвідчитись — у попередніх частинах дослідження автор дуже часто звертав увагу на мовний аспект *Слова*. До того ж, роздуми Максимовича відносно мови *Слова* не мали принагідного чи фрагментарного характеру.

Вони впливали з ширших лінгвістичних зацікавлень і досліджень ученого та були конфрентовані з історичним розвитком сучасних мов, про що свідчить його праця *Історія давньої руської словесности*.

Як прихильник лінгвістично-порівняльного методу, Максимович був переконаний, що східньослов'янські мови зазнали певного впливу іноплемінних мов, бо ж цього вимагало саме життя, потреба життєвого спілкування наших предків. Водночас — зазначає дослідник — треба пам'ятати, що

слова ці не могли своєю кількістю змінити чистоту племінної стихії нашої родової мови, проте вони могли впливати на зміну її духу і зробити значний переворот в її утворенні. Така зміна і перебудова в мові відбувається переважно шляхом освічености, за допомогою мови більше й вище сформованої, до того ж від народу, який вводить справжню зміну духу і життя в якомунебудь іншому народові своєю міцною і тривкою дією на головні центри його життя. А втім отакі вирішальні перевороти бувають лише у відомі й рідкісні епохи життя народу. В житті ж східніх слов'ян до початку прадавнього періоду не було, здається, такого загального і вирішального внутрішнього перевороту. Життя їхнє або було незмінне у загальнім колі свого успадкованого родового надбання, або ж розвивалося самостійно, за власними законами, без надмірного приймання чужих стихій, незважаючи навіть на зовнішні повиви, спричинені натиском іноплемінників. Тому-то наша мова менше від інших слов'янських відійшла від свого корінного першообразу.

Ще одну вагому лінгвістичну проблему порушив Максимович, даючи водночас відповідь численним своїм опонентам з Калайдовічем і Погодіним на чолі, а саме розрізнення мови староруської від старослов'янської, що їх часто вони утотожнювали і на цій основі робили окремі помилкові висновки щодо російської або української мов. Учений з натиском підкреслює, що не слід „змішувати поняття про писемне застосування церковної мови на Русі з поняттям про народну руську мову. Треба зовсім відкинути філологічну думку про тотожність руської мови з церковною, про виникнення з неї народного російського наріччя, і про її першообразність для всіх слов'янських мов”. А трохи далі, критикуючи теорію про походження руської мови від церковної, Максимович констатує: „Наша народна мова зі своїми основними прикметами була, звичайно, раніше, ще до того, ніж церковна мова в писемному вигляді стала відома на Русі. Отже, вважати останню репрезентантом первісної слов'янщини — несправедливо. Першість у цьому відношенні належить більше руській мові, з уваги

хоча б на її повноголосся. У слов'янським колі церковна мова була однією з молодших сестер”.

Відзначаючи окремі прикметні особливості обох мов і вказуючи на спорідненість церковної мови з болгарською і сербською, Максимович на підставі граматичної будови, фонетичної системи та словникового складу доходить висновку, що

ім'я руської мови повинно набувати значення як ім'я родове, яке належить стільки мові всієї південної Руси, що й мові північної Руси; саме в такому загальному значенні руську мову можна б назвати східнослов'янською. Три види цієї мови, які належать до трьох видів руського народу, настільки між собою різні, що їх можна вважати не як три наріччя, лише як три різні однорідні мови, нарівні з іншими західнослов'янськими мовами, навіть з більшим правом, ніж мови польська, сербська, чеська і словацька, бо ці останні подібніші між собою, ніж південноруська [тобто українська — С. К.] з великоруською і навіть білоруською.

Представлені тут трохи ширше мовознавчі міркування Максимовича свідчать, безсумнівно, про широкий науковий кругозір автора, про ролю і значення веденої ним наукової полеміки навколо *Слова о полку Ігоревім*, зокрема мови, як цього твору, так і інших пам'яток староруського письменства і культури взагалі. Приємно відзначити, що на ці прикмети згаданих праць Максимовича вказувала й сучасна критика, про що свідчить хоча б публікація на сторінках журналу *Современник*, де, поряд з високою оцінкою піонерської наукової діяльності дослідника, особливу увагу звернено на те, що „в його філологічному дослідженні є самобутність, своєрідність і докази, які свідчать про уважне і тривале вивчення ним предмета. Тільки такі праці просувають науку до її остаточної довершеності”.

Така висока оцінка російської прогресивної критики не була відокремленим явищем. І то в ситуації, коли Максимович деякі дискусійні тези і міркування формулював надто категорично, хоча б оце: „ні, вже ніхто не сумнівається в тому, що вона [тобто мова *Слова* — С. К.] є поєднання книжної церковнослов'янської мови, за її ж власною давньою формою, і народної південноросійської мови [себто української — С. К.], якою Київська Русь говорила споконвіку і яка донині перебуває в малоросійському говорі”. Чи, приміром, стверджуючи, що мова *Слова* є радше близька до живої, народної мови, пов'язаної з історією, мітологією й поезією, насамперед, українською, яка „потім звучала і звучить донині в думках бандуристів”.

Звісно, що опоненти типу Каченовського вигукували: неймовірно, щоб *Слово о полку Ігоревім* з'явилося тоді, коли в Європі ще писали латинською мовою і не було знаменитої комедії Данте і самого Петрарки. Ще більшим циніком у цій полеміці виявився відомий публіцист М. Катков, який з усією відвертістю твердив: „кажіть що хочете, але *Слово о полку Ігоревім* ніяк не можна прийняти за справжнє і вірогідне джерело”. Натомість Беліков, шукаючи компромісного виходу, схиляється до думки, що *Слово* — це пам'ятка давньоруської усної творчості, яка могла бути записана лише десь в XVI ст.

Найбільш рішучу відповідь дав Максимович Каткову, своєму рецензентові з журналу *Отегественные записки*. Розуміючи спрямованість критики Каткова, український учений доказує йому цілковите невігластво не лише в письменстві Київської Руси, а й в літературі предмету. Це тим більший сором, що, наприклад, про Кирила Туровського необережному критикові можуть сказати більше студенти Київського університету, які прослухали його (тобто Максимовича) курс лекцій. Підсумовуючи свою полеміку з Катковим, Максимович у досить гострому тоні радить йому ось що: не слід братися за критику, не знаючи як слід матеріялу, бо подібні до цих нісенітниці знеславляють лише самого критика.

Полеміку з іншими своїми опонентами Максимович веде більш спокійно. Базуючись на пам'ятках давньоруського письменства, автор всебічно доводить, що мова *Слова* своєю лексико-граматичною будовою нічим істотним не різниться від мови Нестора, Мономаха чи Київського або Галицько-волинського літопису. Може тільки *Слово* має більш світський характер, немає в ньому біблійно-житійських елементів. Це лише свідчить про те, що автор твору був світською людиною.

Дослідник розуміє, що церковнослов'янська мова (або книжно-слов'янська) вживалась ще тоді і книжними, і духовними особами, проте для світських осіб вона могла видатися „застарілою”, тим паче, що більш принадною здавалась йому народно-руська мова, яка дедалі давала про себе міцно знати. У такій ситуації, — констатує Максимович, — анонімний автор міг користуватися „дещо розкинутою, хоч не сформованою, південноруською мовою”, яку він сам майстерно обробив і удосконалив. Про наявність у той час книжнослов'янської мови свідчить велеловно — продовжує дослідник — сам анонімний автор *Слова*, який ще на початку твору визнає, що має намір оспівати походи свого героя „старými словесы”, в дусі свого натхненника Бояна. Це наводить Максимовича на думку, що поруч з мовою Бояна існувала і розвивалась нова

мова, а саме південно-руська, яку він схильний локалізувати в північній частині Чернігівщини. Звідси випливає і наступний висновок: автор *Слова* походив, либонь, також звідси, бо знає дуже добре всі подробиці половецьких походів. Це ж водночас, — підсумовує свої міркування Максимович, — може бути підтвердженням здогаду про безпосередню участь автора в змальованих подіях.

У контексті поданих вище дослідницьких пошуків і гіпотез Максимовича, сам твір і полеміка, що навколо нього розгорнулася, виходять поза межі академічної проблеми. Так зрештою розумів це й сам український учений, який з жагою не так вже й дослідника, що громадянина з особливою силою наголошував:

Слово о полку Ігоревім — це дорогоцінна пам'ятка руської поезії кінця XII ст. В історії нашого письменства треба особливу увагу звертати на цю пам'ятку, бо, крім загальної літературної важливості, яку вона розділяє нарівні з іншими нашими стародавніми творами, вона важлива як єдина, що дійшла до нас, писемна пам'ятка саморобної староруської поезії, що виблискує яскравою поетичною красою, і разом з тим сповнена історичної правди. Це першообраз самобутньої епічної руської поезії і за духом і за формою.

3

З цих міркувань Михайло Максимович приступив до перекладу *Слова о полку Ігоревім*. Лише коли учений узявся за цю працю, він мав уже тридцятирічний досвід дослідницької роботи, низку глибоких праць із письменства Київської Русі, видав чотири фолкльорно-етнографічні збірники, тощо. Перша його спроба перекладу *Слова* — це водночас перший переклад цього тексту в наддніпрянській Україні — була надрукована 1857 року. Через два роки, отже, 1859 року, друге, виправлене видання цього перекладу було надруковане в першій книжці видаваного Максимовичем альманаху *Українець* у Москві. Крім цього, йому належить зроблений окремо переклад плачу Ярославни, дещо відмінний від текстів видань з 1857 і 1859 р. Цей переклад доконав автор 1869 року, але він вийшов у світ щойно 1882 року на сторінках журналу *Русская старина*.

Як уже мовилось, до перекладацької роботи Максимович був добре підготовлений ще попередніми своїми дослідженнями. Саме тоді він уже згадував, що не лише слов'яни, а й інші народи мають переклади *Слова*, пора бо й мати українцям (з

цього видно, що Максимович не знав про переклади *Слова* західньоукраїнських поетів).

Пристаючи до перекладу *Слова*, Максимович поділив його спершу на три частини і двадцять смислово-тематичних розділів, даючи кожному відповідну назву. Згідно з романтичною концепцією поезії, автор вирішив перекласти *Слово* мовою і складом споріднених з ним — на чому Максимович особливо наголошував — українських пісень. Це не могло не позначитися на перекладі *Слова*, особливо коли взяти до уваги, що цей текст писаний у іншій конвенції й не завжди дався „нагнути” і „вмістити” в рамки іншої поетики. Перекладач добирає різні метричні форми, що інколи не відповідають ритміці *Слова* з одного боку та складові народних пісень з другого. Адже ж ритміка Максимовичевого перекладу базується, головним чином, на коломийці. Це кардинальна авторська похибка, бо ж коломийковий розмір не відповідає поважному, іноді суворому, лаконічному й уривчастому стилеві *Слова*. Візьмімо, хоча б, ось таку строфу:

Чи не добре було б браття
Нам про Ігоря війну
Заспівать жалібну пісню
Як співали в старину!

Тут швидкий, близький навіть до танцювального, розмір не передає епічного стилю й всієї своєрідної рефлексійності та настроєвості, що ними наповнений автор *Слова*. Це безпомилково відчув Максим Рильський, чий переклад трактується тут як зразковий. Ось його відповідник до цитованої строфи:

Чи не гоже було б нам браття,
Розпочати давніми словами
Скорбну повість про Ігорів похід,
Ігоря Святославича?
А зачати нам отую пісню
По сьогоднішніх бувальщинах,
Не по намислу Бояновім...

Максимович не зумів цього відчути, і сам заспів зроблений ним 8- і 7-складовим хореем не передає внутрішньої гармонії твору, його поетичної краси, смислового навантаження та патетичного тону мови. Пристосування *Слова* до народної пісні позбавило переклад Максимовича щойно схарактеризованих якостей.

Звичайно, з літературного боку цей переклад досить стислий. Він має правильний ритм і римування; у ньому всього

970 рядків, переважно коломийкових, отже 7—8 складів у рядку. Проте значно слабший переклад Максимовича щодо будови вірша і стилю. У продовженні вищезитованої строфи читаємо:

А початися тій пісні
По сьогоднішнім ділам
Не по умислам високим
Як Боян той починав.

Нікуди правди діти, версифікатор з Максимовича слабкий; відчувається, насамперед, убогість ритміки. Але й стиль шкутильгає, трапляється чимало русизмів, слов'янизмів, наприклад, „по горах і по долам”, а також неясних речень:

А як речі годів давних
Про незгоди споминав...

Навіть подальше заглиблювання в текст не дасть ясности розуміння і не розвіє сумніву. Трапляються іноді й цілком недоладні образи. Звернімося, для порівняння, до перекладу Рильського:

Боян-бо наш віщий,
Як хотів кому пісню творити,
Розтікався мислю по дереву,
Сірим вовком по землі,
Сизим орлом попід хмарами.

Натомість у Максимовича аналогічне місце звучить ось як:

Боян віщий було схоче
Кому пісню заспівать,
Зараз думкою по дереву
Починає він літать.

Оце „літання думкою по дереву” — це не лише образна недоладність, а й прямо-таки сміховинна недоречність. Думається, що переклад цього найбільш загадкового місця в тексті *Слова* найбільш вдало передав Олексій Коваленко:

Ще колись то Боян віщий
Піснотворець часів давних,
Князів Святослава
І Олега Ярослава.
Бувало говорить:
„Без пліч тяжко голові
Й без голови плечам горе” —
Отак без Ігоря
І Руській землі.

Коваленкове прагнення до смислово-образної чіткості да-
ло тут бажаний наслідок. Не втратила на цьому й характерна
для *Слова* лаконічність і стрункість. Але вказуючи на Кова-
ленкові здобутки не значить, що переклад Максимовича ніку-
дишній. Адже попри згадані хиби, він має й свої принади. По-
декуди його образи й прийоми збуджують подив, хоча б, на-
приклад, оця строфа:

Чорна рілля копитами
Була ізорана,
А засіяна кістками,
Кров'ю поливана;
Уродила ж вона Русі
Тугу й горювання.

Бачимо, що тут наслідки каяльської битви передав Макси-
мович незвичайно поетично й філософськи узагальнено; об-
разній пластичності дотримує кроку мовна свіжість і чіт-
кість. Жаско мусить виглядати земля зрита, сплюндрована
кінськими копитами, ще страшніше розтерзані на ній людські
тіла, змішані з кінськими, що лежать у калюжах крові. Цей
образ трапляється часто в історичних піснях, але парафразо-
ваний майстерно Максимовичем він будить читацьку свідо-
мість і уяву. Орудуючи ними вправно, автор не прагне нако-
пичення картин жаху і прикінцеві рядки, присвячені каяль-
ській битві, звучать уже жалібно, меланхолійно:

Жалкуючи, в чистім полі
Трава повалилась
І дерева аж на землю
З туги похилились.

Трактуючи такі місця як психічний перепочинок, пере-
кладач прагне дедалі скріпити патріотичні почуття читача,
„промовляючи” до нього тужливими, задушевними словами:

Уже нашу славу силу
Пустиня покрила

Або:

І виплескала вона крильям
Як лебідка біла.

Загибель Руси Максимович порівнює тут зі смертельним тре-
потом білого, невинного лебедя. Зрозуміло, що вживання
здрібнілої форми — лебідка, — зумовлене впливом народно-
поетичної символіки, що на ній базувався автор у своєму пе-
рекладі. Ось для прикладу ще декілька рядків:

Вовки сірі по яругах
Грози вижидають;
Орли клекотом на кості
Звірів закликають.

Цю картину грізної ночі перед битвою підсилює подальша строфа, в якій епітети й порівняння неначе взяті прямо з народно-пісенного епосу:

Ані тобі ворон чорний
Половчин позорний
Гза поганий сірим вовком
Біжить, поспішає . . .

Названі у цих строфах хижак є символом лютої, кровожадності й зла. Тому зрозуміло, чому саме цими епітетами характеризує автор ворогів.

Дуже часто згадані картини жаху підсилюють також — як це помітно в романтичній поезії — сили природи, що створюють таємничу або грізну сценерію:

А од моря чорні хмари
Ідуть, вихожають,
На чотири ясні сонця
Вони надвигають.
А їх сині блискавиці
Дрижать і блискають.

Не можна мати сумніву, що ці „чотири ясні сонця” — це чотири руські князі, які незабаром мають бути розбиті ворожими силами. Ці авторські передчуття затоплені в народну символіку. Оскільки сокіл є символом швидкості й сили, тому цими рисами автор наділив саме Святослава:

Він за птицею женеться
Високо й сердито
І гнізда свого нікому
Не дасть у в обиду.

Останні дві строфи висловлюють, отже, надію на врятування від загибелі. Закликаючи Рюрика і Давида, щоб спішили на захист Руси, автор звертається до піднесеного, сповненого патосом тону, в якому відчувається неначе тріумфально-переможні звуки:

Чи не ваші ж то дружини
А як тури заревли . . .
Як за птахом ясний сокіл

Женеться на вітру,
Несетесь ви бистро
Бо есть у вас крила

Здається, що цей тон зумовлений вжитими тут символами та епітетами. Руські полки сильні мов тури та швидкі і боєздатні мов соколи. Це неначе підбадьорює автора, який підсилює заклики до бою:

І за Ігореві рани,
За його неволю!

На окрему оцінку заслуговує переклад плачу Ярославни. Звертає на себе увагу факт, що Максимович строго додержується строфічної форми, якою характеризується текст *Слова*, його символіки, образної своєрідності, тощо. Проте використання перекладачем 4-рядкового куплету вплинуло на надмірну розтягненість перекладу. Трапляються лексичні та стильові неоковирності, наприклад:

Чутно голос Ярославни
Як зозулька на зорі.

Думається, що цю пестливу зозульку краще б замінити зозулею, що було б притаманніше реквіємному характерові плачу Ярославни. У перекладі Рильського плач-тужіння княгині зберігає повагу ситуації:

Ярославни-княгині чути голос.
Як та чайка-жалібниця,
Стогне вона вранці-рано:
„Полечу, — каже, — зозулею по Дунаю,
Умочу бобровий рукав
У Каялі-річці
Обмию князеві криваві рани
На тілі його дужому!”

А далі йдуть звернення Ярославни до „вітру-вітрила”, „Дніпра-Славути”, „Сонця присвітлого”, які ще більше підкреслюють розпуку й трагедійний характер ситуації княгині. І тут Максимовичеві стали в пригоді українські голосіння, завдяки чому він досягає в цій частині тексту великої милозвучності, гармонії дій героя з життям природи:

От вечірні зорі згасли;
Ігор спить, ні, він не спить.
Поле мислями він мірить
де Донець за Дон біжить.

Ці рядки вводять читача в таємничу втечу, атмосферу Ігорового „скрадання до скакуна” та його по-байронівськи ефектної їзди на коні, що „мчиться скільки духу”. Після цих рядків емоційного напруження, Максимович завершує переклад строфою-гимном:

Ясне сонце в небі сяє
Ігор в руські краї!

Патріотизм, поетична принадність і художня краса *Слова о полку Ігоревім* так причарували Максимовича, що, крім ґрунтовних досліджень цієї пам’ятки, він з любов’ю віддався її перекладові, вносячи в культурний обіг українців образну мову, мелодійну українську співучість і лицарський дух вірша віщого Бояна, що спершу відлунював в українських думках і піснях, а згодом у поезії Шевченка, Костомарова, Куліша, Франка, Лесі Українки, Олеса, Рильського та сучасних продовжувачів їхньої традиції.

У пошуках лицарського духу своїх предків романтики були особливо невгамовні; бо ж що краще, — на їхню думку — могло будити історичну уяву та національну свідомість сучасників, як не минула слава, героїчні подвиги та давня, ще племінна традиція. Тому, вказуючи на потребу вивчення історії Київської Русі, Максимович особливу увагу приділяв саме *Слову*, свідомо наголошуючи, що „Пісня Ігорю, як вірне відображення свого часу, важлива для самої древньої Русі і своїм сучасним поглядом на порядок речей, на різні події і особи”. Отже, досліджуючи й перекладаючи цю давньоруську пам’ятку, Максимович встановлював надірваний історією безпосередній зв’язок між давниною й сучасністю, сягав до коренів народу, розуміючи, що „корінь народу — посполитство, зрубай корені народу й листя зів’яне”.

Гердерівська романтична концепція народу знайшла в Максимовичеві цікавого продовжувача; його діяльність справила, що він став основоположником української романтичної естетики, науки й ідеології. Свідомість першопрохідника не була легка. „В моїй науці, — писав він, — чим далі в ліс, тим більше дров, і треба було майже на кожному кроці прокладати собі нові шляхи”. Ця свідомість товаришувала Максимовичеві вже на досвітку його діяльності, отже тоді, коли він збирав матеріали і писав програмно-романтичні передмови до збірників українських пісень 1827 і 1834 років, коли займався інтенсивним вивченням пам’яток Київської Русі, зокрема дослідженням і перекладом *Слова*, і коли видавав свої збірники та альманахи й вів полеміку з Михайлом Погодіним

в справі походження й достеменності *Слова*. У цій кореспонденційній полеміці він не пішов на найменший компроміс не лише щодо скандинавського походження Руси, а й відносно признання *Слова* як пізнішої підробки на взірць скандинавських саг. Відповідаючи своєму опонентові, що не лише скандинавські співці величали своїх конунгів, що „не одні саги лунали серед київських князів, бо й німці і венеди, греки і морави виспівували Святославову славу”, Максимович констатує, що *Слово* найбільш споріднене з південноруськими піснями, тільки цей твір не був ані імпровізований, ані співаний на зразок останніх, лише написаний як пісня про Калашнікова Лермонтова. Різниця тут така: Лермонтов, як і інші нові поети, надавав поезії народного характеру; натомість співець Ігоревої слави підніс усну народну поезію на вершок літературно-мистецької майстерности.

І коли в їх подальшій кореспонденції Погодін, через нестачу доказів, звинуватив Максимовича в любові до України, що він залишається й далі „щирим малоросіянином”, український учений відповів йому ось як:

Що я „ширий малоросіянин” і тепер, як раніше, і буду до смерти, це дуже природно; я не від роду варязького, а від малоросійського, і я люблю Малоросію, люблю мову її народу, і пісні її, і її історію... Що я люблю наш першопрестольний Київ більше, ніж ти, це теж природно, бо, виявляючи до нього любов загальноросійську, і найближчу до нього любов — малоросійську, я люблю його ще як батьківщину мого роду.

Ця смілива відповідь одному з найбільш впливових царських теоретиків і практиків наукового обґрунтування політики самодержавства не принесла Максимовичеві якихось більших неприємностей, лише позбавила, мабуть, орденів і всяких інших матеріальних вигод (але до цього йому не треба було звикати) зате вона кинула на нього додаткове світло як на людину, вченого і громадянина.

В атмосфері царського самодержавства і нерівної боротьби за право української мови і літератури на самостійне існування і розвиток, подвижницька діяльність Максимовича набирає куди ширшого і глибшого значення. Та й стійкістю, сміливістю й вірністю своїм переконанням цей хворобливий, здавалося б, кабінетний учений викликає і по нинішній день подив історика літератури. Звертає також на себе увагу ціложиттєва подвижницька праця вченого відданого науці, бережного поцінувача мови й історії народу, його національних тра-

дицій, а надто писемних фолкльорних скарбів і спадщини, до яких відносився з повагою й любов'ю.

Ця любов справила, що він уважно стежив і за сучасним розвитком нової української літератури, яку збагатив перекладом *Слова*. Не дивно, отже, коли помер Шевченко, Максимович у своєму вірші „На похорон Т. Шевченка” писав:

Сподівалися Шевченка
Сей год на Вкраїну;
А діждалися побачить
Його домовину.

Стоїть в Каневі в соборі,
Вся квітками ввита;
По-козацьки — червоною
Китайкою вкрита.

Ідуть люди, — перед нею
Поклон покладають,
І за душу Кобзареву
Господа благають.

Скільки виплакав він горя
Гіркими сльозами,
Скільки виплакав печалі
Віщими словами!

Все бажалось йому волі
Для свого народу...
І не діждав того часу
Як вийшла свобода.

Як і всі передові діячі української культури, Михайло Максимович був палким поборником волі народу, захисником історії оцих „рабів німих”. Як прийнято в епоху романтизму, на сторожі коло їх він поставив слово, підбудовуючи його передовою європейською наукою та літературою, а насамперед— рідною історичною й літературно-культурною традицією.

Як учений і громадянин, Михайло Максимович добре розумів значення й вагу для нормального розвитку народу пам'яток історії, літератури й культури, їхню роль у збереженні і продовженні національної традиції та формуванні свідомости народу. Свідчить про це представлена тут його фолкльористично-видавнича діяльність, основні дослідження, переклади та теоретичні й полемічні писання, які водночас промощували в Україні шлях для нових романтичних віянь.

Bohdan Krawchenko

CHANGES IN THE NATIONAL AND SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE FROM THE REVOLUTION TO 1976

The dismissal of Petro Shelest from the post of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) in May 1972 was a notable event in the history of the party. He was accused of having intentionally promoted a heretical tendency—Ukrainian nationalism—within the bosom of the party.¹ It appears that the trends towards greater national self-assertion that had characterized the intelligentsia of the Ukrainian SSR in the postwar period had also penetrated the upper levels of the party leadership.

Clearly the CPU and its leadership had changed. The climb of Ukrainians within the party to positions of authority had been a long and hard one—as tortuous as the history of their country in this century. Paradoxically, the very policies promoting social and economic development that were to have “solved” the national question produced their opposite result. They made that question a concern of a milieu that had traditionally eschewed it. Our task

Throughout this paper we will refer to the Communist Party of Ukraine and Communist Party of the Soviet Union, even though in the period under study their names changed several times. The support of this research by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged.

¹ See Grey Hodnett, “The Views of Petro Shelest,” *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States*, no. 37-8 (1978-80), 209-43, and his “Ukrainian Politics and the Purge of Shelest,” paper delivered to the Midwest Slavic Conference, Ann Arbor, Mich., 5-7 May 1977.

in this article is to document an aspect of that process, namely, to analyze how the membership of the CPU changed from the revolution to 1976.

The CPU before Industrialization

Tsarism bequeathed its successors in Ukraine a society marked by profound social and national cleavages: a Russian or Russified town, proletariat, and intelligentsia on the one hand; and a Ukrainian village, semiproletariat and paraprofessional intelligentsia on the other.² The Bolshevik organization in Ukraine reflected these social discontinuities. On the eve of the October Revolution the Bolsheviks were a small organization in Ukraine: 22,569 members in August 1917, a paltry figure for a country of over 27 million people.³ Two-thirds of the members were concentrated in the industrial southeastern corner of Ukraine—the Donbas.⁴ With a mere 209 rural party cells and 16 percent of the membership classified as peasant, the Bolsheviks had little influence in the countryside.⁵ Ukrainians (roughly 80 percent of the population) were virtually absent from party ranks. The overwhelming majority of members were either Russian or Jewish.⁶ When the Bolshevik regime finally established itself in Ukraine at the end of 1919 (after two unsuccessful attempts) it was “largely by virtue of the authority of Moscow, Russian Communists and the Russian Red Army,” wrote L. Trotsky in 1920,⁷ and with the opprobrium of being an alien national force.

The record of the local Bolsheviks in Ukraine during the revolution was characterized by helplessness. During the events of 1918, for example, the party simply collapsed, leaving in October of that year a membership of 5,000.⁸ By the end of 1920 the party's

² For a discussion of the social structure of Ukraine before the revolution see Bohdan Krawchenko, “The Social Structure of Ukraine at the Turn of the 20th Century,” *East European Quarterly*, 1982, no. 2, 171-81.

³ *Shestoi sezd RSDRP (bolshevikov), avgust 1917 goda. Protokoly* (Moscow, 1958), 207; *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR v 1964 rotsi* (Kiev, 1965), 9. (Population data are for the year 1913.)

⁴ *Shestoi sezd RSDRP*, 207.

⁵ S. Kikhotiev, *Oktiabrskaiia revoliutsiia i pervye sotsialisticheskie preobrazovaniia v Donetsko-Krivorozhskom basseine* (Kiev, 1969), 118.

⁶ M. Shapoval, *Sotsiografiia Ukrainy* (Prague, 1933), 77.

⁷ *The Trotsky Papers*, 2 vols. (The Hague, 1971), 1:347.

⁸ M. Iavorsky, “K istorii KP(b)U,” in *Oktiabrskaiia revoliutsiia: Pervoe piatiletie* (Kharkiv, 1922), 105.

fortunes had improved and its numbers had risen to 42,018,⁹ but only because new blood had been infused from two sources. By far the most important source was the arrival of cadres from Russia to bolster what, by Lenin's own admission, was a pathetically weak Soviet apparatus.¹⁰ The second source of new members was the absorption of other parties by the CPU. The most important of these was the Borotbisty, former left-wing Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries who had proven their mettle during the Austro-German occupation. According to M. Skrypnyk, 4,000 Borotbisty joined the CPU,¹¹ providing it with much needed influence among the peasantry and cadres "who spoke Ukrainian."¹² By late 1920 almost 20 percent of CPU members had their origins in other political organizations.¹³

The first available data on the social and national composition of the CPU are for the year 1920. The (incomplete) re-registration of party members that occurred in that year revealed that Ukrainians represented less than a quarter of the CPU. In terms of social origin, almost 60 percent was proletarian (see table 1; there are no statistics on the actual occupation).

Table 1: CPU Membership in 1920¹⁴

By social origin		By national composition	
Workers	58%	Ukrainians	23%
Intelligentsia	6%	Russians	50%
White-collar staff	22%	Others	27%
Peasants	14%		

Whatever weight Ukrainians may have gained inside the CPU as a result of the entry of the Borotbisty was soon to be undermined. On the surface, the resolutions of the Tenth Congress of

⁹ M. Donii, *Shosta konferentsiia KP(b)U* (Kiev, 1963), 147-48.

¹⁰ V. I. Lenin *pro Ukrainu*, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1969), 1:224-25.

¹¹ *Dvenadtsatyi sezd RKP(b). Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow, 1968), 572.

¹² M. M. Popov, *Narys istorii Komunistychnoi partii (bilshovykiv) Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1929), 219.

¹³ A. Gilinskii, "Sostoianie KP(b)U k piatiletiiu Oktiabrskoi revoliutsii," in *Oktiabrskaiia revoliutsiia*, 168.

¹⁴ Ibid., 167, and N. N. Popov, *Natsionalnaia politika Sovetskoi vlasti* (Moscow, 1927), 98.

the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1921, which contained a call to draw into the party more members from the indigenous nationalities and to strengthen party influence in the countryside in connection with the New Economic Policy and a condemnation of Russian chauvinism, ought to have favoured the entry of Ukrainians.¹⁵ The same congress, however, announced a purge of "petit bourgeois" elements "not trained in the Communist spirit."¹⁶ While the scope of the purge is a matter of some controversy—some give a figure of 22 percent of the total party membership as having been purged, others "almost half"¹⁷—on the question of who was purged the issue is clear. It was the Ukrainian members who were expelled. Of the 4,000 Borotbisty who joined the CPU in 1920, only 118 remained.¹⁸ Because the purges were more acute in the nonindustrial regions and struck the peasants more than workers, this also supports the conclusion that Ukrainians were disproportionately affected.¹⁹ Ukrainian Communists complained that the purge directive was being implemented by elements hostile to any concessions on the national question.²⁰ Indeed, the attitudes prevailing among the party leadership can be seen from the fact that a mass shutdown of Ukrainian-language newspapers had taken place.²¹ In addition to the purge, the continuing practice of sending members from Russia into the republic contributed towards marginalizing Ukrainians in the party.²²

In the light of the 1922 party census it can be said that the 56,000-strong CPU had become an urban military-bureaucratic apparatus. Almost half of the members (48 percent) were in the Red Army. Only 14 percent of this wing of the organization were Ukrainian. Almost 80 percent of the members lived in towns; 44

¹⁵ *KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniakh sezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK*, 4 vols. (Moscow, 1954), 1:553-56.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 250.

¹⁷ *Odinatsiati sezd RKP(b). Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow, 1961), 743; M. Skrypyk, *Neprymyrenym shliakhom* (Kharkiv, 1929), 40.

¹⁸ *Dvenadtsati sezd RKP(b)*, 572.

¹⁹ Donii, 151.

²⁰ *Dvenadtsati sezd RKP(b)*, 572.

²¹ Popov, *Narys istorii*, 273-74.

²² For example, over 5,000 members were sent into Ukraine from Russia in this period. See *Narys istorii Komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy*, 3d ed. (Kiev, 1971), 304.

percent lived in provincial capitals. While 51 percent of the members claimed to be proletarian, almost 90 percent of all workers in the CPU were employed as state, party, trade-union, or economic-administration functionaries. The toiling element in the CPU was represented by 7 percent who still worked in factories and by 1 percent employed in agriculture.²³ The party's weakness in rural areas is graphically illustrated by Kiev province. There one thousand members lived in rural regions; of these a mere three hundred were actually peasants. At the time the rural population of this province was over three million.²⁴

To say that Ukrainians were underrepresented in the CPU is stating the case rather mildly (see table 2). Russians, who formed 6 percent of the republic's population in 1926, accounted for 54 percent of the party's membership.²⁵ In the CPU Ukrainians accounted for 20 percent of the workers, 22 percent of white-collar staff, and 38 percent of the peasants.²⁶ (In the 1926 population census, Ukrainians represented 55 percent of the working class, 52 percent of white-collar staff, and almost 90 percent of the peasants in the republic.) Linguistically the party was worlds apart from the population: 99 percent of the CPU members spoke Russian fluently, and 82 percent claimed it as their language of everyday use. Ukrainian was spoken by a mere 11 percent of the members.²⁷ Even this figure exaggerates the point, since party members interpreted the census question "language of conversation" to mean mother tongue.²⁸ In a 1921 report, Khrystiiian Rakovsky admitted that a mere 2 percent of CPU members "maintained a tie with the Ukrainian language."²⁹ Bearing in mind that 75 percent of the population in 1926 gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue, the disproportions were rather marked.

²³ *Vserossiiskaia perepis 1922 goda chlenov RKP. Itogi partperepisi 1922 goda na Ukraine* (Kharkiv, 1922), vii, xii. (Hereafter *Itogi 1922*).

²⁴ *Narysy istorii Kyivskoi oblasnoi partiinoi orhanizatsii* (Kiev, 1967), 273.

²⁵ Data from the 1926 census here and below are found in Bohdan Krawchenko, "The Impact of Industrialization on the Social Structure of Ukraine," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 1980, no. 3, 338-57.

²⁶ *Itogi 1922*, vii, ix, xii, 178-79.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ M. Ravich-Cherkassky, *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi partii (b-ov) Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1923), 242.

²⁹ Cited by Kyianyn (pseud.), "Na Ukraini," *Nova Ukraina*, 1924, no. 3, 262.

Table 2: CPU Membership in 1922³⁰

By social origin		By national composition	
Workers	51%	Ukrainians	23%
White-collar staff	29%	Russians	54%
Peasants	18%	Jews	14%
Unknown	2%	Others	7%

The party was thus alienated not only from the millions of Ukrainians it ruled, but also from the proletariat in whose name it claimed to exercise dictatorship. "When Soviet power was established in Ukraine," as was pointed out in a Soviet Ukrainian journal, "the majority of the population spoke its own Ukrainian language, but the state issued decrees and instructions in Russian; the Communist party also used Russian in its propaganda, and the entire central Soviet apparatus functioned in Russian. Following its example, as could be expected, Russian was used by all local organs, right down to the level of the village soviet."³¹ The consequence, as Mykola Popov wrote on the eve of the Seventh CPU Congress (April 1923), was that "we have been unable at the present time, in the sixth year of the revolution, in spite of the strengthening of Soviet rule, to suppress the political banditism about which central Russian provinces have forgotten a long time ago." Those party members who thought they could conquer the Ukrainian nation by Russifying it were mistaken. The only alternative, Popov concluded, was "to conquer the Ukrainian masses" by transacting "party and cultural work in the Ukrainian language."³² At the Twelfth CPSU Congress (1923) the party altered its policies on the national question by enunciating a programme of "indigenization" (*korenizatsiia*), which in Ukraine took the form of a multifaceted policy known as Ukrainization.³³

From 1923 on a number of developments within the party and society favoured the growth of Ukrainian membership within

³⁰ *Itohi* 1922, xii.

³¹ "Navishcho nam Ukrainizatsiia?" *Silsko-hospodarskyi prolietar*, 1923, no. 5, 1.

³² M. M. Popov, "Natsionalna problema na Ukraini," *Nova kultura*, 1923, no. 7-8, 14, 16.

³³ See James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983).

the CPU. The policy of Ukrainization resulted in a more tolerant attitude towards the Ukrainian intelligentsia. The Ukrainization of the educational system saw a new generation of Ukrainian specialists and cultural workers appear, and these sought a place for themselves in the CPU. Secondly, the economic recovery saw Ukrainian youth leave the village and join the working class, resulting in "the entry of new, young cadres" into the party.³⁴ (In 1927, the average member had been in the CPU two to three years.)³⁵ Finally, influential Ukrainian "national Communist" cadres — Oleksander Shumsky, Mykola Skrypnyk, and others, pressed the party to be more consequential in its recruitment of Ukrainians. Stalin, his hands full with the struggle against the Left Opposition, was anxious to win this national current to his side, or at least to neutralize it. So, with the arrival of his plenipotentiary, Lazar Kaganovich, in the spring of 1925, Ukrainization of the CPU was speeded up. Kaganovich himself set an example in this respect by making all official pronouncements in Ukrainian.³⁶

The 1927 party census showed the results of the new policies and social developments.³⁷ The CPU had greatly expanded its membership to 182,396 full and candidate members by 1927. Of the 168,087 members who completed their questionnaires, 52 percent were Ukrainian, virtually double the 1922 figure, and almost 70 percent of the Ukrainian members gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue (compared to 46 percent in 1922). In the CPU as a whole, one third of the members now claimed Ukrainian as their native language. Although in terms of class designation 62 percent of the CPU were workers, only 34 percent were proletarians in their present occupation. Only 9 percent were peasants. Half the membership was concentrated in the industrial regions of Ukraine. The change in the ethnically Ukrainian membership of the CPU reflected the ever-growing penetration of that group into the urban and industrial environment. While in 1922, 20 percent of the Ukrai-

³⁴ F. Sherstiuk, *Partiine budivnytstvo na Ukraini v 1926-1929 rr.* (Kiev, 1960), 61.

³⁵ L. Kahanovych, *Natsionalna polityka bilshovykiv Ukrainy* (New York, 1928), 82.

³⁶ See *ibid.* for measures dealing with Ukrainization of the CPU.

³⁷ For a more detailed analysis of the 1927 census see Basil Dmytryshyn, "National and Social Composition of the Membership of the Communist Party (bolshevik) of the Ukraine, 1918-1928," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, 1957, no. 3, 244-58.

nian membership of the CPU was considered to be working-class, by 1927 this figure had risen to 56 percent.³⁸

Table 3: CPU Membership in 1927³⁹

By social origin		By national composition	
Working class	62%	Ukrainians	52%
White-collar staff	17%	Russians	28%
Peasants	19%	Jews	12%
Others	2%	Others	8%

The CPU during the 1930s

In the climactic era of industrialization Ukrainian society was transformed. Millions of Ukrainians moved into urban centres and industrial occupations, in part to escape the horrors of collectivization and the man-made famine. Tens of thousands of others graduated from technical schools and universities, which had expanded in order to meet industry's needs for technical expertise. In the process, Ukrainians established decisive majorities in the critical sectors of society—the cities, industry, and higher educational institutions. Ukrainians' achievements in this respect would have been even more impressive had the man-made famine of 1932-33 not reduced the numbers available for entry into the urban and industrial milieus. It is equally likely that Ukrainians' new social weight would have manifested itself in greater political and cultural assertiveness, unleashing, as S. Dimanshtein noted, centrifugal forces.⁴⁰ The CPSU leadership, however, adopted policies to ensure that this did not occur. In 1933 Ukrainization was

³⁸ *Sotsialnyi i natsionalnyi sostav VKP(b). Itogi vsesoiuznoi partiinoi perepisi 1927 goda* (Moscow, 1928), 20, 149-50; *Vsesoiuznaia partiinaia perepis 1927 goda. Vypusk II: I. Sotsialnyi sostav VKP(b). II. Kommunisticheskaia prosloika v promyshlennykh predpriiatiakh* (Moscow, 1927), 6-7; *Vsesoiuznaia partiinaia perepis 1927 goda. Vypusk VII: I. Narodnost i rodnoi iazyk chlenov VKP(b) i kandidatov v chleny. II. Sostav komunistov korennoi narodnosti v natsionalnykh respublikakh i oblastiakh SSR* (Moscow, 1927), 51-52.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ S. Dimanshtein, "Problemy natsionalnoi kultury i kulturnogo stroitelstva v natsionalnykh respublikakh," *Vestnik Kommunisticheskoi akademii*, no. 31 (1929), 122.

abandoned, and throughout the 1930s the CPU would be hit constantly where it mattered most: its leadership would be decimated.

In 1933, with the arrival of Pavel Postyshev, the "hangman of Ukraine," the first mass purge of the 1930s occurred in the republic. Accompanied by almost five thousand "leading cadres" sent from Russia to occupy "leading posts,"⁴¹ Postyshev's mission was to rid the CPU of national Communists ("the Skrypnyk nationalist counterrevolution"), as well as to change existing cultural policies and to provide "Bolshevik leadership in agriculture."⁴² The purge unfolded at the height of the famine. Its impact on the local and republican Ukrainian leadership was profound. The same cannot be said of ordinary Ukrainian CPU members. A consequence of the purge all too often overlooked was a growing polarity between an increasingly Ukrainian rank and file and the Russian leadership of the CPU.

On 1 January 1933, the eve of the purge (the purge began in the spring of that year), the CPU had 550,433 full and candidate members. When compared with the 1930 figure of 270,089 members, the 1933 figure shows just how rapid party growth had been during the first five-year plan. Under the impact of the pull of industrialization and the push of collectivization, Ukrainians had increased their representation in the CPU from 53 to 61 percent over that three-year period.⁴³ During the purge, the CPU lost close to 97,000 members.⁴⁴ One should note that in 1933 the word "purge" took on a new meaning. As Postyshev explained during the November 1933 CPU Central Committee plenum, "almost all of the people removed were arrested and put before the firing squad or exiled," that is, sent to prison camps.⁴⁵ Between the spring of 1933 and January 1934, close to 20,000 CPU members in "responsible positions" were expelled for nationalism.⁴⁶ Ukrainians in the CPU declined from 61 to 60 percent. The purge also affected the social composition of the CPU: members giving

⁴¹ P. P. Postyshev and S. V. Kosior, *Soviet Ukraine Today* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1934), 11-12.

⁴² P. P. Postyshev, "Itogi 1933 selskokhoziaistvennogo goda i ocherednye zadachi KP(b)U," *Partiinoe stroitel'stvo*, 1933, no. 23-24, 8.

⁴³ Iu. V. Babko, *Partiine budivnytstvo na Ukraini u 1933-1937 rr.* (Lviv, 1971), 14-15.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 14-15, 124-25.

⁴⁵ Cited by Mykola Kovalevsky, *Ukraina pid chervonym iarmom. Dokumenty i fakty* (Warsaw-Lviv, 1936), 157.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* See also *Pravda*, 23 January 1934.

"worker" as their occupation dropped from 52 percent in 1930 to 31 percent by the autumn of 1933.⁴⁷ Whereas in 1925 six out of nine full Politburo members were Ukrainian, the twelve-member Politburo that emerged from the January 1934 Congress contained only four Ukrainians. Of the four Central Committee secretaries only one, the fourth secretary, was a Ukrainian.⁴⁸

While in the 1920s data were published on Ukrainian-language usage within the party, the 1930s were not so generous. However, evidence suggests that the message of the campaign against Ukrainian national aspirations had been received by the membership. By Postyshev's own admission in 1935, "members have begun to de-Ukrainianize themselves and even to stop speaking the Ukrainian language." The situation had reached such a critical point that even Postyshev stated "this is a very serious development and we must pay considerable attention to it."⁴⁹

The "great purge" of 1936-38 in Ukraine was initiated by a CPU Central Committee resolution in May 1935, which echoed the CPSU Central Committee's April 1935 call for a "verification of party documents."⁵⁰ Because the purge made little headway in Ukraine, Moscow criticized the CPU leadership for "shortcomings" in the verification process.⁵¹ In February 1936, the purge began in earnest. Having devastated the party ranks, it subsided by January 1938 with the appointment of Nikita Khrushchev to the post of first secretary of the CPU. He was charged with the responsibility of rebuilding the shattered party. The main reason why, in Khrushchev's words, the CPU "had been purged spotless" was because the CPU had offered the greatest resistance to Stalin's apparatus of terror.⁵² Party data for this period pay eloquent tribute to the thoroughness of that apparatus.

In studying the impact of the great purge of 1936-38 on party membership, the student of the CPU has considerable ad-

⁴⁷ Babko, *Partiine budivnytstvo*, 14-15; *Partiinoe stroitelstvo*, 1933, no. 21, 32.

⁴⁸ *Narysy istorii Komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy*, 311, 319, 326, 339, 362-63; Jurij Borys, "Who Ruled the Soviet Ukraine in Stalin's Time? (1917-1939)," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 1972, no. 2, 228.

⁴⁹ P. Postyshev, "O nekotorykh zadachakh marksistko-leninskogo obrazovaniia," *Kommunisticheskaia revoliutsiia*, 1935, no. 3, 10.

⁵⁰ *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy v rezoliutsiakh i rishenniakh zizdiv, konferentsii i plenumiv TsK*, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1976-77), 1:871.

⁵¹ *Visti*, 1 February 1936.

⁵² *Pravda*, 28 January 1938.

vantage over his counterpart examining the CPSU. This is because, unlike the CPSU, the CPU held congresses every two years, and between 1934 and 1938 three such congresses took place. Data on membership released on those occasions provide us with information about changes in the number of CPU members. Moreover, a Soviet Ukrainian scholar, Iu. V. Babko, published in 1971 an excellent monograph that throws light on the effects of the purge on the social and national composition of the CPU.

Because between January 1934 and May 1938 recruitment into the CPU was at a virtual standstill,⁵³ we can get a rather precise idea of the number of people purged. In January 1934 the party numbered 453,526 members. By May 1938 the number had fallen to 285,818.⁵⁴ The party had lost 167,708 members, or 37 percent of its total membership. The national and social composition of the party members was substantially altered as a result of the purge. We do not have data that allow us to gauge the impact of the entire purge period. But on 1 April 1937 Ukrainians represented 57 percent of the total membership of the CPU, a drop of three percentage points when compared to October 1933 (see table 4). This means that approximately 40 percent of the Ukrainians in the CPU in 1933 were purged by April 1937. In terms of the *occupational* structure of the CPU ranks, workers represented 51 percent of the total in 1932 and a mere 25 percent by 1937, while the proportion of white-collar staff increased from 32 to 70 percent (see table 5). The overwhelming majority of CPU members were now bureaucrats, "functionaries in the party, state, and economic organizations."⁵⁵

Table 4: National Composition of the CPU, 1933-40⁵⁶

	Ukrainians	Russians	Others
October 1933	60%	23%	17%
April 1937	57%	—	—
May 1940	63%	19%	18%

⁵³ Babko, *Partiine budivnytstvo*, 452.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 14-15, 124-25.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 125.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 14-15, 124-25; M. S. Khrushchov, "Zvitna dopovid TsK KP(b)U XV zizdovi Komunistychnoi partii (bilshovykiv) Ukrainy," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, 1940, no. 6, 21.

Table 5: Occupational Structure of the CPU, 1932-37⁵⁷

	Workers	White-collar staff	Collective farmers	Others
1932	51%	32%	15%	2%
1933	48%	36%	15%	1%
1937	25%	70%	5%	0%

The great purge in Ukraine was an orgy of terror even by the standards of the day. At the Fourteenth CPU Congress in June 1938 it was announced that two-thirds of the party's leadership at the city, oblast, raion, and village levels had been purged.⁵⁸ Except for Hryhorii Petrovsky, who was arrested, the entire Politburo perished. Of the fifty-nine-member Central Committee elected at the congress, only Semen Tymoshenko, later marshal of the Soviet Union, had survived from the previous Central Committee.⁵⁹ Khrushchev noted that "it seemed as though not one regional or executive Committee secretary, not one secretary of the Council of People's Commissars, not even a single deputy was left. We had to start rebuilding from scratch."⁶⁰

The Communist Party of Ukraine was rebuilt very quickly. Spurred by various resolutions urging an all-out campaign to gain new members, the CPU grew from 285,818 members at the time of the Fourteenth Congress (June 1938) to 521,078 by the Fifteenth Congress (May 1940).⁶¹ The rapid intake of new members improved the representation of Ukrainians in the party. In May 1940 they accounted for 63 percent of the total membership (see table 4). The increase was certainly not the result of the addition of new members through the annexation of Western Ukraine in 1939. When Western Ukraine was occupied, the Communist forces there were in a state of disarray. Stalin had dissolved the Communist Party of Poland and its subordinate organization, the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, in the summer of 1938. In 1940 there were only 11,280 party members in Western Ukraine.⁶²

⁵⁷ "Kolichestvennyi i kachestvennyi sostav partii," *Partiinoe stroitel'stvo*, 1932, no. 9, 50; Babko, *Partiine budivnytstvo*, 14-15, 124-25.

⁵⁸ *Visti*, 20 June 1938.

⁵⁹ V. Holub[nychy], "Konspektyvnyi narys istorii KP(b)U," *Ukrainskyi zbirnyk*, 1957, no. 9, 127-30.

⁶⁰ *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston-Toronto, 1970), 108.

⁶¹ Khrushchov, "Zvitna dopovid," 21.

⁶² V. L. Varetsky, *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia u zakhidnykh oblastiakh URSR (v dovoiennyi period)* (Kiev, 1960), 152. For a history of

Ukrainians improved their representation because of the insecurity that Khrushchev felt when assuming the leadership of the CPU. He had told Stalin that he was "afraid the Ukrainians, and particularly the intelligentsia, might be very cool to me" and that "it hardly makes sense to send me, a Russian, to Ukraine."⁶³ At the Fifteenth CPU Congress he sought to reassure the Ukrainian cadres that they would have a place in the new regime.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the fact remained that although the rank and file was largely Ukrainian, within the Politburo, out of eight full and candidate members, only three belonged to the indigenous nationality.⁶⁵ The discrepancy continued until Stalin's death, and it was the first issue to explode on the political arena after he died.

The CPU in the Postwar Era

The Second World War was a watershed in the history of the CPU. In an effort to rally the Ukrainians' support against the Germans, strong appeals were made to their sense of national identity.⁶⁶ Also, the republic's constitutional prerogatives were expanded⁶⁷ This seemed to indicate that a more concessionary policy towards the national aspirations of Ukrainians was in the offing. When the war ended, however, sterner methods were introduced as Stalin sought to reestablish his grip on the shattered republic. In this process the reconstruction of the CPU played a crucial role. That party was in a perilous condition. Its membership had plummeted from 680,000 in 1940 to 164,743 by 1 January 1945. On 1 January 1946 Ukrainians formed 60 percent of the CPU ranks, a drop of 3 percent when this figure is compared with 1940 data.⁶⁸ What accounts for this decline in Ukrainian representation?

In the face of the rapid German advance the majority of party members fled eastward. Only 14,875 remained on the ter-

the Communist Party of Western Ukraine see Janusz Radziejowski, *The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1919-1929* (Edmonton, 1983).

⁶³ Khrushchev Remembers, 106-7.

⁶⁴ *Visti*, 18 May 1940.

⁶⁵ Holub[nychy], "Konspektyvnyi narys," 127-30.

⁶⁶ See *Lystivky partiinoho pidpillia i partyzanskykh zahoniv Ukrainy u roky Velykoi Vitchyznianoï viiny* (Kiev, 1969).

⁶⁷ *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy v rezoliutsiakh*, 2:20-23.

⁶⁸ A. I. Didkovsky, "Orhanizatsiine zmitsnennia partiinykh orhanizatsii Ukrainy v 1945-1952 rr.," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1981, no. 10, 81, 83.

ritory of Ukraine.⁶⁹ In October 1942 the CPSU Politburo decided to develop underground resistance to the German occupation, and the formation of clandestine party organizations was ordered.⁷⁰ Between 1942 and 1944 clandestine party committees had developed to such an extent that they included over 100,000 Communists and Komsomol members.⁷¹ The fact that these people were described as those accustomed to local conditions and that heavy recruitment took place in the oblasts of Left-Bank and Right-Bank Ukraine (areas with small Russian populations) indicates that the great majority of this membership was Ukrainian.⁷² When the republic was freed from German occupation, those who had entered the party during the period of clandestinity joined the ranks of the reconstituted CPU. Since their recruitment had not been supervised by party officialdom in Moscow, and some doubts as to their ideological reliability were expressed, a purge of those members recruited in the underground was ordered.⁷³ Although figures on the scope of the purge were never released, membership data suggest that around 100,000 members were dropped from CPU rolls: on 1 January 1944 the party had 274,411 members; by 1 January 1945, 164,743.⁷⁴ Information available for some oblasts shows the thoroughness of the purge. In March 1944 alone, in some raions of Luhansk oblast, for example, out of 1,647 members recruited during the occupation, 1,434 were expelled.⁷⁵ The atmosphere in the party that surrounded the fighters in the resistance was revealed later, after Stalin's death, when some of those expelled were rehabilitated. In 1954 an official party organ stated that "Officials of the Vinnytsia oblast and city committees treated the activities of the underground organization . . . in an irresponsible manner. An unhealthy atmosphere was created around certain former underground fight-

⁶⁹ *Narysy istorii Komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy*, 520.

⁷⁰ N. F. Kuzmin, *Kommunisticheskaia partiia—vdokhnovitel i organizator borby ukrainskogo naroda za sozdanie i ukreplenie ukrainskogo soetskogo gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1954), 34.

⁷¹ *Ukrainskaia SSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine Sovetskogo Soiuza*, 3 vols. (Kiev, 1975), 1:414.

⁷² G. T. Gorobets, *Partiinoe podpole na Ukraine 1941-1944 gg.* (Moscow, 1969), 72-89.

⁷³ *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy v rezoliutsiakh*, 2:36-37.

⁷⁴ *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy—boiowyi zahin KPRS* (Kiev, 1976), 16.

⁷⁵ M. F. Khoroshailov, *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy—orhanizator vidbudovy i rozvytku promyslovosti Donbasu (1943-1944 rr.)* (Kharkiv, 1967), 19.

ers.”⁷⁶ During the war, the vacuum left by the evacuation of party members to the east was most likely filled by indigenous people. The 1943-44 purge offset these gains.

There is a dearth of information about CPU membership between 1945 and 1949 (the latter being the year of the first post-war party congress). Numerically, the party grew in impressive proportions: from 164,743 to 684,275; almost two-thirds of its ranks had been recruited during the war.⁷⁷ In 1945, 60 percent of CPU members were either state or party functionaries.⁷⁸ In 1948, half the members gave white-collar staff as their social origin.⁷⁹ (Compare this with the autumn 1933 figure of 7 percent!)⁸⁰ Over a third of CPU members had completed higher or secondary education.⁸¹

Following the Sixteenth CPU Congress in 1949, the party was plagued by problems at the local leadership level. Two issues dominated. The first was the inability of the party to develop cadres who could manage the task of industrial and agricultural reconstruction. The second concerned the ideological front—the struggle against “bourgeois nationalism.” Between 1949 and 1952 the leadership of the oblast and raions was purged three times—each purge varying in scope and intensity.⁸² But during this period it does not appear as though Ukrainians lost ground in the apparatus. An unpublished Soviet dissertation claimed that in 1951, 71.4 percent of “directing cadres” in the CPU (at all levels) were Ukrainian.⁸³ Two reasons can be advanced as to why Ukrainians did not suffer reverses in terms of promotion to positions of responsibility in this period of flux of local party officials. The most important reason was that because the lack of adequate cadres was acutely felt, special party schools were established in the republic to train members in methods of economic management

⁷⁶ *Partiinaia zhizn*, 1954, no. 17, 23.

⁷⁷ *Radianska Ukraina*, 27 January 1949; *Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy* (Kiev, 1964), 581.

⁷⁸ P. G. Snitko, *Deiatelnost Kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy po ukrepleniiu soiuza rabochego klassa i kolhoznogo krestianstva (1946-1950 gg.)* (Kiev, 1966), 10.

⁷⁹ *Radianska Ukraina*, 27 January 1949.

⁸⁰ Babko, *Partiine budivnytstvo*, 14-15.

⁸¹ *Radianska Ukraina*, 27 January 1949.

⁸² *Radianska Ukraina*, 3 December 1949; *Pravda*, 2 July 1951; *Radianska Ukraina*, 25 September 1952.

⁸³ Cited by J. A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus* (New York, 1951), 16.

with the aim of dispatching graduates to posts in local party organizations. Evidence suggests that the overwhelming majority of recruits were Ukrainians.⁸⁴ Secondly, Oleksii Kyrychenko's promotion to second secretary may have played a role. When Khrushchev left Ukraine to assume the post of first secretary of Moscow oblast, and Leonid Melnikov became head of the CPU, Kyrychenko was charged with responsibility for cadres.⁸⁵ Judging by the people Kyrychenko promoted when he became head of the CPU after Melnikov's ouster in 1953, one can surmise that in this period he was already advancing local Ukrainian cadres to positions of responsibility.

Stalin's death in March 1953 was timely: it saved the CPU cadres from a major purge that was being prepared in connection with the Jewish "doctors' plot." After Stalin's death developments in the Ukrainian party leadership took a somewhat different course to those in the central Moscow leadership. Whereas "uncertainty, mistrust and political infighting prevailed in Moscow, the situation in the Kiev party leadership was marked by a process of consolidation."⁸⁶ In that connection an event almost unprecedented in the history of the CPU occurred in early June 1953. Following a Central Committee plenum, Melnikov, the head of the party, was dismissed because of "shortcomings in political work and in the leadership of economic and cultural development... deviations from the Leninist-Stalinist nationalities policy... by allowing grave errors in the selection of cadres and in the implementation of the party's nationalities policy."⁸⁷ Kyrychenko took his place.

With Kyrychenko's appointment the CPU was headed by a native Ukrainian for the first time in its history. The position of indigenous cadres in the top leadership was further enhanced with the promotion of Mykola Pidhorny (Nikolai Podgorny) to the strategic post of second secretary in August 1953.⁸⁸ The Eighteenth CPU Congress in 1954 revealed that the consolidation of Ukrainians in leadership positions was proceeding apace. 72 percent of the Central Committee members were Ukrainian.⁸⁹ In a

⁸⁴ *Radianska Ukraina*, 25 September 1952, refers to the recruitment of local cadres.

⁸⁵ *Radianska Ukraina*, 26 September 1952.

⁸⁶ Borys Lewytskyj, *Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine, 1953-1980* (Edmonton, 1984), 3.

⁸⁷ *Radianska Ukraina*, 13 June 1953.

⁸⁸ *Radianska Ukraina*, 19 August 1953.

⁸⁹ Borys Levytsky, "Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy — 1955 rik," *Ukrainskyi zbirnyk*, no. 3 (1965), 111.

marked reversal from past practice, of the eight full Politburo members elected at the Eighteenth Congress, all were Ukrainian. Of the three candidate members, one was Ukrainian. The four top posts in the Central Committee secretariat also went to Ukrainians.⁹⁰ That congress marked a turning point in the history of Ukraine. It saw the emergence of a new Ukrainian political elite.

That Ukrainians achieved a monopoly of top positions in the CPU was a reflection of the transformations that had occurred in the social structure of the Ukrainian nation. It was also the result of new attitudes of the Moscow leadership towards the Ukrainian party. Unlike Stalin, who regarded the republic with great suspicion, Khrushchev, who had a long association with Ukraine, took a much more sympathetic view. His attitude was epitomized by the theme that was developed in 1954 during the celebration of the three-hundredth anniversary of the Pereiaslav Treaty. A note of partnership was sounded. The Russians were still described as the "leading nation," but the Ukrainians were singled out from among other nationalities for the role of associates in the development of the USSR. The new Ukrainian leadership was grateful for the trust that was shown in them. But the partnership—association theme was a double-edged sword. It also meant that the Ukrainian leadership, hesitantly at first, would demand a greater voice in managing the affairs of the republic.

It was against the background of these events that the Nineteenth CPU Congress met in January 1956. There were now 895,000 party members.⁹¹ The only other data available on the members are for occupation: 54 percent were state and party functionaries. All full Politburo members and secretaries of the Central Committee elected at the congress were Ukrainian.⁹² But Ukrainian representation among the "directing cadres of the party" dropped from 72 percent in 1951 to 68 percent in 1956.⁹³

The decline in the proportion of Ukrainians among "directing cadres" was undoubtedly in part a reflection of the addition of the largely Russian Crimea oblast to Ukraine. It was also a consequence of the reforms instituted by Khrushchev in the organization of the state. In connection with the transformation of former

⁹⁰ *Radianska Ukraina*, 27 March 1954.

⁹¹ *Radianska Ukraina*, 19 January 1956.

⁹² A. O. Ianiuk, "Zrostannia silskykh partiinykh orhanizatsii Ukrainy (1956-1961 rr.)," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1963, no. 1, 43; *Ocherki istorii*, 581.

⁹³ *Pravda*, 25 December 1956.

Union ministries into Union-republican institutions, many officials from Moscow were transferred to the republics. The influx of Russian officials into Ukraine emerged as a bone of contention between the party centre in Moscow and the Ukrainian leadership. Although the issue became more prominent with the *sovnarkhoz* reform, the Ukrainian party leadership first expressed its concern in 1956. The protest was often phrased in terms of the need to select "as Soviet and party functionaries those who speak the people's language, know their cultural history and national traditions, for otherwise there can be no real organizational and political work," to quote from an article in the authoritative *Komunist Ukrainy* in 1956.⁹⁴

The Twentieth CPSU Congress initiated a new period in Ukraine. At the congress Khrushchev announced that "the rights of republican ministries are to be considerably expanded."⁹⁵ This statement was in effect a preliminary announcement of the *sovnarkhoz* reform. Instituted in 1957, it greatly enhanced the republic's rights in the field of economic jurisdiction.⁹⁶ Under that reform, 97 percent of the gross industrial production of the republic was produced by enterprises under the direct control of the republic.⁹⁷

Although the reform was greeted with adulation in Ukraine, major differences developed between the CPU leadership and the Moscow centre over it. Significant for our discussion were the tensions that arose around the question of who was to staff the eleven economic councils that were created in Ukraine. In the Ukrainian

⁹⁴ H. Emelianenko, "Leninski pryntsyipy natsionalnoi polityky KPRS," *Komunist Ukrainy*, 1956, no. 8, 58.

⁹⁵ *Pravda*, 15 February 1956.

⁹⁶ *Sovnarkhoz* stands for *sovet narodnogo khoziaistva*—Council of the National Economy. The *sovnarkhoz* reform resulted in the abolition of ten Union and fifteen Union-republican ministries. Economic councils were made the supreme organ of economic management. In Ukraine eleven economic regions were established, each with its own *sovnarkhoz*. These were given responsibility for the enterprises that until then had been the domain of Union and Union-republican ministries. The economic councils established in Ukraine were to be directed by the Council of Ministers of the republic, and the USSR Council of Ministers was to exercise indirect control over the enterprises through the republican organs. (*Radianska Ukraina*, 1 June 1957.)

⁹⁷ I. Starovoitenko and F. Khyliuk, "Pro planuvannia kompleksnoho rozvytku hospodarstva oblasti," *Ekonomika Radianskoi Ukrainy*, 1969, no. 6, 2.

press it was officially stated that efforts should be made to recruit local people.⁹⁸ Moscow, however, sent thousands of employees from the now defunct Union ministries to Ukraine not only to work in the local economic councils, but to occupy many of the top positions in them.⁹⁹ That the transfers provoked opposition in Ukraine is clear from the numerous rebukes that began appearing in the press, which stated that "In the selection and placement of personnel, remnants of nationalism show up in opposing personnel of the native nationality to personnel of another nationality, in the desire to select personnel according to nationality only."¹⁰⁰

Prior to the Twentieth CPSU Congress very few data on party membership were published. In 1958 the first article giving some details about the CPU ranks in the postwar period appeared. By 1958 CPU membership topped the one million mark (1,095,250). Data on the social origin of party members showed a continuing domination of those from white-collar-staff backgrounds (see table 6). But information on social origin has always shown the party to be a good deal more proletarian than it really was. The occupation of CPU members is a more realistic indicator of their place in the social hierarchy. Information released in 1958 showed that 65 percent worked in white-collar occupations, 21 percent were workers, and 14 percent were collective farmers.¹⁰¹ Nationality data showed that Ukrainians formed just 60 percent of the CPU membership, Russians, 28 percent, and other nationalities, 12 percent: that is, the situation remained just as it had been in 1946. Undoubtedly this can be explained by the incorporation of the Crimea in 1954 and the influx of Russian officials in the wake of the *sounarkhoz* reform. It was also a consequence of the social bias that existed in recruitment. The party ranks were chosen from among the socially mobilized sectors of society, and Ukrainians were underrepresented in those layers. The weight of Ukrainians in the CPU was almost identical to their share in the white-collar-staff category—60 percent in 1959.¹⁰² (Ukrainians formed 77 percent of the population.)

⁹⁸ *Radianska Ukraina*, 8 June 1957 (editorial).

⁹⁹ *Radianska Ukraina*, 11 June 1958.

¹⁰⁰ *Radianska Ukraina*, 12 December 1958.

¹⁰¹ "Boiovyi zahin KPRS. Kompartiiia Ukrainy v tsyfrakh," *Komunist Ukrainy*, 1978, no. 6, 28-41.

¹⁰² Iu. V. Arutiunian, "Izmenenie sotsialnoi struktury sovetskikh natsii," *Istoriia SSSR*, 1972, no. 4, 6, 13.

Table 6: Social Origin of CPU Members, 1948-58¹⁰³

	1948	1958
Workers	34 %	33 %
White-collar staff	50 %	49 %
Collective farmers	16 %	18 %

The hegemony enjoyed by Ukrainians in the top leadership of the CPU under Kyrychenko continued under Pidhorny's and Petro Shelest's tenures as CPU first secretaries. In 1966, for example, nine out of eleven full members, and four out of five candidate members, of the Politburo were Ukrainians.¹⁰⁴ In 1971, nine out of ten full Politburo members and all five candidate members belonged to the indigenous nationality.¹⁰⁵ According to a CIA study, in 1964, out of thirty-three "top party officials" in the republic, thirty, or 91 percent, were Ukrainian.¹⁰⁶ Grey Hodnett's comprehensive study of the leadership in both state and party sectors showed that over 75 percent of "all leading jobs" between 1955 and 1972 were held by Ukrainians.¹⁰⁷

Under Kyrychenko and Pidhorny the CPU experienced an exceptionally high growth rate. Between 1958 and 1961 party ranks increased from 1,095,250 to 1,580,169 members, or by 44 percent.¹⁰⁸ By contrast, the CPSU grew by just 18 percent in the same period.¹⁰⁹ Perhaps this expansion of the CPU can be explained by the fact that the Soviet leadership under Khrushchev permitted Ukrainians to build up their base by recruiting heavily into the hitherto underrepresented CPU as a way of strengthening Khrushchev's own position. In the next four-year period, 1961-65, the growth of the CPU ranks was brought into line with the CPSU rate. At the Twenty-third CPU Congress (1966) Shelest announced that the party now had 2,122,816 members. It had grown by 34 percent, while CPSU had grown by 33 percent during the same period.¹¹⁰ The last CPU congress—the twenty-fourth—to

¹⁰³ "Boiovyi zahin KPRS," 28-41.

¹⁰⁴ *Pravda Ukrainy*, 19 March 1966.

¹⁰⁵ *Pravda Ukrainy*, 18 March 1971.

¹⁰⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, *Research Aid: The CPSU under Brezhnev* (Washington, 1976), 73.

¹⁰⁷ Grey Hodnett, *Leadership in the Soviet National Republics: A Quantitative Study of Recruitment Policy* (Oakville, Ont., 1978), 105, table 2.13.

¹⁰⁸ *Pravda Ukrainy*, 28 September 1961.

¹⁰⁹ *Partiinaiia zhizn*, 1973, no. 14, 9-10.

¹¹⁰ *Materialy XII sezda Kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy* (Kiev, 1961), 99-118.

be held with Shelest in command took place in 1971. By then party membership had grown to 2,534,561. This was a 19-percent increase over the 1966 figure, compared to a 16-percent increase for the CPSU.¹¹¹

Important changes occurred in the geographical distribution of the CPU membership. In the past the party organizations of the Donbas dominated the CPU. While the single largest oblast party organization was still that of Donetsk oblast with 270,000 members in 1971, of whom 53 percent gave Ukrainian as their nationality, the Kiev oblast organization came a very close second with 230,000 members. In 1971 over half the CPU ranks were located in the central and western Ukrainian regions.¹¹² In terms of social origin, the CPU became more proletarian between 1958 and 1971 (see table 7). But, as already noted, data on social origin must be treated with a great deal of skepticism. Far more indicative of the real social profile of the CPU would be information about the occupations of party members. This information is not available. However, trends in the levels of educational achievement of party members are diametrically opposite to those that would indicate a greater working-class composition of the CPU. Between 1958 and 1968 the percentage of CPU members with a higher education grew from 16 to 29. In 1971, 45 percent of all specialists in Ukraine with a higher or incomplete higher education belonged to the CPU.¹¹³

Table 7: Social Origin of CPU Membership, 1958-1971¹¹⁴

	1958	1968	1971
Workers	33%	39%	41%
White-collar staff	49%	43%	41%
Collective farmers	18%	18%	18%

It was only in 1965 that Ukrainian representation in the CPU surpassed the prewar figure. In 1965 Ukrainians accounted for 64 percent of the total membership, Russians, for 27 percent,

¹¹¹ *Pravda Ukrainy*, 18 March 1971.

¹¹² *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy — boiovyi zahin*, 18; I. P. Borodyst, "Diialnist partiinykh orhanizatsii Donbasu po vykhovanniu trudiashchykh u dusi internatsionalizmu ta druzhby narodiv SRSR (1966-1970 rr.)," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1980, no. 1, 78.

¹¹³ "Boiovyi zahin KPRS," 32; *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1973), 387.

¹¹⁴ "Boiovyi zahin KPRS," 33; *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy — boiovyi zahin*, 21.

and others, for 9 percent. The 1971 figure for Ukrainians was 65 percent.¹¹⁵

The changes that occurred in the CPU membership in the 1950s and 1960s implied something more than a new statistical relationship. An attitude of greater national assertiveness had also penetrated the leadership of the party. This had been a discernible development since the time of Melnikov's fall. However, it was best exemplified in the person of Petro Shelest.¹¹⁶ In May 1972 Shelest was removed from his post. Shortly thereafter the charges against him were spelled out in a review of his book, *Ukraino, nasha Radianska*, that appeared in the theoretical organ *Komunist Ukrainy*. In it Shelest was accused of misinterpreting the Soviet federal system, promoting "elements of economic autarky," falsifying "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism," ignoring the positive influence of Russian culture on Ukrainian culture, failing to acknowledge nationalist deviations in the CPU and in Ukrainian cultural circles in the 1920s, idealizing the Ukrainian cossacks, and so on.¹¹⁷

In the wake of Shelest's ouster, a purge of the CPU was ordered. Between 1973 and 1974, 37,000 members were expelled. While this represented only 1.5 percent of the total membership, "there is little doubt that the purge had a significant qualitative impact, particularly in the related fields of ideology, culture and education."¹¹⁸

With the demise of Shelest, autonomism as an articulated current within the CPU suffered a setback. The central leadership in Moscow charged Volodymyr Shcherbytsky with the task of returning Ukraine to a state of subservient normality. Shcherbytsky's successes in implementing this policy may be temporary. What has not changed, however, is the preeminent position of Ukrainians in the leadership of the CPU.¹¹⁹ Moreover, by 1976 Ukrainians had increased their plurality in the CPU to 66 percent.¹²⁰ These members represent a force that will continue to place autonomism on the political agenda.

¹¹⁵ P. A. Rudyk, "Zrostannia i zmitsnennia riadiv KPRS na suchas-nemu etapi," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1982, no. 1, 43.

¹¹⁶ See Hodnett, "The Views of Petro Shelest."

¹¹⁷ "Pro seriozni nedoliky ta pomylky odniiei knyhy," *Komunist Ukrainy*, 1973, no. 4, 77-82.

¹¹⁸ Roman Solchanyk, "Politics and the National Question in the Post-Shelest Period," in *Ukraine after Shelest*, ed. Bohdan Krawchenko (Edmonton, 1983), 9.

¹¹⁹ See Borys Lewytzkyj, "The Ruling Party Organs of Ukraine," in *Ukraine in the Seventies*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Oakville, Ont., 1975), 277-79.

¹²⁰ Rudyk, "Zrostannia," 43.

David R. Marples

KHRUSHCHEV, KAGANOVICH, AND THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS

In March 1947, Nikita Khrushchev, who had been appointed first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) in 1938 and maintained that position after a distinguished war service, was suddenly dismissed from his post on Stalin's orders. A favourite of Stalin, Khrushchev had been since February 1944 the only prominent Soviet leader to hold simultaneously the positions of CPU first secretary and head of the Council of Ministers. He was now obliged to give up the former position to Lazar Kaganovich, and the retention of his government post meant very little in terms of his continuing authority. In fact, it was traditional for Stalin to remove those in disfavour by stages, reducing their power a little at a time. That Khrushchev's promising political career was in eclipse seems evident from his almost simultaneous relinquishment (22-24 March 1947) of two other offices—that of secretary of both the Kiev oblast and the Kiev city party committees—in addition to his hitherto undisputed control over the newspaper *Pravda Ukrainy*.

From March to December 1947, Kaganovich imposed his ruthless style of government on Ukraine. Khrushchev's name and photograph simply disappeared from the pages of *Pravda Ukrainy* and *Radianska Ukraina*, the two Ukrainian newspapers, and apart from a solitary appearance (and apology) at a meeting of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet about a week after his dismissal, he kept an exceptionally low profile. Certainly his friends would have concluded that his career was over. But even prior to December it became evident that Khrushchev had been restored to favour. By the fall of 1947 his name began once again to appear on CPU

decrees, ostensibly, according to Khrushchev's reminiscences, because Stalin had demanded that all decrees issued in the republic should carry the signatures of both Kaganovich and Khrushchev.¹ This may be interpreted as an attempt to curb Kaganovich's excesses, but it is also proof that Khrushchev had become "acceptable" again. In December Khrushchev regained his position as first secretary of the CPU, apparently none the worse for his temporary demotion.

What were the reasons for Khrushchev's removal? How serious was it in terms of a setback to his political ambitions? What impact did the event have on the course of Ukrainian history? Although there have been to date few clear answers to these questions, historians concur that the demotion of Khrushchev was an event of major significance. There have been three principal interpretations, which can be categorized roughly as follows: agricultural crisis; nationalism in western Ukraine; and political maneuvering within the Soviet leadership. Let us examine the ramifications of each interpretation in turn.

The "agricultural" interpretation has been adopted by Medvedev and Medvedev.² They argue that in March 1947 the Soviet authorities were afraid that there would be public unrest in Ukraine as a result of the famine in 1946, which had evolved from one of the worst droughts in many years throughout the European part of the USSR. Consequently, they dispatched a "strong arm" in the shape of Kaganovich to ensure that there were no disturbances. This explanation seems plausible, because the 1946 famine occurred in eastern Ukraine rather than the western oblasts, and many Ukrainians in the former region could still recall vividly the effects of the man-made famine of 1933, which resulted in the loss of several million lives.³ The 1946 agricultural year in Ukraine was a disaster; it had a particularly devastating effect on the head of livestock. The number of horses in the republic declined by some 360,000 during the year, while that of hogs fell by more than a million.⁴ In addition, the grain harvests were catastrophic-

¹ *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, introd. E. Crankshaw (Boston, 1970), 243.

² Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, *Khrushchev: The Years in Power* (New York, 1976), 48.

³ For a brief account of the 1933 famine in Ukraine, see Dana Dalrymple, "The Soviet Famine of 1932-1934," *Soviet Studies* 15 (1964), 250-84.

⁴ *Narodne gospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR: Statystychnyi zbirnyk* (Kiev, 1960), 216.

ly low throughout the eastern oblasts, especially in the southern steppe regions and the Kiev and Kharkiv areas.⁵

During this famine period, Khrushchev's position was ambivalent. He was, on the one hand, Stalin's trusted lieutenant, who had been instructed to ensure that the compulsory grain requisitions were delivered to the state on time. On the other hand, however, there is evidence that he made some attempts to have the Ukrainian impositions lowered, possibly for humanitarian reasons, possibly because he realized the implications that a famine might hold for his political future. In his memoirs Khrushchev recounts that:

[Stalin] would be very unhappy to hear that Ukraine not only couldn't fulfill its assigned quota for delivery to the State, but in fact needed food from the State to feed its own people However, I had no choice but to confront Stalin with the facts: famine was imminent, and something had to be done.⁶

Stalin's pathological suspicion of his subordinates whenever difficulties arose rendered this communication of Khrushchev's a dangerous one. Ukrainian agriculture, already devastated by the effects of the German-Soviet conflict (many battles had taken place on Ukrainian territory), suffered yet another serious crisis.

Another indication that Khrushchev's difficulties in agriculture may have led to his temporary downfall was the attack upon him in 1946-47 by Andrei Andreev, the Politburo member with overall responsibility for Soviet agriculture (since 1943). For some time Andreev had been a proponent of the theories of the agriculturalist Vasiliï Villiams, who advocated the cultivation of spring wheat throughout the grain-growing areas of the USSR. Khrushchev had nothing but contempt for this theory and maintained that winter wheat always attained the higher yields. The dispute, one of many over Soviet agricultural policy, acquired importance once the famine had spread throughout Ukraine. Stalin needed a scapegoat for the crisis, and Khrushchev, with his wilfulness and determination to adhere to his own methods, was a convenient target.

As a result of the 1946 agricultural crisis and following the Khrushchev-Andreev dispute, a plenum of the CPSU was held from 21 to 26 February 1947 to discuss ways of alleviating the agricultural problems. The proximity of the dates of this plenum

⁵ *Sotsialistychna perebudova i rozvytok silskoho hospodarstva Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1968), 2:212.

⁶ *Khrushchev Remembers*, 233.

and the dismissal of Khrushchev can hardly have been coincidental. By this time, Khrushchev was on trial. Moreover, as Edward Crankshaw reports, the main speech at the plenum was delivered by Andreev and focused on the need to grow more spring wheat, which could hardly have been more humiliating or ominous for Khrushchev.⁷ It is evident that the situation in agriculture was perceived as a major crisis. Stalin had rarely convoked CPSU plenums in the postwar period and had been generally reluctant to allow his subordinates a say in Soviet policy since the war had ended. Further, the plenum was held in conditions of utmost secrecy. No reports were given to the press (other than of the event being held), and not until 1971 were its resolutions made public. Even then it seems that many of them were not revealed.⁸ No reference was made specifically to Ukraine in the publicized resolutions, which focus largely on the general weakness of the collective farms (already indicated in a major decree of the previous year) and the need for less formalistic party control over agriculture. We can assume, however, that the CPU plenum that followed in March 1947 discussed all aspects of the crisis and admonished the person with ultimate responsibility for it, Khrushchev.

At the least, we can assert that the plenum played some role in Khrushchev's dismissal. But it may have been the instrument rather than the cause of his removal. According to Khrushchev's memoirs, both he and Andreev were subsequently appointed to a commission to deal with the plenum resolutions, and only then did Khrushchev incur Stalin's displeasure by making the suggestion that collective farmers should retain a given percentage of grain for their own seed stores.⁹ The aftermath of the plenum, then, may have been more significant than the plenum itself in bringing about Khrushchev's ouster. Another factor suggesting that the agricultural question may have been crucial was that Khrushchev's successor, Kaganovich, was also known to be a strong advocate of spring wheat cultivation.¹⁰

Still, we must beware of overestimating the agricultural aspect, at least in terms of the east Ukrainian famine of 1946. The

⁷ Edward Crankshaw, *Khrushchev: A Career* (New York, 1966), 157.

⁸ The resolutions of the February 1947 plenum are quoted in *Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, ed. R. H. McNeal (Toronto, 1974), vol. 3: *The Stalin Years: 1929-1953*, 243-48.

⁹ *Khrushchev Remembers*, 237.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 241-42.

famine, after all, affected the villages more than the cities. The experience of 1933 suggests that the plight of Ukrainian peasants was not one of Stalin's greatest concerns. In the earlier year, it is alleged, Stalin had deliberately created the famine to curb the recalcitrant Ukrainian nationalists.¹¹ If this statement is true, then how much greater would have been Stalin's truculence in 1946, after Ukrainians had displayed their "treachery" by surrendering in large numbers to the German forces at the commencement of the German-Soviet war? Would Khrushchev have been called to task for failing to avert a famine in the nation that Stalin allegedly would have liked to have deported en masse after the war? It is more likely that if the agricultural crisis played a part in Khrushchev's dismissal, it was because it represented a setback to the agricultural goals outlined in the Fourth Five-Year Plan rather than through any human suffering that might have resulted. As such, it was not likely to have been the sole cause of Khrushchev's removal in March 1947.

Turning to nationalism in western Ukraine, there are two aspects that merit discussion: the collectivization of agriculture; and nationalist resistance as exhibited by forces of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in the early postwar years. According to Crankshaw, one of the main reasons for Khrushchev's fall was his failure to "resovietize" western Ukraine quickly and thoroughly after its reannexation from the Germans in 1944.¹² He notes the dramatic increase in the number of collective farms established there during Kaganovich's spell as CPU first secretary, thus relating the change of leadership to Khrushchev's problems in the collectivization campaign. Further evidence that Khrushchev himself took this matter seriously were his claims, first, that the number of collective farms established at the end of 1945 was considerably higher than was actually the case,¹³ and second, that his plan was to restore all the collective farms established in the prewar period

¹¹ See R. Conquest, "Progress Report: Forthcoming Book on Collectivization and the Famine," *The Ukrainian Weekly* (Jersey City, N.J.), 20 March 1982.

¹² Crankshaw, 157.

¹³ In *Pravda Ukrainy* (30 January 1946) Khrushchev announced that there were 177 collective farms in western Ukraine. This was clearly an exaggeration. According to a Soviet scholar, there were only 94, and even this total may have been on the generous side. See M. K. Ivasiuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrain-skoi RSR* (Kiev, 1962), 88.

of Soviet rule in western Ukraine by the end of 1947.¹⁴ The plan, if it existed, was an abject failure, but it indicates that Khrushchev was anxious to show Stalin and his critics that he was making progress in collectivizing western Ukraine.

There are two main problems with Crankshaw's analysis. First, it is simplistic in that it treats the question of collectivization in western Ukraine separately from its imposition elsewhere. The campaign was co-ordinated in the western borderlands as a whole. Since the Soviets lacked material resources as a result of losses incurred during the German-Soviet war, they concentrated on each area in turn. Thus the collectivization campaign was initiated in western Ukraine and right-bank Moldavia, the two most important grain-growing regions among the newly annexed territories. Once the campaign there was under way, resources were shifted temporarily to the other regions, western Belorussia and the Baltic republics. In Estonia, for example, collectivization of peasant households began only in 1949, but it overtook all other regions by July of that year.¹⁵ This indicates that the Soviet leaders were relying on short spells of concentrated efforts to achieve their purpose. Thus, in the case of western Ukraine under Khrushchev's leadership between 1945 and March 1947, a start had been made, but it was essentially a limited campaign, with the ostensible aim, as noted above, of restoring those collective farms that had been established in the prewar period.

Second, Crankshaw's comments are based on the total number of collective farms rather than the percentages of households within them. It is true that under Kaganovich's leadership the number of collective farms increased from an estimated 274 at the end of 1946 (in western Ukraine, including Transcarpathia) to over 1,400 by 1 January 1948,¹⁶ an increase of about 600 percent. In terms of peasant households, however, the figure of 1,400 represented only about 7.5 percent of the total, which hardly constitutes a transformation of land ownership. Thus, under Kaganovich some progress had been made, but collectivization had made only a tentative start, well within the limited ambitions of the Soviet leadership, as noted above. Mass collectivization began only when the system was initiated in the East European satellite states in the spring of 1949. And it was undertaken in western Ukraine under the guidance of Khrushchev himself (although he left his

¹⁴ Ivasiuta, 95.

¹⁵ See D. R. Marples, "The Collectivization of Agriculture in West Ukraine, 1944-1951" (Ph.D. diss., University of Sheffield, 1983), 400.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 257.

position and moved to Moscow before the process was brought to completion).

Although Khrushchev would not have been reprimanded merely for the slow pace of collectivization, it is possible that his methods drew some criticism. It was the latter that accounted for the failure to restore the prewar collective farms. Part of the problem was that in the 1939-41 period (also under Khrushchev's leadership), collective farms had been created haphazardly, often miles apart from one another. As a result, they became virtual islands amidst a sea of hostile individual peasants, and because of their isolation they were unable to exert any influence over the west Ukrainian farmers. In this period, the Soviet leaders had placed considerable hopes upon the Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS), at least one of which was established in every raion before the collectivization campaign was begun.¹⁷ In the postwar period, however, most MTS were in a state of almost total disrepair. Whereas tractors on east Ukrainian MTS had largely been evacuated before the Germans arrived, in the western oblasts the speed of the invasion prevented this. Thus the MTS did not play a role in early postwar collectivization, and many were not fully reconstructed until 1948.¹⁸

Khrushchev's method of imposing collectivization was to have groups of enforcers go systematically from village to village when setting up collective farms. An example of this is found in Ternopil oblast. There, whereas the central and northern regions remained noncollectivized at the end of 1945, a cluster of collective farms had been created in the south of the oblast.¹⁹ In this way the new farms had close contacts with one another and a greater chance of surviving both external opposition and disintegration from within. Yet although the method made sense, it was undoubtedly responsible, to some extent, for the continuing operations of nationalist forces, which had only to keep away from the small area being collectivized in order to survive. The concentration of Soviet and party forces in the collectivized area also enhanced the sur-

¹⁷ See the official decree of 25 March 1940, "Pro orhanizatsiiu MTS v zakhidnykh oblastiakh URSR," cited in *Z istorii kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblasteri Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1976), 26-29. (Referred to hereafter as *Z istorii*)

¹⁸ See, for example, *Radianska Ukraina* (22 February 1948) on the restoration of MTS in Lviv oblast.

¹⁹ See, for example, information of the Ternopil oblast land section to the CPU oblast committee, 1 July 1944, "Pro orhanizatsiiu kolhospiv u Zalishchyskomu raioni," cited in *Z istorii*, 180-82.

vival of recalcitrants elsewhere, and it is possible that Khrushchev was blamed for using such methods, even though he had few options open to him at the time. (Under Kaganovich collective-farm establishment was again widespread, but the farms were less stable, frequently dissolving themselves.)²⁰

Soviet policy stipulated that mass collectivization in western Ukraine and elsewhere could not be undertaken until warranted by a sufficient build-up of party forces. This necessitated recruitment from among the local population. Khrushchev's dilemma, which was highlighted frequently in *Radianska Ukraina*, was that western Ukrainians were "not being attracted" to the party cause. There were two principal reasons for this. First, Stalin's almost pathological distrust of Ukrainians was well known, and western Ukrainians were known to be the most nationalistic. In fact, the party organizations in the western oblasts were staffed predominantly by eastern Ukrainians and an indeterminate number of Russians.²¹ A second factor was the reluctance of the western Ukrainians themselves to play a role in the Soviet government. Many feared nationalist reprisals for manifestations of pro-Soviet feeling, while others opposed Soviet rule for one reason or another.

Khrushchev's difficulties were intensified by the all-out assault on Ukrainian cultural and national figures initiated by Stalin and Andrei Zhdanov in mid-1946. The assault was directed against alleged "nationalist deviations" in Ukrainian life, particularly in the intellectual sphere, such as history and literature. But it was closely linked with current party problems in western Ukraine and the general failures of the CPU in postwar reconstruction.²² The Soviet authorities had resolved that radical changes of personnel were required throughout the CPU. How far Ukrainians were trusted with positions of responsibility is shown by Kaganovich's first moves upon becoming first secretary, which included a purge of party cadres that evidently embraced all levels of the ranks.²³

Khrushchev, then, faced almost insuperable problems with the collectivization campaign in western Ukraine and the construction of adequate party forces. Obligated to rely on eastern Ukrainians for the most part, he discovered that even they were no longer considered trustworthy. But would these difficulties have

²⁰ This is discussed in Marples, 386-87.

²¹ Noted in *Arkhiv misii UPA pry ZP UHVR* (Munich, n.d.). (Consulted with the kind permission of Prof. Peter J. Potichnyj.)

²² See R. S. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine 1917-1957* (New York, 1962), 254-56.

²³ Roy Medvedev, *Khrushchev* (Oxford, 1982), 44.

been sufficient to secure his dismissal as first secretary? It is doubtful. Certainly matters improved little under Kaganovich. The "cultural policies" initiated by Zhdanov were still continuing in the early 1950s. Further, even as late as the end of 1949, party forces in western Ukraine were still considered woefully inadequate. When mass collectivization was implemented, for example, it was not left to party forces at all, but rather to the recreated MTS political sections, who arrived in the villages and who had jurisdictional powers over the party.²⁴ If Stalin's chief concern had been the weakness of the party in the western Ukrainian countryside, then Kaganovich would have left his post in disgrace in December 1947, when, in fact, the evidence shows that he returned to Moscow in high favour. The questions of collectivization and party build-up were important and may have added to the list of Khrushchev's alleged indiscretions. But we should emphasize that they would not have brought about his downfall single-handedly.

The second aspect of nationalism was the opposition of the UPA. Oleh Gerus maintains that Khrushchev's dismissal was a result of his failure to overcome the Ukrainian insurgents.²⁵ The two questions—collectivization and nationalist opposition—are closely connected, but we will treat them separately. Essentially the activist nationalists delayed but did not halt the collectivization campaign. Their threat was first and foremost to Soviet authority rather than to specific aspects of Soviet policy. Collectivization of peasant households had the effect of cutting off the UPA's ready-made food supply in the Ukrainian villages, but it would have been imposed regardless of a nationalist presence, as it was, for example, in western Belorussia.

In assessing Gerus's remark, one can say the following. There is no doubt that Kaganovich began a major campaign against the UPA and that UPA forces had been greatly reduced by the end of 1947. Two months after Kaganovich's appointment, the USSR concluded a tripartite agreement with Czechoslovakia and Poland to eliminate UPA forces from their respective countries, and the countryside was subsequently combed by forces of these countries.²⁶ Instead of engaging in open warfare in the countryside,

²⁴ On the formation and role of the MTS political sections in western Ukraine, see R. F. Miller, *One Hundred Thousand Tractors* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), 221-22.

²⁵ Dmytro Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian History*, ed. and updated by Oleh W. Gerus (Winnipeg, 1975), 773.

²⁶ See the account by V. Holubnychy in *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia* (Toronto, 1963), 1:901.

the UPA divided itself up into smaller units and relied on "underground cells" to continue its activities.²⁷ It was also during Kaganovich's incumbency that UPA units made the desperate move of crossing Czechoslovakia in an attempt to make contact with Western forces.²⁸ But before accepting the view that Kaganovich was responsible for the demise of the UPA—thus implying that failure to achieve this was behind Khrushchev's removal—one must make two qualifications.

First, the view assumes that a relatively tolerant figure, Khrushchev, had been replaced by a ruthless fanatic. We should recall that upon being appointed CPU first secretary in April 1925, Kaganovich had been at the forefront of the campaign to curb the "nationalist tendencies" of Oleksander Shumsky and Mykola Khvylovy. He was well known to Ukrainians as a man who had few scruples about the methods used to remove opposition. Further, the view of Kaganovich as a tyrant is one that has been promoted by Khrushchev himself in his memoirs. In his account of the Kaganovich period, Khrushchev is at pains to point out that he tried constantly to restrain Kaganovich's excesses. Attributing the latter's free rein in Ukraine after the spring of 1947 to his [Khrushchev's] illness at this time, Khrushchev remarks that

While I was sick, Kaganovich had a chance to do whatever he pleased without me around, looking over his shoulder. He bullied Patolichev so much that . . . [he] was released from his post in Kiev and transferred to Rostov After my recovery and resumption of my duties, my own relations with Kaganovich went from bad to worse. He became simply unbearable. He developed his intensive activities in two directions: against the so-called Ukrainian nationalists and against the Jews.²⁹

This image of a mild Khrushchev trying to prevent Kaganovich's repressive policies is essentially a myth. The Khrushchev-Kaganovich relationship will be discussed below. Suffice it to say here that Ukrainians knew only too well that there was more to "our Mykyta" than suggested by his jovial peasant image and genuine concern for Ukrainian matters. According to a Western source, Stalin's purges of the 1930s were exceeded, at least in terms of

²⁷ Lew Shankowsky, "Ten Years of the UPA Struggle (1942-1952)," in *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Fight for Freedom* (New York, 1954), 43.

²⁸ John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2d. ed. (Littleton, Colo., 1980), 299.

²⁹ *Khrushchev Remembers*, 242-43.

the "destruction of party functionaries," only by those of Khrushchev in Ukraine.³⁰ His task, in short, had been to remove any vestiges of Ukrainian nationalism. His mentor, in 1938 and very probably in 1947 also, was none other than Kaganovich. Possibly one reason why Kaganovich felt free to purge Ukraine in 1947 was that he and Khrushchev had co-operated closely in imposing similar purges in the past.

Consequently, there were very few policies carried out by Kaganovich against the Ukrainian nationalists and alleged sympathizers that could not have been undertaken by Khrushchev himself. Possibly Stalin's intention in appointing Kaganovich was for the harshest measures to be imposed by the outsider, so that Khrushchev would be perceived as relatively tolerant by contrast when he reassumed office. This, however, is supposition. We recall that the assault on the nationalists was instigated by Khrushchev. Indeed, it was Khrushchev, not Stalin, who first coined the term "Ukrainian-German nationalists," thereby categorizing all UPA members as bona fide collaborators of the Germans, "the worst enemies of the Ukrainian people."³¹

The second counter to Gerus's viewpoint is the undue emphasis laid on the March-December 1947 period in the Soviet-UPA conflict. The main impetus for the intensification of operations in 1947 was not the appointment of Kaganovich as first secretary, but the assassination by UPA troops of the Polish vice-minister, General W. Swierczewski, in May of that year.³² Essentially, Kaganovich's mission in this field was to continue the policies already implemented by Khrushchev. It was under the latter's hegemony that garrisons of MVD and MGB troops were set up in every western Ukrainian village; that recruits from the villages were forcibly conscripted for "self-defence" operations against UPA units; and that all of western Ukraine took on the appearance of a military zone in the early postwar years. Kaganovich introduced very few new measures. The groundwork had been carefully laid out for him, and Swierczewski's assassination accelerated the programme of "mopping up" nationalist opposition. The warfare, albeit on a reduced scale, also continued long after the departure of Kaganovich, with the Soviet forces under Khrushchev's capable supervision. The view of a benevolent Khrushchev

³⁰ Crankshaw, 122-23.

³¹ Evidently Khrushchev first used this term in a speech he gave on 1 March 1944. Cited in Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: Ukraine after World War II* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1964), 127.

³² Holubnychy, 901.

watching over the interests of Ukraine could hardly be more erroneous, even though on a personal level Khrushchev seems to have been more approachable, more likeable, than his colleague.

What were the relations between Khrushchev and Kaganovich? Despite Khrushchev's attempt to denounce his colleague in his memoirs and his summary removal of Kaganovich in 1957 upon consolidating his authority as Soviet leader, the evidence suggests that Khrushchev owed his remarkable rise in the party hierarchy largely to the aid of Kaganovich. Kaganovich was a Ukrainian Jew who was known for his administrative talent and his ruthlessness in carrying out Stalin's orders, most notably in the collectivization campaign of the early 1930s. Unlike Khrushchev, he had worked closely with Stalin as early as the October Revolution, having been a prominent member of the Bolshevik party since 1911. Whereas Kaganovich's position in the party structure was assured once his administrative talents became known to Stalin (he was head of the CPSU Central Committee's Personnel Department as early as 1922),³³ Khrushchev's career possessed no such certainty. And it was Kaganovich who put forward Khrushchev's name as a member of the new Industrial Academy that opened in Moscow in 1929 and who began Khrushchev's meteoric advancement.³⁴ Within three years, upon Kaganovich's recommendation, Khrushchev had been appointed second secretary of the Moscow oblast party committee, which made him Kaganovich's deputy. According to the Soviet press,

Comrade Khrushchev—a working man who has attended the school of struggle and of party work, having started at the very bottom—is an outstanding representative of the post-October generation of party workers educated by Stalin. Under the guidance of that notable master of the Stalin method of working, Comrade Kaganovich, N. S. Khrushchev has grown step by step with our party in recent years and is a worthy leader of our glorious Moscow party organization.³⁵

Thus, Khrushchev was widely perceived as Kaganovich's protégé, and he used his friend's generous patronage to lever his way into power. His adverse comments about Kaganovich in his memoirs, however, should not be seen merely as ingratitude. As is evident from the quotation, Kaganovich was known as a Stalin man, and Khrushchev in his later years was at pains to dissociate

³³ Crankshaw, 29.

³⁴ Medvedev, 14-15. The two men first met in 1916. See Crankshaw, 22.

³⁵ *Rabochaia Moskva*, 9 March 1935; cited in Medvedev, 16.

himself from Stalin's policies. Kaganovich's patronage was a painful reminder to Khrushchev that he had been an integral part of the Soviet leadership during the thirties. One scholar maintains that Khrushchev's hostility toward Kaganovich stemmed directly from the events of March 1947.³⁶ This seems unlikely. The reappearance of Kaganovich in Ukraine meant only two things for certain: first, that Khrushchev was in trouble; but second, that he had not been cast aside permanently. Had Stalin appointed anyone else from the Politburo to the position of CPU first secretary, then Khrushchev would have known that his career was over. Kaganovich, however, was his ally and mentor. This fact has been obscured by the events of 1957 and the bitter rivalry between the two men in the struggle for Stalin's succession.

Khrushchev's worst enemies in 1947 were in Moscow, in the persons of Zhdanov, Andreev, and, especially, Georgii Malenkov. One cannot discuss the events of March 1947 without reference to the intense political rivalry among Stalin's subordinates. As a favourite of Stalin and the first regional leader to hold simultaneously the leadership of both party and government, Khrushchev aroused feelings of great jealousy among his rivals. He was, in short, perceived as "too big for his boots." We noted earlier Andreev's attempts to discredit Khrushchev's agricultural policies. Zhdanov's role in the events affecting Khrushchev are more difficult to assess, since Khrushchev omits him totally from his memoirs; but there is no doubt that relations between the two were far from cordial. The principal figure behind the events of 1947, however, aside from Stalin himself, was Malenkov. Following Zhdanov's death in 1948, Malenkov was almost assured of the number-two position in the Soviet hierarchy. Thus he was a formidable enemy.

Upon Kaganovich's appointment as CPU first secretary, it was Malenkov's protégé Nikolai Patolichev who was appointed to assist him as the secretary with control over agriculture (formerly second secretary).³⁷ The implication of this was that it would be Patolichev, rather than Khrushchev, who would succeed Kaganovich when the latter returned to Moscow, which it was known he was desirous of doing. In effect, it looked as though Khrushchev had been levered out of the power structure. This scheme apparently failed (the reasons for this will be discussed momentarily), but when Khrushchev got back his old position in December

³⁶ Crankshaw gives a good account of the Khrushchev-Kaganovich relationship in *Khrushchev Remembers*, 544-55.

³⁷ Crankshaw, 159.

1947, his second-in-command was Leonid Melnikov, who was also reputed to be a close associate of Malenkov.³⁸ Moreover, Khrushchev's post as chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers went to Demian Korotchenko. Although the latter was Khrushchev's staunch supporter, this meant that the two Ukrainian leadership posts had been separated once again. It is thus possible that Malenkov had both secured a foothold in Khrushchev's empire and reduced his authority, and that this had been his plan from the outset.

As head of a "committee for the rehabilitation of liberated lands" in the first postwar years, Malenkov had a powerful position. Both he and Andreev had avoided the regional responsibility that Khrushchev had taken on and remained close to the source of authority in Moscow. According to Khrushchev, Malenkov continually exploited his proximity to Stalin to discredit his rivals.³⁹ Evidently though, living and working so closely with the leader had its disadvantages. Khrushchev was not eliminated, and a decade later he was to take full revenge. Personality conflicts played a large role in Stalin's USSR and often dictated Soviet policies. In the case of Khrushchev's dismissal, although one cannot state categorically that it was a result of a coup hatched in Moscow by his rivals, we can say, at least, that because of the enormous difficulties he faced in Ukraine, in addition to the power he had accumulated, Khrushchev left himself open to such an attack.

There is one other point that should be dealt with briefly: the question of Khrushchev's alleged illness. None of the authorities on Khrushchev in the West have given much thrift to this, mainly because Khrushchev was well known for his robust health and general indefatigability. Moreover, shortly after the decision to replace him had been made, Khrushchev appeared at a session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet to acknowledge the criticisms levelled at him.⁴⁰ Had he been really ill, he would not have attended (we have a contemporary example of this in Iurii Andropov). When Khrushchev had a heart attack in 1971 at the age of seventy-six, this was his first known illness, and certainly his last. Like many aspects of his memoirs, the illness was a product of his imagination.

Why was Khrushchev returned to power? First, it seems that Kaganovich paid respect to their long-time association. Certainly

³⁸ Bilinsky, 235.

³⁹ *Khrushchev Remembers*, 239-40.

⁴⁰ Medvedev, 44.

he did not take over all of Khrushchev's functions, leaving agricultural matters largely to his comrade and concentrating on industry. In itself, this helps to discount the theory that agricultural failures were behind Khrushchev's removal. The disappearance of Patolichev suggests that Khrushchev and Kaganovich combined to get rid of Malenkov's favourite. It is possible, then, that Kaganovich saved Khrushchev from oblivion for what can only be perceived as the most selfless of reasons: friendship. Given Khrushchev's fall from grace, Kaganovich was living dangerously, but he may have known that Stalin was unwilling to bend too far to Malenkov's desires. Second, in the final analysis Khrushchev owed his return to power directly to Stalin. Despite the addition of the colourless Melnikov to the Ukrainian hierarchy, Khrushchev's powers had not been reduced during his nine-month absence. He returned to Moscow late in the following year and thenceforth was a serious rival to the ambitions of Malenkov and Beria. Khrushchev survived because of his personal friendship with Stalin, who, despite his preoccupation with plots, was evidently wise enough to recognize Khrushchev's administrative talents.

In conclusion, perhaps Khrushchev's demotion and reappointment should be viewed within the context of the extreme difficulties of the postwar years in Ukraine. The republic faced the enormous task of recovering from the effects of the war years and foreign occupation; it lacked manpower, resources, materials, livestock, and machinery. Before recovery could be initiated, the eastern oblasts were beset by a severe famine, which destroyed the agricultural goals of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. The reannexation of the western oblasts, on the other hand, posed immense difficulties also—a passively hostile population and an actively hostile guerrilla force. Added to these problems, which would have overtaxed any leader, Stalin and Zhdanov initiated their policy of Russification, which saw a purge of Ukrainian intellectuals, party members, and cultural figures. Khrushchev's rivals exploited these problems as far as possible, but it should be emphasized both that Khrushchev may have fallen from favour without their machinations and that every Soviet leader with regional responsibility was on shaky ground in the first postwar years. The surprising factor is not that Khrushchev was demoted, but that he survived. Even with a powerful ally like Kaganovich, his survival denoted his remarkable political skills and resilience.

This episode occupies only a small niche in twentieth-century Ukrainian history. We have shown that despite its harshness, Kaganovich's nine-month rule did not appreciably affect the course of events in Soviet Ukraine. If he was hated, as Mykola Pidhorny

has stated,⁴¹ it was for his somewhat unpleasant personality. Certainly he lacked Khrushchev's affability. But the event has loomed larger because of the subsequent rise to supreme power of its subject, Khrushchev. In March 1947 many observers would have predicted his eclipse. Thus the months March to December 1947 should be perceived as one of the most rigorous tests in the career of Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet leader.

⁴¹ See *ibid.*, 45.

Roman Senkus

IURII BADZO: A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The author of the following document was a relatively unknown member of the Ukrainian democratic opposition before his arrest in 1979.

Iurii Badzo (Badz'o, Badzio) was born in 1936 in the village of Kopynivtsi near Mukachiv in Transcarpathia. He began his studies in Ukrainian philology at Uzhhorod University in 1953 and matured intellectually during the post-Stalin thaw. As a student he began questioning the nature of the Soviet system. From 1958 to 1961 he worked as a teacher and director of schools in Mukachiv raion and was active in the local Komsomol hierarchy. Intending to pursue an academic career, he began graduate studies at the Institute of Literature of the Academy of Sciences in Kiev in 1961. In 1965 he defended his candidate's dissertation, "The Criteria of Truth in the Evaluation of a Literary-Artistic Work."

During his stay in Kiev, Badzo became involved with the Ukrainian cultural opposition (the Club of Creative Youth) and took part in the public protests against the arrests of intellectuals in 1965. For this reason he was dismissed from his position as a junior associate of the Institute of Literature, was expelled from the CPSU, and lost his editing job with Molod publishers. Badzo worked at various jobs in the latter half of the 1960s and succeeded in publishing several articles and translations in official literary journals.

In 1971 he wrote a long open letter to the presidium of the congress of the Union of Writers of Ukraine in which he criticized the content and function of the union's organ, *Literaturna Ukraina*. Consequently he lost all the small editing jobs he had. In 1972 he protested against the arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals in that year; among those arrested were Badzo's friends: Ivan and Nadiia Svitlychny, Vasyl Stus, Viacheslav Chornovil, Vasyl Lisovy, Ievhen Proniuk, and others. His apartment was searched, and in 1973 he lost the job he had found in the Institute of General and Communal Hygiene. Unable to find work in fields related to his education, he took a manual job in a bakery, but only after the police began persecuting him for "parasitism."

From 1973 until his arrest Badzo lived quietly and in seclusion. He did not take part in any public protests and did not sign any appeals. Instead, in the privacy of his own home, he researched and wrote a 1,400-page study, "The Right to Live," about the plight of the Ukrainian nation as part of the USSR, Russification, and the nature of the Soviet system. He did not share his thoughts or research with anyone except his wife. In 1977 the sole copy of his treatise mysteriously "disappeared," and Badzo began rewriting it. In 1978 his apartment was searched, and his research materials were confiscated. Badzo managed to rewrite four hundred pages when, in February 1979, another search of his apartment took place and his work was confiscated. Another search in April removed whatever was left.

Aware of his impending arrest, Badzo wrote the long open letter translated below, in which he provided a synopsis of his treatise. On 23 April 1979 he was arrested and charged with "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

Badzo's trial took place in December 1979. Closed to the public, it lasted three days. His wife and son were among the witnesses called; refusing to testify at a trial they considered illegal, they were accused of contempt and expelled from the courtroom. Badzo pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. Nevertheless, the outcome of the trial was a foregone conclusion, as it has been in the trials of all oppositionists. Badzo was found guilty for writing an anti-Soviet work that was never disseminated and no one, besides Badzo, his wife, and the authorities ever saw. On 21 December he was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in strict-regime labor camps, to be followed by five years of internal exile.

Badzo was sent to a Mordovian camp. There he has not received proper medical attention and has developed cataracts and an ulcer. He has not been allowed to see his wife and his mail has been strictly censored.

But Badzo refused to remain silent. In July 1980 he and other political prisoners went on a hunger strike to protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet repression. On 19 July he and others proclaimed another hunger strike lasting the duration of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. In March 1981 Badzo proclaimed a hunger strike on the opening day of the Twenty-sixth CPSU Congress in protest against the dictatorship of the CPSU and the violation of human and national rights in the USSR. In April 1981 he went on a three-day hunger strike to mark the second anniversary of his imprisonment. A third three-day hunger strike took place on 10-12 May. Badzo was then deprived by the

camp authorities of the right to a private visit by his wife and was transferred to the Saransk prison for two months of "re-education".

On 30 December 1982 Badzo and another Ukrainian political prisoner staged a one-day hunger strike to coincide with the sixtieth anniversary of the USSR.

All of Badzo's protests in the camps have been accompanied by letters to the Soviet leaders and to Western figures and bodies. In 1980 he was elected an honorary member of the Norwegian PEN club.

Badzo's wife, Svitlana Kyrychenko, has also not escaped persecution. After the 1972 arrests she publicly protested the institutionalization of Nadiia Svitlychna's son after the latter's imprisonment and lost her academic job in the Institute of Philosophy. After her husband's arrest she wrote several open letters on his behalf to the authorities and to Western figures and bodies. In December 1980, ostensibly for these actions and for joining the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in October 1979, she was sentenced to three months of forced labor. Thereafter she was threatened with arrest if she attempted to visit her husband. On 10 February 1983 an article criticizing her appeared in *Vechirnyi Kyiv*. In it she was described as being a morally corrupt "capricious dame with ambitions" who possessed a superiority complex and received material aid from abroad. She was accused of having 42,000 illicitly acquired rubles stashed away in twenty-nine savings accounts.

Iurii Badzo's open letter is an eloquent indictment of Soviet reality and is the most detailed and most important analysis to have emerged from the Ukrainian democratic opposition since Ivan Dziuba's *Internationalism or Russification?* was written in the mid-1960s. It is a response to the new Russian internationalist line that has prevailed in Ukraine since Petro Shelest's fall and the 1972-73 arrests and purges of academic institutions. The fact that the regime has reacted with such ferocity to it even though it was not circulated indicates that Badzo's criticism of Soviet "socialism," the colonial legacy of Ukraine, national oppression, Russification and great-power chauvinism, the falsification of Ukraine's history, and the party's ideological and political absolutism is very accurate. Because he sees no solution to Ukraine's plight and the struggle for democratization other than state independence (a conclusion reached also by members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group), Badzo has fallen victim to the state's apparatus of repression. His anti-Leninist, democratic-socialist ideas are too heretical and radical for the regime to tolerate. As Svitlana Kyrychenko wrote in a letter in May 1979, the only right Soviet citizens have is "the liberty of being faithful subjects."

**AN OPEN LETTER TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME
SOVIET OF THE USSR AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE CPSU FROM CITIZEN OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR,
IURI VASYLOVYCH BADZO**

I am turning to the highest bodies of party-state rule in the USSR to raise the question of the dependent, unequal status of the Ukrainian people within the federation of Soviet republics.

I had envisaged that this epistle would be a large, scholarly work investigating a series of problems that disturb my consciousness as a citizen and have a general social significance. But the outcome of the situation is such that I must restrict myself to a very laconic presentation of my thoughts. On February 3 of this year [1979], an official search of a political nature took place in my apartment, and an unfinished manuscript of the above-mentioned work—comprising over 400 pages of quite closely typed text—was confiscated.

In 1972 a wave of political arrests swept over Ukraine: over thirty representatives of the younger generation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, predominantly scholars, were imprisoned. It immediately became clear that we were faced with a repressive action that had been planned in advance and was directed against the national rebirth of Ukraine in the new, post-Stalin period of its history. This prompted me to fulfill my duty as a citizen and a patriot: to go before the highest, plenipotentiary bodies of party-state rule with my reservations about the dangerous consequences of such policies. My epistle, which was intended to be a patriotic response to the political situation in Ukraine, grew into an all-encompassing investigation of the present status of the Ukrainian people within the USSR. Thus was born the idea of my book, "The Right to Live." In the middle of 1977, four out of five chapters of this work were completed, comprising almost 1,400 manuscript pages. But suddenly, for unexpected reasons, the manuscript vanished. I have no formal reasons to try to uncover who is responsible for this action, but privately I have concrete suspicions. I took to writing the work anew. I managed to complete again the first and last chapters, and part of the second. The search interrupted my work.

The logical structure of the work was characterized by the idea that, like a person's individual life, so too the historical existence of a nation has three aspects—past, present, and future—that together create one psychological whole and determine the cultural and historical climate of a society. My study over a number of years of the ideological and practical conditions in which the Ukrainian people lives led me to a very sad conclusion: today's party-state ideology and policies in the sphere of national

relations deprive the Ukrainian nation, as they do the other non-Russian peoples of the USSR, of its fundamental and decisive right—the right to live. This assertion has its theoretical and factual foundations. The dependent, unequal status of Ukrainians within the USSR can be seen in all areas of life and encompasses all the historical parameters of reality — past, present, and future. Within this chronological structure of historical progress, psychological and ideological primacy belongs, undeniably, to the future. But the official theory of the future of nations leaves the non-Russian peoples of the USSR without prospects for the future. The antiscientific, dogmatic, and reactionary nature of this theory is examined in the book's first chapter, "The Future, or the Preaching of National Death." I managed to rewrite and edit it. It comprised 161 pages of the manuscript.

The ideological conditions of the historical life of the peoples of the USSR and the implemented national policies of the CPSU are distinguished by an official doctrine that posits the concept of the flourishing and rapprochement of nations. The dominant tendency is considered to be the movement toward rapprochement, and the rapprochement of nations is interpreted as the effacement of national differences, that is, the withering-away of nations and the future creation of a nationless communist society. This ideology, which was created not by an elemental, democratically organized life, but by a politically tendentious doctrine, most clearly reflects the unequal status of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR and embodies the most fundamental form of national oppression. In fact, neither in theory nor in practice does the prospect for the obliteration of nations apply to the Russian people: the theory of the rapprochement and fusion of nations is coupled in the official ideology with the idea of the "second mother tongue"—Russian. The reinforcement of its cultural-historical and political role in the life of the non-Russian peoples is viewed as a supposedly objective, natural development. This is combined with widespread propaganda about Russian patriotism, the exclusive internationalism of the Russians, their particular contributions to Soviet society throughout its history, and so on.

All of this convincingly proves that the source and political substance of the rapprochement and fusion of nations—the ideology of the so-called internationalization of Soviet society—is Russian great-power nationalism. This is not Marx's theory of communism, even though it was Marx who originated the idea of the fusion of nations and adopted it as an ideological weapon. Secondly, even if the idea of the withering-away of nations could be included in Marx and Engels's ideal for the future—that of communism—this should from no point of view mean that our society must subordinate itself to the visions of figures of the past, no matter how great they may be. Every generation creates its own ideal, and only this dialectical process of negation and affirmation can guarantee the

democratic conditions for the life of a society, the growth of humanistic forces in society.

The idea of the fusion of nations is an acquisition of Leninism, a creation of Lenin. Already at the very beginning it revealed its dogmatic nature, its great-power bent, and its reactionary essence. The sad reality of the Russian "prison of peoples" demanded from social forces that claimed to represent progress the ideology of the rebirth of nations and the historical, universally human appreciation of the uniqueness of peoples. Instead, Lenin put forward the idea of the fusion of nations, of ethnic assimilation as an objective, progressive natural occurrence in historical development and as an indispensable prerequisite for the socialist transformation of the world. He welcomed the commingling of nations in the "American melting pot" without noticing, for some reason, that this was the misfortune of humanity, a consequence of the disharmonious, antagonistic development of bourgeois civilization, and not an organically created social ideal, not the desire of people or, even more, of entire peoples. Marx and Engels spoke about the equalization of conditions for national development, about the international nature of capital, about the harmonious coexistence of nations after the victory of the proletarian revolution, and, of course, about the withering-away of the tumor of the political state on the body of the nation. Lenin proclaimed the ethnic assimilation of peoples to be a social ideal.

In the political and national conditions of the Russian Empire and in the context of Russian historical traditions, it was difficult to devise something more meaningful for the supporters of "one, indivisible Russia" than the idea of the fusion of nations and a nationless future for humanity. It created the possibility of maintaining a single, centralized state on a socialist foundation, that is, of maintaining Russia as a great power. Let us remember that Lenin had at first a negative attitude toward the federal principle of building a new society, and that only pressure from below—from the national-liberation movements of the non-Russian peoples—forced him to change his mind.

Lenin and his supporters in the Russian Social Democratic Worker's Party (RSDWP) put forward the slogan about the right of nations to self-determination up to and including secession and the creation of an independent state. This was an internationalist, historically progressive position. However, the right of nations to political selfdetermination in Lenin's ideology was supplemented, and made conditional, by the purpose of secession and was thus in fact negated. For who would decide whether it was good or bad to secede? Clearly, for a ruling nation secession would never have a purpose. The political forces of a great-power nation would always have the upper hand in deciding the question of whether or not dependent peoples should have their own states. In addition, the idea of the fusion of nations completely deprived the position of state indepen-

dence for the small and dependent nations of the status of being a historically valid and progressive demand or of even the need for it. We are the supporters of great centralized states, and the way to socialism lies only through such states, Lenin proclaimed. This was not only a concession to great-power ideology, but also a seminal moment in the psychological pressure on the non-Russian peoples, that is, a particular form of national oppression of the non-Russians by the social democratic party. The Bolshevik slogan about the right of nations to a separate state made the country's peoples equal in terms of their rights; but the idea of the usefulness of secession and the theory of the fusion of nations created ideological and psychological advantages for the dominant nation, that is, the Russians. In essence, it left it the privilege of retaining the state it already had.

Lenin's ideology about the prospects of national development, which predicted the withering-away of nations in the distant future, after the triumph of communism in the world, had its immediate negative effect not only on the ideological and psychological state of the non-Russian representatives of the social-liberation movement, but also on party policies in practice. It seemed that a party that proclaimed the ideal of social and national freedom and national equality of peoples would realize it at the first opportunity. And such an opportunity existed for it from the very beginning: to realize the principle of national equality in its own party ranks. But precisely here, on the question of the building of a proletarian party, Lenin and his supporters displayed the greatest great-power intolerance toward the autonomist aspirations of the non-Russian forces in the social democratic movement, decisively opposing the federal principle for the building of a proletarian party and crudely deriding their opponents as nationalist philistines and primitive Marxists.

This position had neither a theoretical nor a practical justification. It signified a retreat from the ideology of national equality and created political advantages for the Russians in the proletarian movement, who were already numerically and qualitatively superior. Allusions to the possibility that a separate organized representation in the movement of the non-Russian proletariat would break apart peoples and weaken the general front of the anticapitalist struggle were only the reflection of great-power sentiments, of the inertia of centralist beliefs, and could not endure political criticism. After all, the sincerity of relations between nations, the consistency of the politics of national equality and self-organization of all sections of the proletarian-liberation movement, could only consolidate the general front of the struggle and strengthen the interdependence of the party and the masses. On the other hand, the absence in the non-Russian proletariat of its own organization placed its fate in the hands of Russian political forces and deprived it of its most important instrument, that of self-defence. Considering the conditions of political life in

Russia and Russian historical traditions, it was not difficult to foresee how all of this threatened future relations between the nations of the Russian state and the cause of the democratic transformation of society. History confirmed that such fears were not unfounded.

Unfortunately, I did not have enough time to analyze more extensively the historical conditions in which the proletarian revolution took place in Russia and the USSR was created, or to examine in greater detail the evolution of Bolshevik nationality policy. I shall say only that Lenin's concept of the fusion of nations constantly influenced the theory and practice of national relations in Soviet society, always directing the nationality policy of the party further towards Russian great-powerism. The ideological manifestation of this policy today is the concept of a single Soviet people, a single all-Union, or even simply single, state (although formally the USSR is not a single, that is, unitary, state, but a federated one), and the constitutional statute about the USSR being the embodiment of the state unity of the Soviet people. All of this signifies an ideological, theoretical preparation for the liquidation of even the formal statehood of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. The party doctrine of the internationalization of Soviet society signifies in theory and in practice the Russification of the non-Russian peoples and the restoration of "one, indivisible" Russia, that is, the liquidation of the achievements of the October socialist revolution in the sphere of national relations.

A logical analysis of this phenomenon, as well as historical experience, testifies to the fact that the idea of the fusion of nations is opposed to life, dogmatic, unscientific, and politically reactionary. I have no doubt that if Soviet socialism became democratic, it would immediately deposit this idea in the archive of history.

The party's present nationality policy deprives my people of the right to its past. In present-day Soviet historiography of Ukraine's history the dependent, unequal status of the Ukrainian people is manifested most clearly in the official concept of the future of nations: these are but two ends of the policy to restore "one, indivisible" Russia. The historiographical status of the Ukrainian people today is examined in my book's second chapter, "The Past, or the Contemporary Historiographical Neocolonization of Ukraine by Soviet Russia."

The falsification of Ukraine's history in today's Soviet historiography encompasses not just some isolated period, but the entire history of the Ukrainian people; it denies that our historical development has been a self-sufficient process and subordinates its interpretation to the political interests of the Soviet state. The concept of "an ancient Rus' nationality [*narodnost*]" is simply an ideological twin of the theory of "one Soviet people"; it completely eradicates the early-feudal period of Ukraine's history and, in the family of the Slavic peoples of the early Middle Ages, leaves only the Ukrainians and Belorussians without a place. The specula-

tive, antiscientific idea of an "ancient Rus' nationality" as a "common ancestor," and of Kievan Rus' as the "common legacy" of the Ukrainians, Russians, and Belorussians, in practice means that equal rights do not exist for the Ukrainians and Belorussians in the official interpretation of the past of the Eastern Slavs. The Russians neither terminologically nor conceptually dissociate themselves from early East Slavic history of the sixth to the thirteenth century. Everything here exists only as "Rus'" [*russskoe*]: "Rus' tribes," "the Rus' people," "Rus' culture," "the Rus' state," "the initial period of Rus' statehood," and so on. On the other hand, a reader will find in Soviet literature nothing Ukrainian up to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries—neither a territory, nor a language, nor a culture, nor even an ethnos. The scientifically and historically absurd idea that the Eastern Slavs in the ninth to the thirteenth centuries constituted one people, one ethnos, of course the "Rus'" one, and that the Ukrainians and Belorussians appeared only in the fourteenth to fifteenth century is affirmed. They appeared in order to "dream" about "reunification" with Russia. All the peoples of the world have aspired and aspire to national independence, including an independent state, and only the Ukrainians and Belorussians constitute the exception: they dreamed of "reuniting" with the Russian people.

This has reached the stage that one can read in the Soviet press and literature about Ukraine's aspirations to reunite with Russia in "a single state." This, even formally, is a vulgar distortion of historical truth, because there is evidence that in drawing up the treaty with representatives of the Russian state, the Ukrainian government under Bohdan Khmelnytsky stipulated for itself quite an extensive political autonomy. The concept of "reunification" carries within itself the idea of a single people. It essentially denies the Ukrainian people the right to its own, separate, independent state and is a gross violation of the constitutions of the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR.

The theory of "a single ancient Rus' nationality," of "a single Rus' people in Kievan times" (this can often be found in Soviet historical literature), and the concept of "unification" are supplemented by the speculative, literally mythologized idea of the struggle with "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism," with which, in fact, the Ukrainian movement of national liberation from Russia, particularly and primarily the idea of a Ukrainian state independent of Russia, is identified. In other words, once again the Ukrainian people is denied the right to an independent state. This is how the historiographical context appears, whereby the Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples are transformed into an ethnographic mass, an ethnographic part of "a single Rus' people from the Carpathians to the Pacific Ocean." The constant and ever more consistent use of the term "Great Russian" dots the "i" once and for all. For example, in 1944 a book by the historian N. S. Derzhavin, *Proiskhozhdenie russkogo naroda*

—*velikorusskogo, ukrainskogo, belorusskogo* [The Origins of the Rus' People—Great Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian], was published in Moscow. In other words, what is being fully restored is the great-power concept of prerevolutionary Russian historiography, the doctrine of the Black Hundreds, which denied the existence of the Ukrainians and Belorussians as separate nationalities. In Soviet historiographic publications on the above subject, one comes across unbelievable texts. "A single ancient Rus' nationality" and "a single Soviet people" are links in one political chain, one political doctrine, of the so-called internationalization of Soviet society. The falsification of the history of Ukraine by Russian great-power nationalists is a very significant factor in the national oppression of the Ukrainian people.

In my third chapter, "The Past Versus the Present, or the Myth about 'Ukrainian Bourgeois Nationalism,'" I analyzed the theory and practice of the state's anti-Ukrainian propaganda, which is conducted under the guise of the struggle with so-called Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism. From Stalin's time to the present, a real psychological war has been conducted against Ukrainian national consciousness, a war that is supplemented by the endless physical repression of nationally conscious Ukrainians. It demoralizes the Ukrainian population and psychologically oppresses it. The party's current "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" is also simply an ideological complement of the prerevolutionary "Mazepists" and "separatists."

In this chapter, based on abundant factual material, I showed that the contemporary party doctrine of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" cannot guarantee for itself the support of our revolutionary-democratic leaders of the past, neither in its views on the origins of the Ukrainian people, in its attitude to "unification," nor in its understanding of the character and tasks of the Ukrainian national-liberation movement. Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko, Lesia Ukrainka, Pavlo Hrabovsky, and all the other figures in Ukrainian history that current party propaganda exploits in the struggle with so-called Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism would, in fact, if one did not falsify their works and was consistent in one's criteria, also have to end up in the ranks of the "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists," and in the front ranks at that. The spokesmen of the prerevolutionary Black Hundreds did not distinguish Ivan Franko from Mykhailo Hrushevsky, and from the viewpoint of "a single people" and "a single fatherland" they were completely right. The official doctrine of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism," the huge quantity of so-called antinationalist literature, the state's endless propaganda campaign against Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism: all of this plays a very reactionary role in the relations between the Ukrainian and Russian nations, damages the contacts between them, incites the philistines against nationally conscious Ukrainians, and awakens suspicion and intolerance toward any manifesta-

tions of the Ukrainians' national dignity. The struggle with "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" has as its first and foremost goal the destruction of the Ukrainian people's political consciousness, the containment of its development: it serves to create "a single Soviet people," in other words, the Russification of the non-Russian peoples. Suffice it to say that the idea of an independent Ukrainian state is branded by party propaganda as nationalist, although secession from the USSR and the creation of a separate independent Ukrainian state is our constitutional right.

The fourth chapter, tentatively called "The Present, or the State of Siege," I conceived as being an analysis of the psychological, political, and cultural state of the Ukrainian people today, as the motivation of the idea that the party's national ideology and policies presently do not allow our people to step off the path of "natural" dying-out as a nation and make our cultural-political existence merely a factor serving so-called internationalization, that is, the process of the Russification of the Ukrainian nation. Science, the press, education, the political aspect of existence: all this is allowed in doses, so that in the interim there is visible a Ukrainian form, a Ukrainian semblance, but no independent Ukrainian voice, no serious, prestigious Ukrainian content.

The fifth chapter—196 pages long—which was completed and edited (for the second time), is called "Future Prospects, or a Word about the Unity of Human History." On the basis of a detailed theoretical and concrete, historical analysis of the situation, the idea of a national-historical future is optimistically affirmed. Besides a series of our historical achievements, in the first place of such important ones as the formal existence of Ukrainian statehood, the main argument here is that the requirements of progress and the natural development of history do not abandon us to chance, but guarantee support for our aspirations to national freedom as aspirations that are objectively progressive and as such move in the same direction as the world's natural historical development. Soviet party-state socialism is antagonistic toward society, because the party, the party-state bureaucracy, has been transformed in the process of the development of Soviet society into a ruling social class. This thesis is proven in my work by applying the politico-economic and socio-philosophical logic of Marxism. The Soviet scholar H. Kh. Shakhnazarov, author of the book *Sotsialisticheskaia demokratiia. Nekotorye voprosy teorii* [Socialist Democracy. Some Questions of Theory] (Moscow, 1972), writes:

Social property is equal to the social regulation of property. The State, by realizing the planned management of socialist production, the accounting for and control of the amount of labor and consumption, acts in the name of and is entrusted by the collective owner of the means of production—the entire people (p. 12).

But the CPSU itself admits that it runs the state, that is, that it is the force that has supreme power over it. On the other hand, the people, society, in the person of its citizens, not only does not elect the organs of party rule, but also does not have even the formal right to control their activity, for the leading status of the party is entrenched in the constitution. One cannot speak of the practical possibility of such control: there exist for this in society's classes and social strata (the workers, peasants, intelligentsia) neither the material nor the ideological conditions, these being first and foremost their own political organizations independent of the CPSU, their own organs of civic thought. Being the sole organized force in society, the supreme political arbiter of social relations, under conditions when the individual private ownership of the means of production is absent, the party is transformed into the collective owner of the means of production. Thus it is transformed into a separate social class, into a ruling, exploitative class in Soviet society.

The argument is convincing and completely sufficient. But Marx and Engels's sociology offers us still another theoretical means of proving the correctness of the conclusion that the Soviet party and party-state bureaucracies constitute a separate social stratum, a separate social class. I am referring to Marx's concept of the so-called broad elucidation of private property, a concept according to which the essence of private property is the division of labor. "The division of labor and private property," wrote the authors of *The German Ideology*, "are identical manifestations: in one case one says the same in relation to activity that in the second case one does in relation to the product of activity" (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works in Three Volumes* [Kiev, 1977], 1:22). "Various stages in the development of the division of labor," we read in another place in Marx and Engels's work, "are at the same time also various forms of property; that is, every stage in the division of labor determines also the relations of individuals to each other according to their relationship to matter, tools, and the products of labor." (Ibid., p. 9).

Thus Marx and Engels's broad understanding of private property embraces not only the objective, material side of social life, but also the subjective side, "private property as depersonalized activity" (Marx and Engels, *Early Works* [Kiev, 1973], p. 540). The subjective essence of private property is the relationship of the human being to the product of his or her activity and the relations between those involved in labor. This is the source of Marx and Engels's third category of social philosophy, the category of alienation (self-alienation, alienated and self-alienated labor). The categories of private property—the division of labor, and alienation—by reflecting the various facets of the social activity of the human being, their dialectical unity, when combined reveal the scientific essence of Marx and Engels's sociology. Based on this, there arose Marx and Engels's theory of the future (communism).

Private property is divided labor; divided labor is labor that is alienated, self-alienated, the source of social and universally human alienation.

Beyond this concept the true meaning of Marx and Engels's theory of communism does not exist. Its concretization is the communist idea about the destruction of the division of labor, including also professional labor, about the liquidation of the enslavement of people within separate aspects of social activity, and the transformation of labor into the free, voluntary, creative activity of individuals. Only in this way is the destruction of classes, of the contradiction between the city and countryside and between intellectual and physical labor, made possible. Thus it was foreseen that one could create planned communist production free from the phenomenon of demand and proposition and a communist society of self-management free of political relations, of the social relations of domination and subordination—that is, a society without a state. Hence the concept of the broad elucidation of private property constitutes the basis of Marx and Engels's theory of communism. Soviet philosophical literature maintains that “the mature” Marx was free of the widespread view on private property, but this deduction is supported neither by the theoretical logic of Marx and Engels's social ideal nor by the texts of their works.

Of course, Marx and Engels's hopes for the possibility of, as they said, “the destruction of work,” that is, the liquidation of all division of social activity, turned out to be utopian. Their social philosophy, however, realistically reflects the real collisions in life and thus, in its section on dialectical materialism, is relevant to real life, constituting a great scientific and methodological contribution. It also provides us with the theoretical key to understanding the social nature of the CPSU and the non-party public service. The political management of Soviet society is not the function of elected public servants who are answerable, formally and in fact, to all the citizens of the country, but the activity of a separate, organized layer of people—the party—which both formally and in practice exists beyond the control of the entire society. In other words, the party's activity in Soviet society is not a private, group concern of individuals, but the particular work of a separate, organized social stratum that relates to material and spiritual productivity on an all-societal scale in terms of power. Its leading activity is a separate aspect of *social* labor, and this stratum itself is the arbiter of social relations, that is, a separate social class.

In his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx wrote that under the conditions of divided labor, “with the help of alienated and self-alienated labor, the worker gives birth to a relationship to this labor of a person who does not know what labor is and exists outside labor. The relationship of the worker to labor gives birth to the relationship to this same labor of the capitalist, or whatever else you can call the master of labor” (Marx and Engels, *Early Works* [Kiev, 1977], p. 529). This master of labor in Soviet society is the Communist party,

the party-state bureaucracy. Neither the working class, the peasantry, nor the intelligentsia—who embody the three fundamental aspects of social labor—possess in the USSR a separate political organization of their own, a separate representation in the organs of state power. Not having a self-organized life of their own, they are thus deprived also of the material means of forming a common will, of defending their class interests. Therefore, they are not the masters of their own labor; they cannot be viewed as the collective owners of the means and the product of their own productive activity. The master, the owner, is the party, the party-state bureaucracy.

According to Marxist sociology, the state is a political form of social domination, an organization created by the ruling class for its own self-defense. This type of state can also be seen in so-called Soviet rule, which is formed and controlled by the party. That it manages the state, that it is a higher force ruling above it, the CPSU itself admits. The fact that the party forms the organs of state rule is also not a secret to anyone. We, the electors, even formally do not have anyone to elect, because for each deputy seat only one candidate is nominated. He is in fact nominated by the organs of party rule and appointed by them.

Stalinism was a true social counterrevolution that once and for all defeated the power of the soviets (soviet power) and deprived the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia of their political freedom, making the party the supreme and sole political master in the country. The idea of the leading role of the CPSU means that the highest, sovereign embodiment of power is not the soviet, but the party organs. They, in reality, are also the state power in Soviet society.

In this chapter, the history of the appearance in Soviet society of a new ruling class is analyzed; on the basis of Marx's sociology, the internal structure of this class is examined, and it is shown that in its distinguishing traits and sociopolitical nature the Soviet ruling class is indistinguishable from other historically known ruling social classes. It has its own state form of self-defense and self-affirmation: hence the party idea about the growth in the role of the party and of the state in the process of building communism. From the perspective of Marx's theory of communism, this concept is totally absurd, for, according to Marx, communism becomes more tenable to the extent that the state, every state, withers away.

My social position is socialist; my political position, democratic. I formulate it as a conception of democratic socialism. It is close to Eurocommunism. I support ideological, cultural, and political pluralism. The working class and the peasantry should have their own, separate, class representation in the organs of state power and the freedom, in accordance with the law, to create democratic parties. Only in this way will the party-state bureaucracy lose the status of the sole "master of

labor" (Marx), of a separate social class. Only then will the party be a party and not the ruling social layer in society.

My conception of democratic socialism foresees not the restoration of the private ownership of the means of production, but the liquidation of the party's private ownership—of ideological and political absolutism, of party autocracy. It foresees a movement toward Marx's ideal of the future, even though the pinnacle of this ideal is utopian. The utopianism of Marx's theory of historical development after a triumphant socialist revolution is based on the hope that the liquidation of capitalist private property and the high level of development of productive forces would allow the liquidation of all, including professional, divisions of labor and the transformation of labor into free and voluntary creative activity. Of course, Marx and Engels were right when they thought that only in this manner could alienation as a social phenomenon, and the state as its political form, be destroyed. Nevertheless, until now theory has not provided us with any arguments to prove that such hopes are realistic. The complexity of contemporary production, the difficulties of psychologically mastering the world, and, in addition, and this is most fundamental, the very nature of the human being, which is a finite and limited (not in the usual but philosophical sense of the word) entity, make it impossible to liquidate the division of labor and the social enslavement of people by particular aspects of the activity of production. Therefore, it is also impossible to realize the communist ideal to the extent that Marx and Engels envisaged it. After all, an ideal is an ideal only as long as it is created by the elemental movement of life and is the manifestation of an individual, organically and elementally acquired vision of a better future, and not the ideology and politics of a state. The state form of existence is always a conservative and egoistic factor in history. (Hence the communist idea of the withering-away of the state, of every state.) The state does not realize ideals; it only, if it is democratic, adapts to them and guarantees the evolutionary development of society. Soviet socialism has not contributed any revolutionary changes to the relations between the ideal and the state. The political form of existence in our country is also the conservative and egoistic side of reality.

If this conclusion seems too subversive to the reader with a socialist consciousness, suffice it to say here that the official communist ideal foresees the withering-away of the state and the political sphere of life in the process of building communism. Therefore, my "subversion" is within the current of Marx and Engels's sociology, philosophy, and history. Holding on principle the position of socialism and democracy, I can acknowledge the presence of only one "subversion" in my world view and in my work, which has been confiscated by the punitive organs of the state. I truly did proclaim an anti-party conception; I harshly criticize the ideology and policies of the party; I dispute its ideological and

political absolutism, its ideological and political autocracy. This, of course, contradicts the articles in the constitution about the leading role of the CPSU, but it does not contradict Marx's conception of the future—of communism—according to which in the process of moving closer to communism the political sphere of social activity is supposed to be withering away. Thus, both the official idea about strengthening the leading role of the CPSU and the state and the corresponding article in the constitution of the USSR have an anticommunist, which means also antidemocratic, character. On their ideological base there have arisen the corresponding articles of the criminal code about legal accountability for so-called slander of the Soviet order, for "anti-Soviet propaganda," and so on.

For socialism, these are disgraceful motives for persecuting Soviet citizens. They negate the articles of the constitution about the freedom of speech, thought, scholarly research, and so on. Under our ideological and political circumstances, any criticism of living conditions can be called slander, not to speak of criticism of party-state policies. But every state in the world, including also a fascist state, guarantees the freedom of supporting and extolling state policies. Of what, then, consists the freedom of speech, thought, and political freedom, and does such a problem exist at all? Clearly, political freedom has meaning only if it is the freedom to criticize "the substance" (Marx) of the state and the ruling party, if it is the freedom to control, also in an organized form, the activity of the state, and in our country of the party-state, organs. Of course, under democratic conditions, in a socialist society there would appear neither the ideology of party autocracy (the leading role of the CPSU) and the absurd, politically anticommunist, anti-Marxian doctrine about the building of communism by the state, nor the blatant contradiction of the constitution of the USSR. This constitution proclaims in one article (the second) the rule of the people in the person of the Soviet of People's Deputies, and in another article (the sixth), by affirming the leading role of the CPSU, hands over lock, stock, and barrel this rule, the soviets themselves, and the entire people to one party and places them under its absolute control: control by an organized stratum of people that (as an organization, as a political institution) society, the entire people, even formally does not have the right to criticize, to control, or whose organs it does not have the right to elect.

The state of the development of Soviet society today constitutes the continuation and inertia of Stalinism, altered, of course, technically and in all its aspects according to contemporary historical conditions to accommodate the political needs of today's dominant Soviet class, the party-state bureaucracy. Stalinism is the tragedy of the Soviet peoples, a tragic page in the history of socialism, and a massive blow to the idea of socialism. One can agree with the party idea that the fundamental contradiction in the contemporary world is the contradiction between capitalism and so-

cialism. But people cannot and should not abstract themselves from real socialism. Yet here we, supporters of the socialist order, find ourselves in complicated, uncomfortable conditions, because real socialism has not yet become democratic. It has acquired the political form of party autocracy and affirms the absolutism of ideology. It does not guarantee people the freedom of spiritual life and independent social activity. The persistent attempts by the CPSU at rehabilitating Stalin and Stalinism, the silence about Stalin's crimes, the strict censorship of thought about the past, the persecution in the Soviet Union of people for criticizing party-state policies and especially and primarily for the national patriotism of the non-Russians, the shameful facts about the torture of healthy people in psychiatric prisons, Maoism, the great-power aggressive politics of China, and the fascism of Pol Pot's Kampuchean socialism: how could all of this fail to make the peoples of the capitalist countries wary of the very idea of socialism, fail to create doubts about the viability of socialist doctrine? Only the democratization of the Soviet Union, of Soviet socialism, can save the prestige of socialism and guarantee its progressive historical development; only this can weaken the ideological, and then the political, tensions between the states comprising the various social systems.

Again about China: I do not see any other way of neutralizing the Chinese threat to the world other than by ideologically disarming China, that is, by helping it become democratic. But this can be done only when we ourselves have become democratic, when the Soviet Union joins the vanguard of world democracy and the CPSU no longer virulently attacks bourgeois democracy, but takes the position of Marx and Engels, who considered bourgeois democracy a great achievement of human civilization and maintained that the proletarian revolution should not reject bourgeois democracy, but extend it by liquidating capitalist private ownership of the means of production and transforming the material means and social forms of human activity into the property of everyone, of every person.

Eurocommunism is a very welcome event (for people of anticapitalist convictions) in the world proletarian movement. It points to the possible way out of the contradictions within existing socialism; it, I think, has already played a certain role in raising the prestige of the socialist idea, in the ideological strengthening of the proletarian, anticapitalist struggle. Unfortunately, the political leadership of the Soviet Union reacted to this current not only with suspicion, but also with hostility. The future and possibly even the nearest political fate of Soviet society depends to a significant degree on the firmness and the consistency of the Eurocommunists: will democratic forces prevail in the ranks of the party-state stratum, or will the Stalinists again gain the upper hand, bring the Soviet people new misfortune and new repressions, and increase the threat to world peace?

Yes, in the contemporary world filled with nuclear weapons, in a world of very serious economic problems in the conditions of a scientific-

technical revolution, the problem of the democratization of Soviet society is directly connected to the problem of war and peace. Any despotism and antidemocratic ideology is a threat to peace. If the antidemocratic Stalinist forces triumph in Soviet society, not only will the general material and spiritual living conditions of the Soviet population deteriorate, but also the threat to world peace will increase. I beseech you, those who stand at the helm of state power, not to treat lightly the fate of the peoples of the USSR and the entire world, the fate of world peace! Rise at least a little above your class egoism, above your party intolerance of other thought! Doubt for a moment your infallibility and manifest your historical wisdom, the scope of your view of the world. These are very serious matters I am writing about!

From the point of view of its formal status, the situation of the Ukrainian people within the USSR is quite unbelievable. We, the Ukrainians, are a separate people, a separate nation. Yet party propaganda argues that we are faced with only one prospect: of gradual withering-away as a nation.

We have our own state and, according to you, have voluntarily united with other peoples in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Soviet Union is a federation of republics, yet the official press more and more consistently writes about the USSR as if it were a unitary state. Many peoples live in the Soviet Union, yet you talk about a single people!

We have the constitutional right to secede freely from the USSR, yet official propaganda castigates the idea of an independent, self-sufficient Ukrainian state as an idea that is nationalist and inimical (!) to the Ukrainian people.

The Ukrainian people, you admit, has suffered severe national oppression at the hands of the prerevolutionary Russian state, yet the struggle against Russian national oppression you label Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, and the leaders of this movement, traitors of the Ukrainian people!

The Ukrainians are a separate people, yet you talk of "reunification" with the Russians. Ukraine in the seventeenth century became part of the Russian state with the rights of autonomy, yet you now talk of "the reunification" of Ukraine with Russia in a single state!

You cite Lenin's idea that every national-liberation movement tends towards and ends in the creation of a separate state, yet for the Ukrainian people you do not consider this legal, natural, or progressive.

Lenin's theory foresaw the fusion of nations long after the triumph of communism in the entire world, yet you, who call yourselves Leninists, fuse, "bring closer together" the Soviet peoples already; you invent "a single people," "a single economy," "a single territory," and thus, it turns out, also a single Soviet nation.

Is a normal national life possible in such ideological conditions? Caught between the prospect of the fusion of nations and the prerevolu-

tionary dream about reunification, a nation can only die, not create its own historical life. Thus, it is not strange that in the "sovereign" Ukrainian SSR people are persecuted for their public new-year carolling in Kiev, for the most modest expression of national patriotism; that in the cities of our republic there are few Ukrainian schools; that we do not have Ukrainian-language films; that the publication of scholarly literature in the Ukrainian language is being catastrophically reduced; that the past of the Ukrainian people is being falsified; and so on.

Humanism, justice, and the peaceful coexistence of individuals and nations are guaranteed only in the conditions of the evolutionary historical development of society, and this development is guaranteed only by democracy. History is unable not to develop; contradictions, primarily antagonistic ones, are unable not to be resolved. But the extent of difficulties encountered on this road depends a great deal on the flexibility in ideology and in practice of the ruling political forces of the ruling class.

Soviet society is faced with the need for revolutionary changes, with the necessity of overcoming the ideology and practice of stratified privileges—the privilege of a separate layer of people (the party) to run society. This privilege is the rudiment of the feudal structure of societal life. The official deification of the CPSU, the mystification of the Soviet Communist party by the party-state ideology, is an unbelievable phenomenon in today's civilized world, an obvious relic of feudal consciousness and psychology.

In order to democratize Soviet party-state socialism, we must transcend the ideology and the politics not only of Stalinism, but also of Leninism. We must adopt a critical attitude toward Marx and Engels's theory of the future. The idea of socialism demands this, as does the contemporary stage in the world's progressive development. We will be able to consider theoretically the socialist concept of life only if we explain the contradictions of both capitalism and socialism from the position of one sociophilosophical theory.

Marx and Engels's sociology, their conception (as one phenomenon) of private property, the division of labor, and alienation, and the dialectical-materialistic part of their theory of the future of society can function for us as this theory. In the context of this sociophilosophical world view, it becomes particularly understandable that Stalinism has its roots in the ideology of Leninism, in the ideology of the one-party rule of society, which turned out to be an utter contradiction of Marx and Engels's concept of the self-regulating development of history, of the communist concept of life as independent activity. Marx's idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat theoretically aided the invention of the Leninist ideology of party autocracy; but in its true meaning it in no way meant the liquidation of political democracy or the outlawing of oppositional forces. On the contrary, Marx spoke of the organs of civic thought under

socialism; he said that "the working class, in order not to lose again its just acquired rule, must on one hand remove entirely the old machine of oppression that had been until then used against it, and must on the other secure itself against its own deputies and functionaries, declaring them all without exception replaceable at any time" (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works in Three Volumes* [Kiev, 1977], 2:188).

The Eurocommunists have rejected the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and, having proclaimed the principle of political pluralism, are moving in essence in the direction of Marx's social philosophy. They have simply read it realistically and have realistically applied Marx's criteria of socialist humanism. The theoretical logic of the socialist ideal and concrete historical considerations convince us that political democracy, the freedom of oppositional activity, would in no way threaten socialism in the Soviet Union. On the contrary, for the historical development of Soviet society this is the only possible way of making real socialism healthy again, of harmonizing social relations between people, of creating the optimal conditions for guaranteeing the material and spiritual well-being of Soviet society, and of raising the prestige of the socialist system and winning the historical duel with capitalism.

The characteristic trait of social antagonism in Soviet society—and the basis of the group and estate privileges of the party and its servants in society, the basis of the party's domination of society—is, in Marx's words, "common private property" (as a result of the absence of political democracy and owing to the leading status of the CPSU). This condition creates the hope that Soviet party-state socialism will evolve into democratic socialism. But besides class egoism, there is still another reactionary destructive force here: Russian great-power nationalism. It stood at the cradle of the party theory of the future of nations, theoretically and organizationally disarmed the non-Russian forces at the anticapitalist front, and played a decisive role in the implementation of the Stalinist counterrevolution, in the transformation of the party into a ruling social class. It is that most concrete human ferment that fertilized and continues to fertilize the centralizing great-power ideology and policies of the CPSU.

It is no accident that the contradiction between the formal principles of national relations and the practice, the essence of the party's nationality policies, is expressed extraordinarily clearly first and foremost in the official interpretation of the past of the non-Russian peoples, particularly of the Ukrainians and Belorussians. In the historiography of the history of Ukraine, that is, where the object of the interests of contemporary and prerevolutionary Russian chauvinism is one and the same, we see the total confluence of the methodological criteria and terminological language of prerevolutionary great-power historiography about the past of the Ukrainian people with that of contemporary Soviet historical scholarship. "A single Rus' people of Kievan times," "an ancient Rus' nationality,"

the disintegration of this nationality as a result of the Tatar-Mongol invasion (according to the logic of this conception, the new creations are simply the ethnographic parts of one whole), the "reunification" of a disintegrated single people, the struggle against the "traitors" of the people and the "fatherland"—the "Mazepists" and "separatists"—the identification of Rus' with Russia, and the brotherhood of the "Great Russians" and "Little Russians": this Black-Hundred conception of prerevolutionary Russian historiography has been completely restored in official Soviet historical scholarship.

Matters have progressed so far that in contemporary Soviet literature the terms "Russia" and "Russian" are not only used to denote Eastern Slavdom of the ninth to the thirteenth century (which grossly contradicts even the conception of a "common ancestor"), but are also applied to today's Ukrainian historical reality. This cannot be called anything else but expansionism, the neocolonization of Ukraine by Soviet Russia, the restoration of the theory and practice of the White-Guardist "one and indivisible Russia." I am drawing the attention of the party-state authorities in the Soviet Union and in the Ukrainian republic to the propaganda war against so-called Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism in particular.

When not a word is mentioned about Russian nationalism, when Ukraine has no essential traits distinguishing it as a sovereign political entity in domestic and international affairs, when in Ukraine there dominates a Russian and Russian-speaking political and cultural atmosphere, when the national consolidation of the Ukrainian people has not been achieved; in the context of the theory of an "ancient Rus' nationality," "reunification," the rapprochement and fusion of nations; in an atmosphere of the total falsification of the history of Ukraine, of the subordination of the Ukrainian ethno-national historical process to the political interests of Russia and so on: in these conditions the struggle against so-called Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism means nothing else but the struggle against the Ukrainians' ethnic, national-historical consciousness of themselves as a people, the instigation of the eastern Ukrainian population against western Ukrainians and of Russians against Ukrainians, a stage in the politics of the denationalization and the Russification of Ukraine, and a method of struggling for the restoration of a prerevolutionary great-power Russia. A sad consequence of this ideological atmosphere is Ukrainophobia, with which a significant part of the Russian and Russified population of Ukraine is infected.

Various forms of a voluntary political union of socialist peoples based on equality could have become a significant factor in preserving and strengthening world peace, the model for the future harmonious and dynamic coexistence of the world's peoples. Unfortunately, Russian great-power nationalism also ruined things here. The democratization of Soviet society is inconceivable without a cardinal reexamination of the inter-

state relations between the Soviet peoples. Many Ukrainians, myself included, think that for the Ukrainian people a free, dignified life as a nation is impossible within the framework of political and state unity with Russia. The great-power traditions of viewing Ukraine as Russia's legitimate "younger brother," that is, as its historical property, are too strong and persistent. There can be various views about the form that the self-determination of the Ukrainian state should take, but there can be no compromise when it comes to the secession of Ukraine from the federation of Soviet republics. This is our constitutional and moral right, and only the Ukrainian people is competent enough to resolve this question, in the conditions of democracy and free discussion. By calling the demand for an independent Ukrainian state nationalist and trying to compromise its morality and ideals, official propaganda grossly violates the Soviet constitution and the principle of the right of nations to self-determination. The persecution of people for propagating the idea of state independence for this or that Soviet people is also an obstruction, because such a practice transforms the voluntary nature of the union of the Soviet peoples and the constitutional right of the republics to secede from the USSR into an artifice.

The contemporary historical life of the Ukrainian people is a life in the conditions of ideological ethnocide, political injustice, cultural second-ratedness, and spiritual inadequacy. Ideological ethnocide is centered in the official propaganda about the rapprochement and fusion of nations, an idea that has an ethno-assimilationist purpose and is explained as the "objective, natural" process of the creation of a nationless communist society, that is, as the process of the withering-away of nations. In reality, life does not know tendencies like this progressive humanistic phenomenon. Only certain achievements of ethnic assimilation, or Russification, are common in the conditions of national oppression, as is some correlation between the historical conditions of material life and cultural development. The concept of the rapprochement and fusion of nations is not a scholarly theory (it, from the point of view of experience till now, has no basis to even be considered a scholarly hypothesis), but a political doctrine that is not subject to public discussion in our country. It is forced on people's consciousnesses by the ruling political forces, by Russian great-power nationalism. Thus, it is a way of destroying the non-Russian nations of the USSR through ideology. In order to democratize social relations and to guarantee the national equality of the peoples of the USSR, the political leadership of the Soviet Union should, as its first and most important step, undertake a cardinal review of the ideology of national relations, the official concept of the future of nations. This should also be the first demand of the democratic forces in Soviet society.

The preaching of national nihilism and the ideology of the death of nations, which is conducted in the form of propaganda about the

rapprochement and fusion of nations, "internationalization," and so on, is possible only when there is a lack of political rights for dependent nations and the political dictatorship of supranational forces exists. Ukraine today is formally a sovereign state, but in reality it lacks the means that are necessary to guarantee its national sovereignty.

The situation here is very clear and unequivocal, particularly in regard to the structure of political rule. The organs of state power in the Ukrainian SSR, like those in the entire Soviet Union, are formed in reality by the party, which—and this is the party's official political postulate—controls and directs the state. But the CPSU in turn is the only party, and a centralized party at that; the Ukrainian people does not have its own separate, independent representation in the system of party rule, that is, the rule of the political elite: the Communist Party of Ukraine exists, according to the constitution, with only the rights of a regional (oblast) organization and is in no way autonomous. In the conditions of ideological absolutism and party autocracy this means the total domination in the country of central, Russian political forces and the transformation of the non-Russian republics in the federation into political provinces of Russia. Actually, even this is too elevated a qualification of the situation, because the non-Russian republics of the USSR lack the rights of sovereign political entities both in the internal life of the people and in the sphere of international politics (excluding some superficial, formal elements of a state structure). The material and structural manifestation of this situation is the absence among the non-Russian peoples of the USSR not only of their own party self-organization, but also of independent republican ministries in almost all social spheres.

According to the first Soviet constitution, which enforced the creation of the federation of Soviet republics, and according to the agreement that created the USSR, the cultural life of the peoples of the new federation was not subordinated to the authority of the state organs governing the federation as a whole. This was a significant instrument for the national-cultural renaissance of the nations oppressed under Tsarism and a real obstacle for Russian chauvinism, which—on a new foundation, dressed up in socialist phraseology—came into the open already in the first years of Soviet rule. The party conferences in the early 1920s described Russian great-power nationalism as the principal danger in Soviet ideology and political life. The Stalinist counterrevolution put an end to the political consolidation of the non-Russian peoples; their cultural independence was also eliminated.

Today, in order to mend the relations among the peoples of the USSR on the basis of equality, it is necessary above all and at the very least to place national-cultural life outside the authority of those state organs governing the Soviet Union as a whole and, of course, to get rid of the unconstitutional practice of calling the USSR a "unitary state."

The full cultural independence of the Soviet peoples would automatically give rise to public state relations among the Union republics and between them and foreign countries. This would manifest their sovereignty and would generally enrich the social life of the Soviet population and enhance the prestige of socialism. The economic life of the peoples of the USSR should also have the material and organizational guarantees of national state sovereignty. A very important factor in the pressure on the non-Russian nations to assimilate is the absence in the republics of public life in the international arena on a daily basis. And of course, all-Union international official discussions should all be conducted in the name of the Soviet peoples, and not the fictional "single Soviet nation." The political rights of the Ukrainian people have decreased tremendously in the last decade, especially since 1972; the political anonymity of Ukraine within the USSR has increased. The present situation has resulted in the disappearance in Ukraine of even the formal indicators of its national-political representation. The party-state leaders of the Ukrainian SSR have been using the Russian language more and more frequently in their public appearances inside the republic instead of the language of the Ukrainian nation.

The above ideological and political conditions have also given rise to the second-ratedness and provincialism of the Ukrainian national-cultural environment and are the reason for the spiritual insecurity of the Ukrainian people. Above all, they have lowered the intellectual level of the entire community, especially of the intelligentsia, by exerting psychological pressure on the creative abilities of people, which has resulted in the fragmentation of these abilities, the narrowing of its values, and a demoralized public consciousness. The ideology of "rapprochement," the extinction of nations, in principle has made the national life of the non-Russian peoples impossible, especially in the cultural sphere. Besides hampering the creative energy of the nation, it has made any serious national-cultural initiatives politically suspect; it has subordinated the elemental movement of history to a tendency contrary to the nature of real life—to the planned extinguishment of everything national. This ideology, as well as direct political dependence on the Russian center, has arrested the cultural initiative of the organs of power representing the non-Russian republics and has generally made impossible any public discussion about national problems, about the historical problems of the national life of the people. This last predicament has been the most important factor in the national-cultural oppression of the non-Russian peoples, for societal culture, in the broad sense of the term, manifests itself primarily in interpersonal communication, in a response to the conditions of life.

(To be concluded in the next issue)

[Translated from the Ukrainian by Roman Senkus]

GUIDE TO RESEARCH

The V. J. Kaye (Kysilewsky) Collection at the Public Archives of Canada

The V. J. Kaye (Kysilewsky) Collection (MG 31, D 69) is one of the most significant archival collections in the area of Ukrainian-Canadian history at the Public Archives of Canada. It is of particular relevance to researchers interested in the history of the first wave (1891-1914) of Ukrainian immigration to Canada. The material is also of interest to genealogists and researchers in Ukrainian family history.

The collection was donated in 1968 and 1974 by Dr. V. J. Kaye. Additional archival material was presented to the Public Archives in 1976 and 1979 by Mrs. G. Kaye of Ottawa. The manuscript portion amounts to forty-one volumes; publications are included in vols. 41 to 68. Each volume is a box containing approximately 20 cm. of files, except vol. 68, which is a box of 8 cm. Over three hundred photographs from Dr. Kaye's collection are available in the National Photography Collection, and an interview with Dr. Kaye taped shortly before his death is available in the Sound Archives. Records, including correspondence, notes, and press clippings, kept by Dr. Kaye during his employment with the departments of National War Services and Citizenship and Immigration during the years 1942-47, are found in RG 26, vols. 1-12, in the Federal Archives Division.

Vladimir Kysilewsky was born on 4 August 1896 in Kolomyia in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He was the son of Julian V. Kysilewsky, a civil servant, and Olena Simenovych Kysilewsky. He completed four grades of primary education in Kolomyia and received his secondary education in Chernivtsi, graduating on 29 June 1914. After the First World War broke out, Kysilewsky joined, in December 1914, the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, a Ukrainian volunteer unit in the Austro-Hungarian Army. In 1917 he received a study furlough and entered the Technische Hochschule (engineering college) in Vienna and attended arts (including history) courses at the University of Vienna. At the end of the war in November 1918 he held the rank of lieutenant. During the years 1918-20 he served in the Ukrainian Army as personal adjutant to Lt. Gen. Gustav Adolf Zieritz.

Although he began his higher education in engineering, Kysilewsky developed a keen interest in his family's history, which broadened to include Ukrainian history. He obtained his Ph.D. degree on 24 July 1924 after defending his thesis, "Ukrainian Nobility of the Seventeenth Century." From the autumn of 1924 until January 1925 he lived in Paris to improve his knowledge of French language and history. He then emigrated to Canada and spent seven months working on a farm near Stuartburn, Manitoba. In July 1925 he attended a short summer course at the University of Manitoba and in 1926 he attended the teacher's course at the College of Education, University of Toronto. He took the short course in engineering at the University of Manitoba in 1927. From 1926 to 1928 he was a sergeant in the Winnipeg Grenadiers, a militia unit, and received military training at Camp Hughes, Manitoba, in 1927. During this period he had the opportunity to meet with many of the first Ukrainian pioneers in Canada. These encounters sparked his interest in the study of the first wave of Ukrainian immigration to Canada.

In 1927 Kysilewsky joined the newspaper publishing firm, National Publishers, as a correspondent in Winnipeg. In 1928 he became editor of the Ukrainian weekly *Western News* in Edmonton and held this position until May 1930. He received his naturalization papers on 8 May 1930 in Edmonton. He travelled in Europe from May to July 1930. From August 1930 until April 1931 he was assistant editor of the weekly *Ukraina* in Chicago.

From May 1931 until May 1940 he was head of the Ukrainian Press Bureau in London, England. In this position he was responsible for writing and disseminating information on the Ukrainian situation in Poland and the Soviet Union. During the years 1933-36 he also studied at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, under Prof. Robert Seton-Watson and prepared a doctoral thesis, "Ukrainian National Revival in Austria 1772-1849." He completed his doctoral studies in England with the intention of returning to Canada and teaching Slavic studies, and Ukrainian studies in particular, at a university.

With the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939, Kysilewsky joined the British Ministry of Information, broadcasting to Canada. In June 1940 he returned to Canada. He then worked for the Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship. On 2 February 1942 he joined the Nationalities Branch, Department of National War Services in Ottawa as liaison officer with ethnic groups and the ethnic press. At that time he adopted the name Kaye. In 1944, he was appointed head of the editorial section, and in this position he undertook departmental research on the problems of integration of immigrants and the history of the settlement of East Europeans in Canada. With the end of the war in 1945 the Nationalities Branch became the Citizenship Branch of the

Department of the Secretary of State. Kaye continued to work there until his retirement.

In 1948, the University of Ottawa invited Kaye to join the teaching staff of the newly established Institute of Slavic Studies. He accepted the invitation and continued, at the same time, his career in the Canadian public service. In 1950 he was appointed associate professor and head of the Slavic Department. He taught at the University of Ottawa until 1960.

After retiring from the public service on 1 January 1962, Kaye continued his research. His study *Early Ukrainian Settlements in Canada* was published in October 1964. In 1974 a second study, *The Dictionary of Ukrainian Canadian Biography: Manitoba Pioneer Settlers, 1895-1900*, was published. Through his writings, Kaye attempted to interest Ukrainian Canadians in their own history by establishing a link between individual pioneer families and their participation in the first wave of Ukrainian immigration to Canada.

During his career in Canada, Kaye was elected to executive positions in various learned societies. He was elected first president of the Canadian Association of Slavists (CAS) in 1954, honorary president of CAS in 1967, and was chairman of the Ottawa chapter of the Shevchenko Scientific Society until 1974. He received the Taras Shevchenko Gold Medal from the Ukrainian Canadian Committee and was awarded the Order of Canada in 1974. In addition to his doctoral studies and major publications, Kaye is the author of over thirty scholarly articles and approximately one thousand articles in Ukrainian newspapers and periodicals. Dr. V. J. Kaye died on 30 August 1976 and was buried in Ottawa.

During his last years, Kaye regularly visited the Public Archives, where he continued his research and assisted in identifying documents in his archival collection. The material is arranged in the following series:

- A. Personal and Family Papers, 1903-76. 80 cm. (vols. 1-4)
Family history and genealogy, personal documents, diplomas, certificates, awards, some correspondence, diaries from London years (1931-40), and personal diaries (1941-61).
- B. General Correspondence, 1926-76. 1 m. (vols. 5-9)
General correspondence with Ukrainian Canadians and others.
- C. Ukrainian Bureau, London, 1929-40. 20 cm. (vol. 10)
Correspondence, articles, press clippings, and other material relating to the activities of the Ukrainian Bureau in London, England.
- D. Canadian Citizenship Branch, 1940-67. 45 cm. (vols. 11-13)
Correspondence, lectures, speeches, notes, reports, and publications related to Kaye's work in the Canadian Citizenship Branch.

Journal

- E. Notes and Speeches, 1942-61. 15 cm. (vol. 13)
Various notes and speeches by politicians, including miscellaneous notes on immigration.
- F. Ethnic Press and Publications, n.d., 1942-65. 15 cm. (vols. 13-14)
Articles, notes, statistics, and lists of ethnic publications in Canada.
- G. Ethnic Political Participation, n.d., 1957-68. 15 cm. (vol. 14)
Notes on ethnic voting and politics.
- H. University of Ottawa, n.d., 1950-65. 30 cm. (vols. 14-15)
Correspondence, lectures, and student papers relating to Kaye's work at the university.
- I. University of Ottawa Theses, 1951-53. 20 cm. (vol. 16)
Various university theses by Kaye's students.
- J. Research Notes on Ethnocultural Groups, 1941-76. 30 cm. (vols. 17-18)
Notes, press clippings, statistics, correspondence, papers, and other material relating to Kaye's research.
- K. Ukrainian Ethnocultural Organizations, Churches, and Press, 1928-76. 45 cm. (vols. 18-20)
Correspondence, periodicals, notes, reports, and other information.
- L. Ukrainian Canadian Committee, 1940-76. 40 cm. (vols. 21-22)
Correspondence, reports, briefs, circulars, resolutions, statements, and other material relating to the activities of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee.
- M. Academic Institutions, Societies, Organizations; Correspondence, 1946-76. 20 cm. (vol. 23)
Correspondence, articles, and other information relating to Kaye's academic interests and participation.
- N. Academic Institutions, Societies, Organizations; Bulletins and Newsletters, 1949-74. 20 cm. (vol. 24)
Circulars, announcements, programs of conferences, reports, and bulletins produced by various academic organizations.
- O. Research Material on Ukrainian Pioneer Settlers; Sailing and Naturalization Records, 1891-1900; Obituary and Death Notices, 1890-1944. 55 cm. (vols. 25-27)
Notes, memoirs, copies of official reports and documents, and other material relating to Kaye's research on Ukrainian pioneer settlers.
- P. Research on Ukrainians in World War I and World War II, 1914-45. 25 cm. (vols. 27-28)
Research notes, biographies, lists, and other information on Ukrainian Canadians in the two world wars.
- Q. Historical Notes on Groups and Individuals, 1915-71. 65 cm. (vols. 29-32)
Biographical notes, press clippings, obituaries, correspondence, articles, file cards, and other material on ethnocultural groups and individuals.

- R. Manuscripts and Research Notes, 1889-1976. 1.1 m. (vols. 32-37)
Notes, file cards, draft manuscripts, and other material relating to Dictionary of Ukrainian Canadian Biography; Early Settlements in Canada, Pioneer Families.
- S. Articles, Book Reviews, and Short Stories by Kaye, 1913-76. 30 cm. (vols. 37-38)
Draft articles, press clippings, correspondence, draft manuscripts, and other material relating to Kaye's research and writing.
- T. Publishing of Dr. Kaye's Books, 1947-76. 10 cm. (vol. 39)
Correspondence regarding publishing of manuscripts, correspondence with Mr. Stephen Pawluk and Dr. S. M. Fostun on the publication of Kaye's studies.
- U. T.V. Series: To Canada, 1975-76. 10 cm. (vol. 39)
Correspondence, notes, and script relating to a television series on immigrants sponsored by Imperial Oil.
- V. Miscellaneous Reports, Articles, Press Clippings, 1871-1976. 30 cm. (vols. 40-41)
Correspondence, notes, and information relating to Kaye's research interests.
- W. Various Publications, Manuscripts, and Articles (Photocopies), 1924-67. 10 cm. (vol. 41)
Copies of publications and other material relating Dr. Kaye's research interests.
- X. Printed Matter and Microfilm Reel C-10521, 1896-1976. 5.08 m. (vols. 42-68)
Articles, brochures, publications, reports, newspaper calendars, jubilee and other anniversary publications, periodicals, bulletins, pamphlets, journals, newspapers, rare books, and other related materials.

A finding aid (no. 1409) describing this collection has been prepared. Researchers wishing to receive more information regarding this collection or other archival collections are invited to write to or visit:

Ukrainian Archives Program
National Ethnic Archives
Public Archives of Canada
395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N3

Myron Momryk

*Ukrainian Archives Program
National Ethnic Archives*

REVIEWS

GEORGE G. GRABOWICZ, *TOWARD A HISTORY OF UKRAINIAN LITERATURE*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1981. 101 pp. Distributed by Harvard University Press.

This book defines itself as a "review and critique" (Preface, n. p.) of Dmytro Chyzhevsky's *History of Ukrainian Literature* (1956; trans. 1975).¹ Its tenor is polemical, its objective aggressive: to deprive the *History* of its hitherto almost unchallenged authority.²

The reader encounters four chapters, each subdivided, perhaps in parodic homage to Chyzhevsky's practice, into numbered paragraphs. Chapter one, "Prehistory," outlines the (thin) tradition of Ukrainian literary histories; chapter two, "The Method and Premises of the *History*," criticizes the English version of 1975 for failing to undertake a scholarly updating of Chyzhevsky's book, especially its bibliographical apparatus, and takes issue with a few—not all—of Chyzhevsky's methodological principles, notably his focus on details of style and form. Chapter three, "The Argument of the *History*," is the longest and constitutes a polemical companion to Chyzhevsky's text; there is little, one should note, with which Grabowicz finds himself in agreement. Finally, chapter four, "The Basic Problems," reiterates Grabowicz's chief sources of disaffection with Chyzhevsky's method.

In part, these disaffections are not new. Chyzhevsky's "most fundamental premise," his alleged belief that literature "exists apart from other spheres of human activity (social, political, etc.);" (p. 85) had already been attacked by Oleksandr Biletsky from a conventional Marxist base-and-superstructure position.³ Like Grabowicz (pp. 33, 94-97), Iurii She-

¹ Dmytro Chyzhevsky, *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury vid pochatkiv do doby realizmu* (New York, 1956); Dmytro Čyževs'kyj, *A History of Ukrainian Literature (From the 11th to the End of the 19th Century)*, trans. by Dolly Ferguson, Doreen Gorsline, and Ulana Petyk, ed. with a foreword by George S. N. Luckyj (Littleton, Colo., 1975).

² The few reviews and discussions have been favourable, overall, in tone, even where they have differed in detail. See Iurii Sherekh, "Na ryshtovanniakh istorii literatury," *Ukrainska literaturna hazeta* 2 (1956), no. 6 (12), 1-2; and Iurii Lavrinenko, "Dmytro Chyzhevsky—literaturoznaveť" [1957], in his *Zrub i parosty* (Munich, 1971), 241-49.

³ Oleksandr Biletsky, "Stan i problemy vyvchennia davnoi ukrainskoi literatury," in his *Zibrannia prats v piaty tomakh* (Kiev, 1965), 1:126.

rekh (Shevelov) had found Chyzhevsky's presentation of styles and style-based periods to be too static and inadequate in dealing with such phenomena as the genesis, interpenetration, and conflict of styles.⁴ Grabowicz adds a number of serious objections of his own. Chyzhevsky's sense of empathy with certain styles and periods he reads as a "tendency to subjective, even partisan involvement" (p. 85); he accuses Chyzhevsky of doing "violence to reality" and adjusting the facts of Ukrainian literature to fit the "Procrustean bed" of a model based on West European literary development (p. 94). And if Chyzhevsky's original is defective, then the English translation is rendered positively misleading by its outdated bibliography and its errors in the translation of central literary terms.

Must the fair-minded reader, then, share Grabowicz's implied condemnation of Chyzhevsky's *History* as a work so flawed by the accumulated defects of original and translation as to be no longer useful to the student of Ukrainian literature? The answer, I suggest, must be, emphatically, "No"—even though many of Grabowicz's objections are justified. The bibliography *is* but a distorted and dim reflection of the state of current research; the rendering of "*zahalni mistsia*" as "direct narration" instead of "commonplaces" (*topoi, loci communes*) (Grabowicz, p. 19) *is* scandalous; the charges of schematism and truncation of historical perspective are not without foundation. But *Toward a History* does not present a balanced judgment of the target text. Sherekh's reservations had been expressed in the context of agreement with all but a few of Chyzhevsky's theses, of admiration for the breadth of the encompassed material, and of respect for the sureness of Chyzhevsky's aesthetic judgment.⁵ Sherekh and, like him, Lavrinenko had reflected upon the *History's* innovative significance as a step beyond the Iefremovite conception of Ukrainian literary history as merely a history of the ideological moods of authors and works.⁶ Lavrinenko lauded the work in terms of the values espoused by the then dominant New Criticism and "immanente Methode": Chyzhevsky's focus on actual works and their internal organization, and his recognition of the fusion of content and form in style, opened new possibilities for the perception of Ukrainian literature.⁷

nian literature. First, the *History* recognizes the cognitive value of the Furthermore, in spite of having been conceived in the 1940s, Chyzhevsky's book still today possesses virtues in abundance—less, perhaps, for one who, like Grabowicz (p. 19), expects an up-to-the-minute *Forschungsbericht*, than for a student who needs an introduction to Ukrai-

⁴ Sherekh, 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁶ Sherekh, 1; Lavrinenko, 242.

⁷ Lavrinenko, 242-43.

informed generalization, and it generalizes brilliantly and memorably. The result is an image of literary history not as a confusing myriad of facts, but as an ordered succession of phases, in each of which literature acquires a certain character. Some simplification is involved, certainly; but it is more than compensated by the attendant clarity and vividness. Second, the *History* accompanies its generalizations with a mass of illustrations, constantly confronting the reader with the actual subject matter of the historical account. Third, Chyzhevsky's practice of depicting Ukrainian literature in relation to European trends acquires a new significance for the English-speaking reader, because for him it links the particular to the general, the unknown to the known.

None of this makes a positive impression on Grabowicz, and herein lies, I think, the injustice of his attitude toward the *History*. He fails to see it as a work that had a liberating effect on the reader's understanding of Ukrainian literature—and not only in the second half of the 1950s: classroom experience suggests that it can exercise a similarly benevolent effect now. Grabowicz chooses to present the *History* negatively—as subjectivistic, eclectic, and, by implication, misleading.

Nevertheless, Grabowicz's book is a valuable contribution to the study and discussion of Ukrainian literature. In the course of his critique of the 1975 bibliography Grabowicz provides, in the footnotes, what amounts to an extremely useful guide to recent research. The discussion of specific problems brings to light Grabowicz's enviable erudition and critical sensitivity, which establish beyond doubt his competence to refine and correct many of Chyzhevsky's views. His comments on Chyzhevsky's treatment of Kotliarevsky's *Eneida*, of Hulak-Artemovsky, of Borovykovsky and Metlynsky, are cases in point. By way of example a single illustration will have to suffice.

Chyzhevsky dedicates part of his discussion of Classicism to the treatment of anonymous Ukrainian-language *virshi* on religious themes dating from the eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries. He interprets the vulgar vocabulary and extreme informality of this class of poetry as elements of satiric parody and as typical manifestations of the spirit of Enlightenment impiety.⁸ Grabowicz provides a more differentiated account of the sense in which these texts are parodic: technically speaking, they are parodies because they use one level of expression where another would be expected; but insofar as parody implies mockery or ridicule, they are most often not parodic (p. 45). By quoting more completely from the texts than Chyzhevsky had done, Grabowicz is able to make plausible his view that the *virshi*, far from being enlightened blasphemies, are the very opposite: expressions of a traditional Christian piety. Their

⁸ Čyževs'kyj, 378.

tone is deliberately lowered "to make the narrative emotionally real and gripping" (p. 45).

On the other hand, it would be incautious to go all the way with Grabowicz. As though in further refutation of Chyzhevsky's characterization of the *virshi*, Grabowicz reminds the reader that they were probably the works of *mandrivni diaky*, composed for oral performance (p. 44); he argues that the colloquialism of such poems is a part of the strategy of "emotional actualization," which testifies to "genuine piety" and characterizes "folk and folk-like reworkings of Biblical motifs in different cultures and in different times" (p. 46). All this, the reader is apparently expected to conclude, is incompatible with satirical intentions. Yet nothing that Grabowicz argues excludes the possibility (which is forcefully entertained, as one would expect, by Soviet *communis opinio*)⁹ that the *diaky*, educated but not integrated into society, possessed a disaffected and cynical group consciousness that was particularly conducive to religious satire. Grabowicz's textual argument is persuasive; his implied social argument remains inconclusive.

Quite antihistorical and startling, however, is Grabowicz's attempt to lend still further weight to his position by taking an allegedly analogous example from another period and another culture. The fact that the folksy, colloquial, familiar style of the Polish author Jędrzej Wawro (1864-1937) is not incompatible with manifestly pious content is offered, one presumes, as evidence that the same may be true of the Ukrainian *virshi*. A scholar as sensitive to history as Grabowicz would be the first to concede that apparently similar phenomena may have entirely different meanings in historically, socially, and culturally disparate contexts. Yet here, without further argument, Grabowicz appears to expect the reader to receive a cross-cultural analogy as convincing evidence.

A fundamental complaint of Grabowicz's concerns Chyzhevsky's model of the historical development of style and period in literature as an oscillation between the poles of simplicity and complexity, order and freedom, creating a kind of eternal recurrence of Classical and Baroque, albeit under different names (p. 96). For all the overriding advantages of inspired generalization, Grabowicz is right about certain inadequacies of such a theory. It runs the danger of oversimplifying the literary process and channeling our perceptions of its empirical manifestations—the works themselves—toward the reconfirmation of our preconceptions of prevailing styles. It copes badly with the phenomenon of change, tending to produce, as Sherekh pointed out, a succession of stills in place of a moving picture.¹⁰ What is more, the rule of binary alternation may

⁹ For the official view, see the article "Mandrivni diaky" in *Ukrainskaadianska entsyklopediia*, vol. 8 (Kiev, 1962), 452.

¹⁰ Sherekh, 2.

well artificially impose certain structures on the literary historian. Thus, Grabowicz shares the unease of Sherekh and Biletsky about the periods of dissimilar "monumental" and "ornamental" style;¹¹ with Biletsky, Grabowicz fears that the application of the term "Baroque" to two centuries of literary development has resulted in the artificial imposition of a spurious cohesion onto thoroughly different works (pp. 33-34).¹²

And yet Grabowicz's own, very tentative and brief, proposal for an alternative periodization shows that he is far from solving this cursed question of literary history—and not only Ukrainian literary history. What he proposes on the closing pages of his book (pp. 97-98) is but a revision of Chyzhevsky's periods, some joined together and others broken up. In spite of such aphorisms as "it is an age that creates a style, not the style an age" (p. 98), Grabowicz provides no definition of what, in literary history, a "period" is or should be. From his thumbnail sketch of an alternative periodization it emerges that his periods are still defined, apparently, by a mixture of such criteria as prevailing genres, conventions, even *Weltanschauungen*. Thus, for example, "The period that Cyževs'kyj identifies as Classicism, the end of the eighteenth and the first three decades of the nineteenth century, should certainly not be defined solely by Classicism but rather viewed as a transitional period in which traditional, popular forms (burlesques, etc.), Classicist and Sentimental conventions, and the new pre-Romanticism were unevenly commingled" (p. 97). Altogether, the drift of the whole of Grabowicz's work is away from the idea of periodization. It would be more consistent of Grabowicz, who systematically objects to the subjugation of the empirical phenomenon by the generalization, to abandon the notion of a literary periodization completely, preferring some arbitrary or extra-literary time units instead.

Grabowicz emerges from *Toward a History* as a scholar dedicated to the conviction (which few, nowadays, would care to dispute) that literature is indissolubly part of the historical (cultural, political, social, and economic) process. He is particularly aggravated, therefore, by Chyzhevsky's alleged indifference to history (p. 85), singling out for criticism, for example, the all-too-abridged exposition of the nature and consequences of medieval Byzantine cultural influence (pp. 22-24) or the inadequate explanation of the social circumstances of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and their importance for the literature of Chyzhevsky's "Renaissance and Reformation" period (pp. 31-32). Yet socio-political history is not absent from Chyzhevsky's book. It is simply not treated for its own sake or elevated to the status of primary cause. The

¹¹ Sherekh, 2; Biletsky, 124.

¹² Biletsky, 126.

reader of the chapter on the Baroque, however, will learn *en passant* of the relative importance of ecclesiastical and cossack groups to Ukrainian Baroque culture, of the religious and educational institutions that maintained it, and (admittedly, as a mere hint) of the political change that caused its demise. Grabowicz, however, is probably correct in his complaint that the *History* offers inadequate orientation to the English-speaking reader with little or no background knowledge.

And yet where Chyzhevsky essays more than marginally into history, Grabowicz finds the venture not at all to his liking. In his treatment of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century in Ukrainian literature, Chyzhevsky advances his theory of an "incomplete literature" in an "incomplete nation."¹³ The function of the theory is to relate a literary phenomenon to a social one: the predominance in Ukrainian vernacular literature at that time of "low" genres and "low" style (to use the metaphor of Classicist poetics) is the result of the low social status of the Ukrainian language, which in turn is connected to the assimilation by the Ukrainian cultural elite of the new imperial (and therefore Russian) cultural values and language. If the kind of historical understanding that interests us most relates cultural phenomena to social and political facts, then this notion, one would think, eminently fits the bill. But Grabowicz dismisses it as "the single most misleading concept in the entire *History*" (p. 41). Literature, he claims, "like the culture of which it is a part . . . is *by its very nature complete*" (p. 87; Grabowicz's emphasis); it is more proper for a literary scholar to describe its organic wholeness (p. 57) than to *evaluate* it as incomplete by abstract, universal and external norms (p. 58).

In answer to this it should be said that completeness and incompleteness are, after all, metaphorical attributes, which can be used to highlight different aspects of the same phenomenon. If, retrospectively, we apply the metaphor of incompleteness to Ukrainian literature of the Classicist period, we do so to emphasize two sets of circumstances: first, that Ukrainian literature did not have all of the genres foreseen by the Classicist genre theory, which was familiar to all educated readers; and second, that Ukrainian literature did not have the range of styles and genres that were represented in other literatures, with which those readers were also acquainted: ancient, French, Russian, and Polish. The meta-

¹³ Čyževs'kyj, 374. The legitimacy of the term "incompleteness" in describing literatures and nations has been defended at some length by Ivan L. Rudnytsky in "Observations on the Problem of 'Historical' and 'Non-historical' Nations," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5 (1981), 358-68. See also Grabowicz's response, "Some Further Observations on 'Non-historical' Nations and 'Incomplete' Literatures: A Reply," in the same issue, pp. 369-88.

phor of incompleteness is used simply to describe a state of affairs and need by no means be evaluative. In that respect it is like the metaphor of readiness used by Pavlo Fylypovych, which Grabowicz receives favourably (p. 77). Ukrainian literature of a certain period was "incomplete" in the sense that Ukrainian culture and society were not "ready" for manifestations in the vernacular of literary phenomena that existed elsewhere or in other languages.

On the other hand it can be argued—with Grabowicz's own evidence—that members of the Ukrainian cultural elite of the early nineteenth century *themselves* perceived literature in the Ukrainian vernacular as incomplete, applied a negative evaluation to this circumstance, and strove to rectify it. Thus Hulak-Artemovsky is by no means content that writing in the Ukrainian language should bask in its organic union with "non-elite 'folk' models" (p. 57); he wants to increase the amplitude of Ukrainian letters, to see "if one cannot express in Ukrainian feelings that are gentle, noble, and elevated, and which do not force the reader or listener to laugh, as he would from Kotljarevs'kyj's *Eneida*..." (quoted on p. 53).

Grabowicz's objections to the concept of an incomplete literature are strange, given his recognition of the need to be aware of the connections between related cultures and literary processes (e.g., pp. 40-41). They take a grotesque turn when Grabowicz suggests that one might equally well call Persian, Turkish, or Chinese literature incomplete "because at some period in their history they do not exhibit the same system of genres that the West European literatures do" (p. 89). This is too much. Surely it is self-evident that in Grabowicz's hypothetical Orient, which is uninfluenced by European cultural traditions, the authority of the genre system and the exemplary force of European literatures is next to nil; but the same is certainly not the case for the Ukrainian cultural elite of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, given the nature of its education and its literary horizon of expectations. In the former case, the metaphor of incompleteness relative to the developed European model of an eighteenth-century literature is clearly inapplicable; in the latter case, it is both applicable and instructive.

Toward a History, then, is a mixed blessing. On one hand, it is a brilliantly written book, a collection of acute observations, a welcome bibliographical addendum to Chyzhevsky's *History*, and a useful corrective to some of the older book's idiosyncrasies. On the other hand, it is a one-sided, often splenetic polemic whose argumentation is at times less than convincing. One lives in the hope that when Grabowicz, having so vigorously cast the first stone, writes *his* history of Ukrainian literature, it shall prove to be without sin.

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MAHDALYNA LASLO-KUTSIUK, *SHUKANNIA FORMY: NARYSY Z UKRAINSKOI LITERATURY XX STOLITTIA*. Bucharest: Kriterion, 1980. 327 pp.

The author of this volume, a Rumanian scholar of Ukrainian literature, has several publications to her credit, many of them reflecting an interest in comparativism, structuralism, and formalism.* The present work, *Shukannia formy*, is acknowledged to be a continuation of *Velyka tradytsiia*. The introduction, nine essays, and conclusion in the volume deal with twentieth-century Ukrainian literature, particularly that of the 1920s.

The opening essay is a study of "the changes that have occurred in the poetic image of the moon in Ukrainian literature." The second essay traces the influence of Emile Verhaeren on Pavlo Tychyna and Mykola Bazhan. In the third essay the author pursues a "hermeneutic" analysis of four early poems by Maksym Rylsky. The fourth essay examines Mykola Zerov's approach to the sonnet. The fifth essay posits the influence of several Western writers on Iurii Ianovsky's fiction. The sixth essay considers developments and tendencies in contemporary Soviet Ukrainian prose; specifically, it is a concise discussion of Iurii Mushketyk, Iurii Shcherbak, Ievhen Hutsalo, and Hryhir Tiutiunyk. The eighth essay purports to be an examination of Mykola Kulish's main dramatic characters as "masks" of the author. And the final essay studies lexical-semantic word clusters and their function in the plays of Ivan Kocherha.

In the introduction, Laslo-Kutsiuk states that her goal is to analyze "certain significant achievements of Ukrainian literature in the twentieth century in the area of form." She proposes to do this through the prism of "world literature" in order to demonstrate how Ukrainian writers synthesized the latter with their native traditions. Stating that "a great literature is always in some respect a return to the old," she chooses to disregard (regrettably) "the search for form" as it was conducted by the Ukrainian avant-garde. Her volume of essays concludes with the observation that Ukrainian literature of the twentieth century bears two characteristic traits: (1) it shows a strong awareness of form and is highly conscious of its own "specificity"; (2) its artistic trends have achieved "synchronicity" with trends in "world literature." In her view, even though Ukrainian literature often turned toward old models, its achievements were on par with the age.

Shukannia formy is attractive primarily for the broad perspective in which it places its subject. For a critic of Ukrainian literature writing in the Eastern bloc, Laslo-Kutsiuk has an impressive knowledge of recent

* Cf. *Pytannia ukrainskoi poetyky: Spetsialnyi kurs* (Bucharest, 1974); *Velyka tradytsiia: Ukrainska klasychna literatura v porivnialnomu vysvitleni* (Bucharest, 1979).

Western critical thought and familiarity with Ukrainian literary criticism in the West, with which she enters into productive, even if limited, dialogue. In general, *Shukannia formy* can be credited with exploring terrain that is not frequently broached either by Ukrainian criticism in the West or in the Soviet Union. But although it has a number of attractive features, *Shukannia formy* is not without shortcomings.

The author concedes two things: the concept of "form" that figures so prominently in the title and is frequently invoked on the pages of the book is very loosely defined; secondly, the volume does not represent some single methodology, but exploits a variety of critical approaches. This has certain repercussions for the book. First of all, although there are many allusions and references to formalist and structuralist thought, it cannot be said that either of them really define the profile of this eclectic volume. The search for "form" here implies primarily a search for the "new." And even though Laslo-Kutsiuk is quite good in suggesting twentieth-century Ukrainian literature's drive for originality and freshness, her book can hardly be considered a study or analysis of this literature from a strict formalist or structuralist perspective. The real methodology of this volume is "comparativism"; it is pursued relentlessly, but with mixed results.

The essays here have not all been created equal. While some are well argued (e.g., "Vidblysky Verkharna," "Tendentsii suchasnoi ukrain-skoi prozy," "Kliuchi do teatru Ivana Kocherhy," "Dzvinka zakinchenist soneta Zerova"), others, even though they contain valuable observations, tend to waver, betraying at times a disquieting lack of focus. This is exemplified in the essay on Mykola Kulish, "Masky Kulisha." It begins with the author's claim that "one could write about all the leading characters [in Kulish's] plays . . . [as if] 'these [were] 'masks' of the author himself" (p. 233). On the following page Laslo-Kutsiuk makes several unsubstantiated statements to this effect and then drops the subject for all practical purposes until the last page. This essay—which contains some very interesting moments (especially intriguing are the parallels that Laslo-Kutsiuk draws between *Narodnyi malakhii* and Joyce's *Ulysses*), as well as one serious error (on p. 234 she writes that Kurbas "did not orient his actors . . . toward Western modernism," only to state a few pages later that he was a leading representative of expressionism [p. 247])—never really develops its promised theme.

The weakest essay is unquestionably the first. "Metamorfozy misia-tsia" is very consciously "structuralist," but it is so diffuse that it achieves very little. Its basic and fatal flaw lies in that the function and meaning of the moon, which is under investigation here, is never adequately discussed within the particular contexts in which it appears. In the author's headlong rush from folklore to literature, from one writer to another, the reader is subjected to a host of unsubstantiated generali-

zations. Perhaps if the field of investigation had been narrowed and then more deeply pursued this essay would have been more meaningful and convincing.

Laslo-Kutsiuk's "comparative" approach to Ukrainian literature has its merits and leads (as Joyce would say) to a number of "epiphanies." But there are drawbacks here as well. First, the author is overly preoccupied with the question of "genetic dependence." Much of her effort is devoted to demonstrating some kind of direct relationship between specific Western and Ukrainian works. Her attempts to prove this do not always succeed. What Laslo-Kutsiuk presents as proof of an influence is frequently unconvincing either because she presents too little external evidence (did the writer in fact know or read the works she discusses?), or because the internal evidence (such things as plot, images) is too general to be conclusive. While many of her arguments seem plausible, they remain, nonetheless, moot. The author herself seems to admit as much when she resorts to such qualifiers as "possibly" and "probably" when citing particular authors and works as models. Second, it seems that Laslo-Kutsiuk tries to do too much in too little space. Sometimes she opens so many avenues of inquiry in the course of a single essay and travels such short distances on them that her comparative methodology begins to resemble a kind of subjective, impressionistic criticism. For example, in her article on Ianovsky, "'Vikno do velykoho svitu' Iuriiia Ianovskoho," she invokes, among others, Joseph Conrad, Rudyard Kipling, Claude Farrere, Jack London, H. G. Wells, and John Dos Passos. By embracing such a broad spectrum of writers, Laslo-Kutsiuk does herself a disservice because she leaves many an interesting observation unfinished and unexplored. The third drawback of the author's "comparativism" is her almost total disregard of the Ukrainian literary milieu, the various movements, groups, and organizations that were exponents and transmitters of Western ideas in the 1920s. This oversight may give the false impression that only external forces played a role in molding Ukrainian writers, that their works were not affected by trends within Ukrainian literature itself. In the case of Ianovsky, for example, it seems insufficient to draw attention to Western models alone; his prose was an integral part of a wider Ukrainian phenomenon and cannot be fully comprehended without some reference to Ukrainian futurism or to such writers as Iurii Smolych and Maik Iohansen, i.e., to the experimental currents of the day. Although Laslo-Kutsiuk hints at all this when she mentions in passing Geo Shkurupii's name, she on the whole eschews, both in this and other essays, discussions that might give a fuller picture of where individual Ukrainian writers stood in relationship to their native, westernizing trends.

For these and other reasons *Shukanna formy* cannot be called a completely satisfying volume. But despite its limitations, it is a useful

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work. Laslo-Kutsiuk has, after all, attempted to do something relatively uncommon in Ukrainian literary criticism, and she has done it, for the most part, in an intriguing manner.

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STEPAN MISHKO, *NARYS RANNOI ISTORII RUSY-UKRAINY*. Edited and with an introduction and summary by Oleksander Dombrovsky. New York, Toronto, and Munich: Ukrainian Historical Association, 1981. 226 pp.

Currently the Ukrainian historical scene is again enmeshed in the Normanist versus anti-Normanist debate over the creation of Kievan Rus'. Instead of being buried with its nineteenth-century proponents, the Normanist theory is still being advocated, though under the guise of neo-Normanism. Stepan Mishko's book addresses this debate not by directly engaging in it, but by providing evidence of a Slavic political state that antedates Kievan Rus'. Instead of starting the argumentation for either side of the controversy in the ninth century, the debate is now regressed to the protohistoric third century.

The first millennium AD is an important period in the development of the East Slavic nations. The inhabitants of the Middle-Dnieper region, though themselves not in possession of writing, did enter the historic consciousness through the writings of contemporary chroniclers and historians of alien empires and civilizations. It must be stated that references to the early Slavs were included in these writings not for scholarly or ethnographic reasons; the Slavs were regarded as a military threat, and the information gathered was to be used as military intelligence. Documentation is sparse and scanty, and the information is often biased, but, nonetheless, it does contain kernels of information. Mishko has taken these kernels and written, as the book's title indicates, an outline of the protohistoric events and people of the Middle-Dniiper region. The disinterred archaeological record speaks eloquently of a settled, agricultural way of life in the region from Eneolithic times (4,000 BC). Using existing Greek, Latin, and later Byzantine and Arabic documentation, Mishko fleshes out the cultures that predate Rus'.

Interestingly enough, Mishko was never a professional historian. A lawyer by education, he was so enamored of history, especially the pre-history of his nation, that he dedicated some twenty years of his life to writing this book. Though it is not written in a scholarly fashion (it lacks footnotes, citations, etc.), the book is well written and treats its subject in broad, encompassing terms. Mishko does not digress from or augment the existing historical documentation. He extracts the snippets concerning

the early Slavs from the larger tracts and places them logically within the context of Ukrainian historical development. The focal point of the book is the series of events that culminated in a historical manifestation in the Middle-Dnieper region that historians of that period call the Antean Confederation. Mishko traces the rise, development, and subsequent decline of this phenomenon.

This nascent political state was brought about by the external threats from the steppe, from the expanding Roman Empire, and, later, from the Byzantine Empire. The Antean Confederation of tribes can temporally and spatially be related to the archaeological Cherniakhiv culture (2nd-5th century AD). This culture predominated in most of the Ukrainian forest-steppe and reached the northern Pontic coast through the river valleys that traverse the steppe. The overwhelming fact is that the Cherniakhiv culture was culturally homogeneous over such vast tracts of territory. If, as some Soviet archaeologists assert, this culture had a multi-ethnic base, then the Antean state was more akin to an empire, encompassing a central seat of authority and culturally dominating its subject tribes. As such, the Antean Confederation posed a threat in Dacia to the Roman Empire. The latter's response was as it always was when confronted by a threat from the "barbarian" world: extensive lines of fortifications, tribute, and domination through trade. The Cherniakhiv culture has yielded thousands of silver Roman dinars. In many respects it can be compared to a Roman provincial culture, like Britain; initially it was known in the archaeological literature as the Culture of Roman Influences.

The Byzantine Empire, on the other hand, relied more on diplomacy, treaties, and political subterfuge in its relations with the Antes. The numerous incursions into the Balkans by the Slavs and Antes directly threatened the existence of the Byzantine Empire. Byzantine sources refer periodically to the Antes until the year AD 602; thereafter it seems Byzantium lost sight of or was less concerned with the northeast. What, then, contributed to the decline of the Antean Confederation? It is known that in AD 602 the Avars under Apsikha were sent north by their kagan to destroy the Antes, because at that time the Antes were allies of Byzantium. Were they successful? Mishko belies they were not. According to him, the main reason Byzantium lost sight of the Antes was that the Slavs and Bulgars successfully colonized the Balkans, creating a glacis state for the Byzantine Empire in the northeast. The ensuing seventh and eighth centuries were relatively peaceful, and the confederation, which had been formed for defensive and offensive purposes, thus simply withered away and was replaced by localized tribal entities.

In one sense the archaeological record does support Mishko. Indeed, the large, homogeneous Cherniakhiv culture, encompassing most of Ukraine, gave way to small, localized archaeological manifestations. But the archaeological record also shows that the cultural level of the Cher-

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niakhiv culture was not attained by the succeeding early Slavic cultures (sixth-ninth century AD). The Slavic settlements, unlike those of the Antes, were small, fortified, and in remote areas far from navigable rivers. The cultural inventory also became impoverished; where once wheel-turned pottery predominated, hand-molded pottery became the norm. (This same scenario was repeated after the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus'; the latter part of the thirteenth century saw a general cultural decline, comparable in many respects to that of the sixth and seventh century AD.)

A more probable reason why the Antean state declined was the one external blow by the Avars in 602, from which the confederation did not fully recover until the formation of Rus' in the ninth century.

The Ukrainian Historical Association is to be congratulated for publishing the late Stepan Mishko's book. It is this reviewer's hope that more students of early Ukrainian history will emulate Mishko's multi-disciplinary approach in coming to an understanding of the origin of Rus' and its peoples. Mishko might have had his historical template set in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, but his view of the methodologies needed to reconcile early Ukrainian history (protohistory) was up-to-date:

It is in our era that the confrontation of written sources with archaeological material and the attendant microanalysis of these same sources, together with the greater exploitation of ancillary disciplines of history developed during the present century, will allow more light to be shed on the problematic early history of Slavdom (p. 23).

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THEODORE MACKIW, *ENGLISH REPORTS ON MAZEPA, HETMAN OF UKRAINE AND PRINCE OF THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE, 1687-1709*. New York, Munich, and Toronto: Ukrainian Historical Association, 1983. xii, 175 pp.

This book consists of a short biography of Ivan Mazepa, a summary of English "reports" about him, including not only diplomatic correspondence but memoir literature, and an appendix of thirty pages of reprinted sources used in the narrative. The author's intention was "to analyze the sources as far as historical facts are concerned" and to examine his chosen materials as "barometers" of English public opinion. Unfortunately, however, he did not succeed in doing what he set out to do; after

reading the book one is left with the impression that the author lost sight of the forest for the trees. The actual information presented is interesting, but Prof. Mackiw pays too little attention to the conceptual framework of his analysis and totally ignores the context in which these reports were written. Consequently his study is neither a study of British mentality or of perceptions of Ukraine and its leader, nor a study of an event or person in light of contemporary opinions.

During the period in question, leading thinkers were, of course, making an epistemological distinction between fact and interpretation. But lesser, "average" men in the literate elites were either unaware or unconcerned with such a division and did not think that facts and interpretation were different orders of reality. It was not believed that the assembling of facts would somehow lead to a proper interpretation. More important in the writing of accounts was the application of moral judgments, and the position taken in regard to treatment of material rested primarily on the writer's awareness of his responsibility to do justice to rival groups and conflicting aspirations. Such men realized judgments had to be made, and we today should realize their judgments were as good or as bad as their capacity for wise insight and human understanding. This being said, Prof. Mackiw's conclusion becomes rather vacuous. He asserts the English diplomats wrote about Mazepa in an "unbiased manner, merely giving the facts" (pp. 120, 124). If their reports were neutral and unbiased, how could they have been at the same time positive towards Mazepa?

An examination of the political and economic context of Russian-British relations, which Prof. Mackiw has omitted, leads to a markedly different understanding of why the British wrote as they did. After Peter I left London in 1698, economic relations between the two empires picked up remarkably. In the space of three years the volume of trade between them tripled; by 1733 it had increased fivefold. British ministers, fearing war with France over the Spanish succession, regarded Sweden as a potential political ally, and after the outbreak of the Great Northern War they did what they could to divert Karl's attention from eastern to western Europe. The Swedish king was not interested in this plan, but the British never lost hope. It was therefore in the British interest to mediate between Karl and Peter, and their policy towards Russia was basically friendly, at least until 1717, when it changed in reaction to the threat of rising Russian power. Against such a background it is curious why the British defended Mazepa if they had no particular interest in doing so. Prof. Mackiw writes that "the English diplomats carried out the instructions of their government and there is no reason to suspect that they could have had any particular interest in defending or sending reports favourable to Mazepa; therefore their reports about him are to be trusted and considered a valuable historical source" (p. 126). Is the

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author saying that if the British did have such interests their reports would be less valuable? Cannot opinion that is committed be balanced and judicious?

Prof. Mackiw fails to point out to the reader that by Mazepa's time the popular British image of Russia, if not of all of eastern Europe, was basically hostile. The author cites from one work by Daniel Defoe written in 1715 as an example of a negative attitude towards the hetman. But this statement hangs in space, for Prof. Mackiw does not deal with any of the satirist's other writings. In *The Dyet of Poland, a Satyr*, written in 1705, Defoe made remarks that reflected his feelings not only about the country in question but also about the rest of that part of Europe: "The World's Proboscis, near the Globe's extremes / For Barb'rous men renowned, and barb'rous names." Writing on the Battle of Poltava in *Review of the State of the British Nation*, Defoe expressed amazement at the Russian victory: "An Army of the bravest fellows in the World beaten by scoundrels, old Alms-Women or any Thing what you may please to call them." In light of these statements, how are we to understand Defoe's remarks about Mazepa? More generally, might it not have been the case that a more or less sympathetic attitude towards the Cossack hetman stemmed from British dislike or disdain of the Russians rather than any "objectivity" on the part of the cited authors? Mackiw fails to examine these questions, and his book is much the weaker for it.

In conclusion, it is regrettable, especially in light of his subject, that the author included all the British men he dealt with under the term "English." Patrick Gordon, for one, might have objected.

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IVO BANAC AND PAUL BUSHKOVITCH, EDS., *THE NOBILITY IN RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE*. Yale Russian and East European Publications. New Haven: Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies, 1983. 221 pp. Distributed by Slavica Publishers, P.O. Box 14388, Columbus OH 43214.

This volume of essays, intended to spark interest in the role of the nobility in modern East European history, contains nine contributions. There is one on the Ukrainian elite and five on nobilities that owned Ukrainian serfs (two each on the Polish and Russian nobilities; one on the Hungarian nobility). An essay on the Croatian nobility and an introduction by the editors complete the contents.

Zenon E. Kohut's study of the Ukrainian elite in the eighteenth century and its integration into the Russian nobility is one of several solid

pieces of scholarship in the book. He demonstrates what a powerful impact the Polish political tradition had exerted on the Cossack officer class, the elite of the Hetmanate, and how its Commonwealth-inspired views led to conflict with the patrimonial Russian state. The conflict was resolved by a compromise struck in the reign of Catherine II. The Russian imperial government satisfied the social demands of the Ukrainian elite by legally enserfing the Left-Bank peasantry in 1783 and recognizing the legitimacy of Ukrainian nobles. But for its part the Ukrainian nobility was compelled to abandon its political programme and acquiesce to the total abolition of Hetmanate institutions and vestiges of autonomy. Kohut carries his story into the early nineteenth century, when the Ukrainian nobility and the Russian state engaged in a tug-of-war over the legitimacy of nearly half of the Ukrainian nobles.

Andrzej Kamiński's essay on the *szlachta* of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth tries to show that the concept of "magnates" is imprecise, if not artificial, and that their role in Polish history has been greatly inflated in the historiography. This is a revisionist essay that really demands a book to do justice to the argument suggested. Kamiński also deals with other problems of differentiation within the Polish nobility, including the political leanings of various strata of the nobility and regional, including Ukrainian, specificities. On the latter point he states that "until 1648, the predominant political system in the Ukraine was a *de facto* oligarchy. Moreover, as distinct from Lithuania, the power of the aristocrats in the Ukraine was challenged mainly by the mass of militarily organized Cossacks, not (as elsewhere in the Commonwealth) by the county nobility" (p. 31).

Wiktor Weintraub contributes a slight, but rather interesting, essay on the noble as hero and villain in Polish Romantic literature. He concludes that there was a paradox pervading the literature: "the apotheosis of old gentry, their ethos and mores, by people who considered themselves to be social revolutionaries and dreamed of a future Poland that would radically break with the past and wipe out gentry privileges" (p. 62). The same paradox permeated Polish revolutionary activity in the 1840s.

Marc Raeff, in his comparison of the nobilities of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Russia, is the only author in the volume to touch on aspects of noble life-styles. His contribution is one of those broadly comparative, wide-ranging essays that contain no specific references to sources or literature but closes with a concise bibliographical survey. The major thesis advanced by Raeff is that the Russian nobility's enforced subservience to the state made it insecure.

Terence Emmons, by contrast, draws on a massive amount of empirical evidence to refine traditional views of noble participation in the Kadet and Octobrist parties before the revolution.

Istvan Deak's essay on the Hungarian nobles during the 1848 revolution argues that they, especially the very active middle gentry, were "progressive feudalists," with the emphasis on "progressive." Much the same view was held by Marx and Engels, but Marxists of the so-called "nonhistorical nations," such as the Ukrainian Roman Rozdolsky, have accentuated the "feudalist" part. Deak brings no new facts or conceptions into the literature with this essay.

One of the finest contributions to the volume is Mirjana Gross's thorough study of the fusion of the nobility and bourgeoisie in northern Croatia at the turn of the century. The questions she asks and the methods and types of sources she employs would be useful to adopt for regional studies of the nobility in Ukraine. Her central problem, on the relationship of an old and new elite, might be most applicable to the Sloboda region and southern steppe, but many of the subsidiary themes she investigates would find wider application.

The introduction to the volume by Ivo Banac and Paul Bushkovitch is an attempt to link up all the essays in the volume into a common problematic. In offering a justification for the appearance of this book, the introduction makes some good points. Viewing the history of modern Europe as the age of the bourgeoisie is, as the authors say, to overlook the entire east of the continent, where "throughout nearly all of the modern age the bourgeoisie took a second place to the nobility" (p. 1). The editors are also right that the scholarship on the East European nobility per se is disproportionately meager when viewed against the magnitude of its political, socioeconomic, and cultural significance.

The Nobility in Russia and Eastern Europe can serve to awaken interest in and to suggest ways of exploring the role of the traditional elites in Eastern Europe. Together with other recent publications on the nobility, such as Irena Rychlikowa's *Ziemiaństwo polskie 1789-1864: Zróżnicowanie społeczne* (Warsaw, 1983) and Frank Sysyn's contribution to *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, it may encourage Ukrainian social historians to examine Ukraine's long-term ruling class, even though it was largely non-Ukrainian by nationality. When and if that happens, I suspect that noble history will look a bit different than it does in the Banac-Bushkovitch volume, where—with a single exception (Emmons)—the national nobilities are examined by scholars of the same nationality and where the whole noble-peasant nexus is conspicuously absent. An analysis of the nobility, and not just the short-lived and numerically small Ukrainian nobility, within the context of Ukrainian history would surely identify the nobles' contempt for and oppression of the peasants as essential components of the nobility's psychological make-up and socioeconomic role.

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ANDREI S. MARKOVITS AND FRANK E. SYSYN, EDS., *NATION-BUILDING AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONALISM: ESSAYS ON AUSTRIAN GALICIA*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1982. viii, 343 pp. Distributed by Harvard University Press.

The essays in this volume describe a period and subject that seem innately familiar but on which there have been few studies published in English. The particular problem proposed by the title *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism* is, of course, the crucial one for all the peoples of Eastern Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century. Yet the tendency of much writing on the growth of nationalism and the formation of nations has been to show a simple division between East and West. The often-quoted Hans Kohn expressed the idea that has passed into conventional wisdom: "In Western Europe modern nationalism was the work of statesmen and political leaders. . . . In Central and Eastern Europe it was the poet, the philologist and the historian who created the nationalities." This case study of Austrian Galicia, focusing on the Ukrainian population, shows that there was much more to it than that.

The terms "nationbuilding" and "nationalism" require close scrutiny in their application. The population of Austrian Galicia, a fifth of the Habsburg Empire, was divided between Ukrainians and Poles (50 percent and 41 percent in 1854), with the Jews as a majority of the rest. Each national group underwent different experiences on the path towards nationbuilding. The Poles, who were dominant in the towns, among the landowners, and in the territories west of the San River, had a clear sense of their historical identity. The urbanized Jews went through a period of assimilation by the stronger Polish cultural milieu before developing a distinctly Jewish ideology. The Ukrainians, inhabitants of the rural areas of eastern Galicia, subsumed a variety of conflicting ideas about their identity under the term "Ruthenian" until late in the century. They had no wish to form a nation-state, nor did they take active steps to become part of the same political configuration as their conationals across the border. In this period, before the idea of self-determination had become widely accepted, the nature of the politics of nationalism in Eastern Europe often needs separate qualifications.

Aware of the problems of this area, the editors have brought together a thoughtful selection of essays. The volume includes four papers given at a conference sponsored by the Ukrainian Research Institute and the Soviet and East European Language Center at Harvard University on "Austria-Hungary, 1867-1918," four previously published articles, and three essays, including the introduction, written for the volume. Each author takes an aspect of the history of Austrian Galicia to illustrate the complexities of the nationbuilding process.

In his general introduction, "Empire and Province," Andrei Markovits introduces a new approach to this period in his attempt to apply the vocabulary of political scientists to explain the phenomenon of nationalism in nineteenth-century Austria. While this approach is useful for comparisons, a standard historical approach is usually the better starting point for study. Ivan L. Rudnytsky's encyclopedic essay on "The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule" has remained one of the most comprehensive works on the subject since it was first published in 1967. It covers the period between 1772 and 1914 and outlines the issues that were important in turning eastern Galicia into the "Ukrainian piedmont": the resolution of the language question, the growth in cultural life, and the formation of Ukrainian political parties.

Peter Brock's previously published article on "Ivan Vahylevych (1811-1866) and the Ukrainian National Identity" describes some early deliberations on the nature and significance of nationality when the social and economic changes of the 1840s had only just made important the need for self-identification. Vahylevych's interest in language and folk culture was a typical starting point for many nineteenth-century scholars who were concerned about nationality. The exclusively cultural activities took on political inclinations in the society a decade or so later, when the language question became the single most important issue in defining the identity of the people. The choice of alphabet and the debate on the origins of the language split the Ukrainian Galician intelligentsia into factions of Russophiles and Ukrainophiles. Paul R. Magocsi deftly picks through the vicissitudes of the language debate in his "The Language Question as a Factor in the National Movement in Eastern Galicia" to explain the transition from Ruthenian to Ukrainian by the turn of the century.

John-Paul Himka's discussion of "Voluntary Artisan Associations and the Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia (the 1870s)" shows the structural aspects of nationbuilding in the rural society of Ukrainian Galicia. Away from the linguistic preoccupation of the intelligentsia, the pervasive influence of the church remained the main focus for loyalty and also the obstacle to the formation of any successful secular organization of the people until late in the period. The subject of Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak's study "Natalia Kobryns'ka: A Formulator of Feminism" found similar prejudices in the society when she proposed that feminist, social, economic, and national concerns were interrelated and interdependent. Leonid Rudnytsky investigates "The Image of Austria in the Works of Ivan Franko." Paul R. Magocsi's valuable "Bibliographic Guide to the History of Ukrainians in Galicia: 1848-1918" concludes the collection of essays on the Ukrainians and provides over three hundred references for following up any questions remaining on the subject.

The Jewish response to the growing need for self-identification developed in the hybrid cultural environment of urban Galicia. Ezra Men-

delsohn's "Jewish Assimilation in L'viv: The Case of Wilhelm Feldman" shows the conflicts in Jewish society between assimilationist tendencies and the emergence of Zionism through the observations of an author and publicist. By the turn of the century, reform of Austria's constitutional system brought more of the national groups into the political arena. Leila P. Everett's "The Rise of Jewish National Politics in Galicia, 1905-1907" describes the interest of the Jewish population at this time. Piotr Wandycz's previously published "The Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy" gives a comprehensive account of the third national group between 1848 and 1914.

This volume is part of the steady flow of publications in Ukrainian studies in the genre of collected conference papers. This trend might be worrying if it were not for the books promised and recently published by some of the authors here. As a contribution to Ukrainian history, it brings to attention also the lack of similar studies on Dnieper Ukraine, although we understand the difficulties in gaining access to archival materials there. Nevertheless, as it stands, this volume contains some well-written and appropriately selected essays that make it a key reference book for the period and an admirable addition to the growing stock of English-language textbooks on Ukrainian history.

Nadia Diuk
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MICHAEL H. MARUNCHAK, *THE UKRAINIAN CANADIANS: A HISTORY*, 2d rev. edn. Winnipeg: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Canada, 1982. 970 pp.

This volume represents an enlarged version of Marunchak's 1970 magnum opus on Ukrainians in Canada. It takes the Ukrainian experience to 1981, adding approximately ten years to the chronology and 150 pages to the script. Aside from a long list of corrigenda, the original text is intact.

The supplement falls under the general rubric of "Decade of Multiculturalism." In an introductory chapter to this section, Marunchak strongly endorses the concept of multiculturalism as a national policy and "the basic principle of Canadian identity." This echoes the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and official Federal policy as proclaimed by P. E. Trudeau in 1971. Accordingly, the author states that the principle of a multilingual and multicultural Canada should have been embodied firmly in the new constitution (p. 728). Sadly, however, such was not the case. He notes, for example, that despite vigorous Ukrainian representation aimed at ensuring that the official Languages Act "recognize all languages rooted in Canada as Canadian languages" and not merely as languages to be tolerated beside English and French, the fathers of the new constitution chose

to be rather mute on the subject. Instead, the parts pertaining to multiculturalism were diluted within the section encompassing heritage languages in particular, making them "complicated and imperceptible." Marunchak concludes "It is quite obvious that the struggle for ethnocultural organization to assert a dignified position in Canada is still ahead" (p. 730).

The above observation is well taken and provides the framework for Marunchak's new chapters surveying Ukrainian life in Canada during the last ten years. He performs a credible job of delineating the expansion of Ukrainian studies, the teaching of the Ukrainian language in schools, Ukrainians in the literary and performing arts, Ukrainian professional, social, and religious societies, Ukrainian-Canadian historiography, and the "integration process" evident in Canada.

One could, of course, argue with Marunchak's interpretations and biases, but that would be counterproductive. These have been commented on in the past. The work should be recognized for what it really is: an information-rich tome, encyclopedic in coverage, to be used as a valuable reference source. For this the author should be applauded.

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IOSIF G. DYADKIN, *UNNATURAL DEATHS IN THE USSR, 1928-1954*. Edited and with an introduction and commentary by Nick Eberstadt. New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction Books, 1983. viii, 63 pp.

Iosif Dyadkin's book is devoted to one of the most painful questions in Soviet history: the assessment of population losses during the terrible Stalin period. It is very significant that both in the USSR (in the underground) and in the West the number of works on this problem is constantly growing. People want to know the cost of the conducted experiment, to understand the dimensions of the perfect crime. They want to know in order to prevent it from ever being repeated.

As important as this growing interest in the problem may be, no less important is the Soviet authorities' reaction. Dyadkin, a learned geophysicist, completed his demographic study independently, outside the framework of any Soviet institution. His work turned out to be so dangerous to the authorities that he was arrested and sentenced to three years in labor camps. The very desire to research the demographic consequences of past historical events appears to be considered a crime by the Soviet authorities.

And it is understandable why. Only by keeping secret from its own people and the entire world the real cost of the accomplished transformations can the leaders of the country continue to repeat the hackneyed clichés about the great achievements and advanced system.

They even try to conceal this unpleasant truth from each other. In the Soviet Union research of the population losses in the period of collectivization or the [Stalinist] repressions has not been undertaken. Not even one serious scholarly study has been dedicated to the losses of the Second World War. Only one figure has been repeated from one book to the next: that of twenty million, cited at one time by Khrushchev. Why twenty million, and not ten or thirty? Although almost twenty years have passed since this unexpected revelation, no scientific substantiation of it has appeared.

Dyadkin's work is the natural reaction of a thinking individual who has collided with obvious falsehood and concealment. The author took demographic data available to him and, having analyzed them, showed that the conclusions reached by official Soviet demographers are falsified and cannot withstand a confrontation with a basically sound mind. This is one of the most important merits of Dyadkin's work.

A second merit is the attempt to assess the real population losses—the number of people who died before their time. The point is that some researchers in the West, primarily Russian emigrants, view the losses as a decline in the rate of population growth. In this case the reduction of the birthrate is markedly higher than the individual losses from the repressions. The demographer I. Kurganov came up in this manner with a “loss” of 110.7 million people. Such an approach does not lead to a realistic assessment of the regime's crimes, but rather to their concealment: “losses” of this type have occurred in all European countries, and such “losses” in the United States have exceeded 100 million people in the twentieth century.

It is good to see that Dyadkin does not base himself on this facile means of obtaining larger figures, but that he tries to utilize realistic information about the population's births and deaths. However, the absence in official Soviet publications of data for the major periods of 1932-37 and 1941-49 has impeded his research and considerably diminished the reliability of the achieved results. Lacking information, the author has had to resort to interpolations of adjacent time intervals, which are not always sufficiently justified. Among the not too cautious assumptions he makes one can include the acceptance of the average population growth in the 1929-36 period on a par with 1927-28 and 1937. It is known, however, that after 1928 a noticeable decline in the birthrate occurred, and that in 1937 it again rose unevenly as a result of the prohibition of abortions. The attempt to apply an exponential equation to the changes in mortality for the entire period of 1913-50 is hardly justified. Thrice during these years demographic catastrophes occurred, considerably altering the population structure and thus its mortality. A sharp increase [in life expectancy] was caused by the use of antibiotics and sulfa drugs in the late 1940s. Therefore the hypothesis about the

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even decline in mortality throughout the entire period is demographically unsubstantiated.

Several remarks of a technical nature could also be made, but they are not very important.

The basic merit of this work is not the figures that have been obtained, but the formulation of the problem, the selection of the correct way of solving it. Specifically, the author correctly places great importance on the preponderance of females and makes many interesting observations regarding its changes. In particular, his assessment of the excess of male losses over female losses in the 1926-39 period by 1.5 to 3.4 million is supported by quite detailed calculations.

The author has also quite successfully handled the complex problem of determining the birthrate. His slight underestimation of it must be considered one of the virtues of the work, because it does not lead to an exaggeration of the losses by a false assessment of this indicator. I am pleased to be able to point out that for the 1929-36 period Dyadkin obtained a summary birthrate that is quite similar to F. Lorimer's data, which were based on more solid demographic sources—prewar publications of the 1939 census.

Thus, although it has not answered the question raised in it, Dyadkin's work is an important step in the right direction. One would like to believe that the author will soon be able to return to it.

Nick Eberstadt's contributions to the book deserve a separate comment. His remarks, emendations, and references to Western sources, which, naturally, are unknown to the author, give this work greater validity and significance. The materials cited by Eberstadt about population losses in other countries (estimates of the number of Jews destroyed by the Nazis, of the consequences of the Chinese Cultural Revolution) are very relevant. Such parallels place the phenomenon examined by Dyadkin in the context of the repressions by totalitarian regimes of its subjects.

As for misprints, the only important one is found on p. 41: there the losses in 1926 are stated to be 0.6 million instead of 0.06 million.

Maksudov

[Translated from the Russian by Roman Senkus]

DAVID LANE, *THE END OF SOCIAL INEQUALITY? CLASS, STATUS AND POWER UNDER STATE SOCIALISM*. London, Boston, and Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1982. x, 176 pp.

This book is an updated and expanded version of the author's earlier work, *The End of Inequality? Stratification under State Socialism* (Penguin, 1971). The first chapter, which describes the impact of Marxism

in Russia before 1917 and the evolution of Soviet ideology since the revolution, and the second, which reviews the analyses of Soviet development offered by contemporary Soviet sociologists, are largely unchanged from those in the first edition. The final chapter, which provides a very useful review of the most popular models used by Western scholars and Eastern European critics of the USSR has been considerably expanded and improved upon. Discussion of recent works by Konrad and Szelenyi, Hillel Ticktin, and Jerry Hough has been effectively integrated into sections from the first edition examining older interpretations offered by Trotsky, Kuroń and Modzelewski, Brzezinski, and others. The middle two chapters, dealing with the forms, dynamics, and consequences of stratification in the Soviet Union, have been updated with more recent statistics and data, although Lane's conclusions remain largely the same as before.

Very simply, Lane's major thesis is that the Soviet system today is best characterized as "state socialism." In his view, it is not a traditional capitalist system nor is it a fully socialist one; rather, state socialism represents a transitional phase from the former to the latter, combining elements found in both systems. This type of organization was largely the result of Russia's backwardness in 1917 and the fact that early Bolshevik programmes were designed to modernize and develop the USSR's economic and material base as quickly as possible. From the outset it was necessary for the state and the Communist party to perform functions normally associated with the bourgeoisie in capitalist societies.

In many respects this interpretation, as Lane himself notes, is similar to the one offered by such Marxist critics as Tony Cliff, Milovan Djilas, and Jacek Kuroń. There are, however, some crucial differences that Lane points out, differences that revolve around the issue of change and the dynamics of Soviet development. Cliff, Djilas, and others argue that the Soviet elite has in fact developed into a ruling class not unlike the bourgeoisie under capitalism. As a group they not only enjoy a higher standard of living, but they also control political and economic decision-making, and, through their monopoly over ideology and culture, society as a whole. Furthermore, these analyses try to show that the elite is actually conscious of itself as a class, that Soviet leaders act in their own class interest, that they successfully appropriate surpluses from the economy to support their own position and the given social order, and that they are able to pass their favored status on to their sons and daughters. As opposed to the characterization of the USSR as a system of state socialism, these writers tend to refer to it as state capitalism—a concept that obviously implies something very different.

A large part of Lane's book is intended to disprove these arguments. For example, in studying income and consumption differentials, Lane uses statistics to show that inequalities are not only much smaller than

they are in the capitalist West, but that they are also declining in size and importance. Moreover, those inequalities that do persist are again primarily due to historical backwardness and the necessities of the industrialization drive. Lane believes that differences between town and country, manual and nonmanual occupations, regions, ethnic groups, and men and women are all being overcome by Soviet development. Implicit throughout the book is the contention that as the USSR grows in wealth it will establish the material basis for a truly egalitarian society. Meanwhile, the current elite will not be able to perpetuate existing inequalities. This is guaranteed not only by laws limiting the inheritance of wealth and position, but also by the overall thrust of Soviet development and ideology. In Lane's description, upward social mobility has been a pervasive feature of the Soviet period, allowing women, national minorities, peasants, and workers to take advantage of many opportunities for advancement. These groups have been able to gain higher education, party membership, better jobs, and finally access to political power, and there is little to indicate that this trend will stop in the near future.

Students of Soviet society will find much of this book to be very useful. Lane's summary of the models used in Sovietology is concise and mostly accurate. Moreover, the statistics and data—presented in various charts and tables—are interesting and illuminating, even in cases where the reader does not agree with the author's interpretation. At the same time, however, it is necessary to enter some major criticisms of the book's overall form and organization. What is particularly disappointing is Lane's unwillingness or inability to decide whether he is writing a book specifically on the USSR, or on "state socialism" as a general phenomenon. While everyone studying the USSR is frustrated by the paucity of sources and information, this reviewer is not convinced that almost random inclusion of data from other socialist countries is a positive solution to the problem. Despite obvious similarities between these countries, the differences in historical and social development between, say, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union are much too great to be glossed over in the way Lane does. Tables referring to Poland and Hungary (pp. 64 and 71) are not even labelled as such, further increasing the reader's confusion. Perhaps sociologists should search other sources—more general political works, or even contemporary Soviet literature—to supplement their meager data base.

Beyond such methodological criticisms, there are other aspects of this book that are contentious, particularly the constantly repeated point that existing inequalities are all inherited from the past or unavoidable in periods of industrialization, and not the result of conscious policies. One way to disprove this is to consider the position and role of women in the USSR. As Lane shows, Soviet women endure a difficult burden: not only do almost all hold regular jobs, but they also spend a great deal

more of their free time doing housework, raising children, and preparing food (as much as twice the time spent by their husbands, p. 79). While it is true that their emancipation could be accomplished through a radical change in men's consciousness and the equal division of such responsibilities, this is not happening, nor is it likely to occur in the foreseeable future. Clearly, however, this could be accomplished by a change in the regime's priorities. The production of consumer goods such as washing machines, vacuum cleaners, dishwashers, and prepared foods—all of which are extremely rare today—would undoubtedly free women from their domestic tasks and set the stage for their ultimate equality as it has done in the West. Until this "technological revolution" takes place, women are caught in a never-ending cycle in which their domestic obligations prevent them from completing extra courses, upgrading their skills, or becoming involved in party work and committees—the necessary preconditions for advancement in the Soviet Union. This is a simple example of how the regime's priorities—favoring heavy industry, producer goods, armaments, and a certain style of economic growth—directly encourage inequalities.

It is Lane's treatment of the national question that will probably provoke the greatest criticism from readers of this journal. He begins this short section by uncritically restating Soviet pronouncements on nationalism and ethnicity in the USSR, namely, that the cultural uniqueness and identity of the various nationalities are being preserved and even fostered, while all forms of discrimination and chauvinism are being eliminated. Moreover, Lane accepts the official description of a *sovetskii narod* as being a supranational, multiethnic identity uniting the peoples of the USSR. He argues that Soviet industrial development strategies have greatly benefited many republics, even allowing the Central Asian ones to surpass such Third World counterparts as Colombia, India, and Iran and to rival France, Italy, and Japan in the 1960s (p. 86). At the same time he claims that educational opportunities for minorities have risen much quicker than those for Russians—aided in part by a "nationality quota system of positive discrimination which tries to ensure a fairer balance between the national groups than would be the case if qualifications alone were considered" (p. 88). Finally, he implies that there is little evidence to show that Russification is a powerful trend in the USSR, or that this is a conscious policy of the predominantly Russian elite.

Many of these arguments are questionable and even contradicted by evidence given in the book. For example, the argument about increasing educational opportunities for minorities and the existence of a "positive quota system" (something that, incidentally, is not supported by any references) is not substantiated by table 3.12, "Index of Student Composition by Nationality." The data here show a much more mixed picture regarding the national composition of the student body. From 1959 to

1974/5, for example, eight nationalities actually *decreased* in their relative proportion of students, while only three (Ukrainians, Kazakhs, and Tatars) increased and the Russians remained steady. Even the period 1965-74/5 shows no clear trend, as six nations decreased proportionally (including such traditionally disadvantaged groups as Turkmens and Azeris) and seven improved their relative standing (including the historically more advanced Russians and Jews). Similarly, Lane's statements regarding Russification can be challenged by his own data. On p. 89, after admitting that there are many forces favoring the Russian language and "a certain degree of assimilation to the Russian nationality," Lane writes:

It would be erroneous, however, to infer that the other languages of peoples in the USSR are in decline. Data collected in the censuses of 1979 and 1970 showed the following percentages of ethnic groups which considered their 'native language' to be the same as their national group: Ukrainians 82.8 per cent (85.7 per cent in 1970), Uzbeks 98.5 per cent (98.6 per cent), White Russians 74.2 per cent (80.6 per cent), Kazakhs 97.5 per cent (98 per cent), Tatars 85.9 per cent (89.2 per cent), Armenians 90.7 per cent (91.4 per cent), Georgians 98.3 per cent (98.4 per cent), Germans 57 per cent (66.8 per cent), Jews 14.2 per cent (17.7 per cent). (p. 89)

What is remarkable is that these figures in fact suggest that the non-Russian languages *are* in decline, albeit in many cases only slightly. The declines registered by Ukrainians, Belorussians, Germans, and Jews are quite substantial and, assuming that speaking Russian is more common among young people than the more traditional elderly, point to a strong trend towards the replacement of native languages by Russian.

This section of the book is also marred by a very selective choice of focus by Lane. While his arguments that the Central Asian region has greatly benefited under Soviet rule are quite convincing (although it seems a little absurd to suggest that Tadzhikistan should rightly be compared to France and Italy in terms of overall development), his unqualified conclusion that "while there may be unevenness in economic and social development between regions of the USSR, comparisons with developments in similar areas outside of the USSR invariably point to greater social and economic growth in the Soviet areas" (p. 86) can easily be disputed. Comparisons of the Baltic states and, to a lesser extent, Ukrainian areas acquired after 1939 with 'similar areas outside the USSR' actually point to the retarding effects of Soviet economic strategies and political organization. In the end a much more mixed conclusion is called for regarding the relative costs and benefits of Soviet rule to nationalities. Moreover, this mixed conclusion should be extended to include cultural and social questions as well. Readily available data on book publishing in Ukrainian, for example, often suggest much less "positive"

trends than Lane's conclusion that "the nationalities come into their own in many localities, where their cultural life thrives and where the indigenous national groups, especially if in a majority, enjoy considerable political and social rights. They have greatly gained from Soviet power" (p. 95).

What emerges perhaps most clearly from Lane's book is the extremely paradoxical and sometimes contradictory nature of Soviet rule and Soviet-style communism. On the one hand, the system is undeniably an effective one for the large-scale mobilization of resources and the rapid development of "backward" societies and economies. This is clearly demonstrated by the radical transformation of the Central Asian republics. At the same time, however, there is much to suggest that Soviet achievements in more developed areas are less impressive. This obviously raises very important questions for the future of the USSR. As the entire country reaches a "developed" stage, will Soviet rule increasingly become a brake on continued changes and growth, or will it retain its original dynamism? This is precisely the question economists have asked when they wonder whether the Soviet leadership will successfully manage the change from an extensive to an intensive economic strategy, with all that this implies for politics and society. Maybe the question "Is there a ruling class in the USSR?" will be answered by the configuration Soviet society takes as it emerges from this transition.

Boris Balan
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MANOLY R. LUPUL, ED., *A HERITAGE IN TRANSITION: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF UKRAINIANS IN CANADA*. Generations: A History of Canada's Peoples. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1982. viii, 344 pp.

A Heritage in Transition is the best overview of Ukrainian-Canadian history published to date. It deals with a broad range of topics in a solid, academic manner, and the reader can quickly recognize that this work is qualitatively better than many of the others that have preceded it. It is an invaluable resource book, and it will likely find a place in a large number of public and private libraries.

The essays in total provide a good introduction to many of the major themes in Ukrainian-Canadian history: the Old Country background, settlement, economic activity, political activity, religion, community organization, education, the press, fine arts, literature, and historiography. Although one usually hesitates to point to outstanding efforts in a compilation of this sort, it would probably be safe to say that the first four essays in the book are perhaps the strongest. It is pleasing to note that the other essays in this compilation are invariably of fairly high caliber.

Notwithstanding such well-deserved praise, we must recognize that this work has two shortcomings: it could be more cohesive and it is not completely balanced in its coverage of themes. The matter of cohesion is noted by the editor, Manoly Lupul, in his introduction, when he states outrightly that these essays "have no central theme." Moreover, there is much variation in focus and style among the individual essays, an inevitability when one is dealing with a host of authors and topics. This latter matter has been muted somewhat by a very good and thorough job of stylistic editing.

The emphasis of these essays as a whole is obviously on the first (and, to a lesser degree, the second) wave of Ukrainian settlers, the mainstream community organizations they founded, and their general undertakings, with a geographical focus on the three Prairie provinces. While this reflects the historic experiences of the majority of Ukrainian Canadians, it nevertheless leaves some obvious gaps: eastern Canada, northern Ontario, the DP experience, and the pro-Soviet Left. The editor notes these and other limitations in terms of the book's scope and provides an extensive list of themes requiring additional study, alerting the reader to the fact that this is not the final word on the subject. It is hoped that future research will address these matters in a substantial way.

Ultimately, it may actually have been better to have had this book written by a single author. A look at two other works in the "Generations: A History of Canada's Peoples" series sponsored by the Multiculturalism Directorate of the Department of the Secretary of State (of which this is the Ukrainian contribution) clearly underlines the value of this approach. These are *A Member of a Distinguished Family: The Polish Group in Canada*, coauthored by Henry Radecki and Benedykt Heydenkorn, and *For a Better Life: A History of the Croats in Canada* by Anthony Rasporich. The former demonstrates that the topical approach used in *A Heritage in Transition* can be done in a more integrated manner with a consolidated authorship, while the latter (which is generally considered as perhaps the finest work of the "Generations" series to date) proceeds chronologically and reads exceedingly well. The quality of the research in specific areas may not have been as strong with this approach, but the finished product would probably have been more readily comprehensible.

At this time, with the publication of *A Heritage in Transition* behind us, the question of how it might have otherwise been structured is a moot point. The most significant fact about this work is perhaps, as Myrna Kostash noted in a review for the *Edmonton Journal*, that "at last" a reliable source book of this type is available. It is indeed a significant achievement.

Andrij Makuch
Saskatoon

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A TABLE OF TRANSLITERATION (Modified Library of Congress)

а — a	ĩ — i	ф — f
б — b	й — i	х — kh
в — v	к — k	ц — ts
г — h	л — l	ч — ch
г' — g	м — m	ш — sh
д — d	н — n	щ — shch
е — e	о — o	ю — iu
є — ie	п — p	я — ia
ж — zh	р — r	ь — -
з — z	с — s	-ий — y in endings
и — y	т — t	of personal
і — i	у — u	names only

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